Nowhere are the stakes higher than in the Asia-Pacific. The region may appear more stable compared to Europe or the Middle East, but it is anything but placid: a rising China is pressing for greater influence in a region where American primacy—and that of its allies—once went largely unchallenged.
Washington and several U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific criticized the “irresponsible” test. Still, the episode reinforced allies’ longstanding concerns about the effectiveness and reliability of the U.S. security guarantees to deter an ever more powerful China. What are American allies and partners supposed to do about it? The answers vary across the region, but every answer points toward a stronger American role.
Nearly every Asian capital has by now grown less certain that Washington will honor those commitments if put to the test. And while Trump does not tend to rant against Asian allies as he does against NATO partners, this offers little comfort to Asian capitals. Some read it as a sign that Washington doesn’t care enough even to get worked up over them. These anxieties are magnified by other changes, even subtle ones. Many worry that the Trump Administration may pivot away from the region, given its prioritization of U.S. homeland security and the Western Hemisphere. The Pentagon’s decision to rename the Indo-Pacific Command by dropping “Indo” further signals a pivot away from the region.
This strategy of arming up while working hard to keep the U.S. close is not new. A series of reports by the International Crisis Group on military modernization across the region traces how some of Washington’s Asian allies and partners have been following a similar playbook for several years now. Only now, they have stronger incentives.
The rearmament effort predates Trump’s second term, but pressure from Washington has only added momentum. Tokyo’s purchase of Tomahawk missiles from the U.S., along with the new indigenous long-range munitions it is producing, would still rely on U.S. targeting data to be used effectively.
South Korea has vowed to increase its defense spending from 2.3% of its GDP to as much as 3.6% and has earned praise from Washington as a “model ally.” Seoul’s contribution runs through its factories. It has become one of the world's largest arms exporters, with its tanks and howitzers topping up the European stocks that the war in Ukraine has emptied. Those sales fund Seoul’s own defense modernization and serve as a source of global influence, though the government shows relatively little appetite for a wider regional diplomatic role.
Australia, having made its largest-ever defense investment on nuclear-propelled submarines through the AUKUS (Australia–U.K.–U.S.) partnership established in 2021, continues to bet on getting closer to the U.S. rather than becoming more independent of it. Canberra recognizes that Washington is recalibrating its commitments to its allies, but it sees no substitute for American military support. To become a more capable partner, Australia has pledged to raise its defense spending from 2% of GDP at the moment to 3% by the mid-2030s; expand production lines for its own guided weapons; and allow the U.S. to build a war-ready weapons store on its east coast, out of range of Chinese missiles, and to invest in naval facilities capable of servicing nuclear submarines of allied forces.
The Philippines has a smaller defense budget, as a share of its economy, than almost any other American ally in Asia. The country lacks the industrial base to build significant productive capacity. So Manila draws on its strategic position, its geographical proximity to Taiwan and the Chinese mainland—a fact even Trump recognized in his particular manner, describing the Philippines as "the most prime piece of real estate from a military standpoint."
No plan but America
Even though every Asian ally is handling American unpredictability in its own way, guided by its own security contexts and domestic politics, their strategies have certain things in common. They are all reaching out to build stronger connections among other “spokes,” and beyond, with outside partners like Europe. The clearest evidence of this is that Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand have now become regular participants of the NATO summits, despite not being members.
For America’s Asian allies, continued U.S. presence in the region remains the most effective deterrent against what they see as the threat of Chinese hegemony. They see the investments they are making in higher defense budgets, weapons factories, and the careful management of Trump’s moods as the price of keeping this tool within reach.
Strategic autonomy may be a popular idea, but for now, most of the America’s Asian allies see it as a distant prospect, whereas the threats they need to deter are clear and present. And so the question of whether to keep making these investments may not be much of a dilemma after all.
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