There is a widespread view in the Western media that Vladimir Putin’s position has weakened considerably over the past few months and that he is losing the war in Ukraine. But in reality, this is not quite the case.
Right now there are, in effect, three wars: 1) the war on the battlefield itself; 2) long-range strikes against each side’s territory; and 3) the information war. Of these, the Kremlin is clearly losing only the information war in the West. On the battlefield, Russian forces continue to advance, albeit slowly and painfully. And for all the damage that Ukrainian long-range strikes have inflicted on Russia’s oil refining and transport infrastructure, Russia’s strikes have been no less — and probably more — painful for Ukraine. It is no coincidence that Kyiv has proposed a mutual halt to such attacks.
How accurate is the information on which Putin bases his decisions about the war? My impression is that, allowing for both the “fog of war” and the information warfare being waged by both sides, it is fairly accurate.
I’ve been observing the Kremlin for decades, formerly as an adviser to the Russian parliament, government and presidency in the era of Boris Yeltsin. Today, judging from my own work and the assessments of colleagues, including those in Russia, as well as from Putin’s own actions, he appears to scrutinise significant information carefully, receiving reports from competing intelligence and security agencies and communicating directly with military officers at different levels.
One of the reported purposes of the visit by the CIA director John Ratcliffe to Moscow last month was to convey to the Kremlin information about the real state of affairs on the battlefield. Perhaps in response, Putin recently did something unusual during a summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Before describing Russia’s military successes, he explained where his information came from: “The information I receive comes from different sources, practically from all the command bodies of the special services and our agencies that are involved, in one way or another, in the special military operation. So the picture that emerges — for me, at least — is sufficiently objective.”
War fatigue is accumulating among the Russian public. But insofar as this produces irritation with the Kremlin, it tends to be irritation at its insufficient effectiveness and decisiveness. Such sentiments are therefore more likely to push Putin towards intensifying the war than to restrain him.
A recent Levada Centre poll shows that support for the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine remains high and, after declining slightly in recent months, actually edged up in August, to 68 per cent. Only one respondent in five says they do not support the actions of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine.
Since the beginning of the year, the share of Russians favouring peace negotiations has been falling, while the share supporting continued military action has been rising. The ratio between the two groups is currently roughly two to one — 59 per cent versus 31 per cent — but it is important to understand that a large proportion of these conditional “doves” favour peace on Russia’s terms. More than half of respondents (55 per cent) believe the fighting in Ukraine will continue for more than another year — the highest figure recorded since polling began. At the same time, as many as 30 per cent of Russians consider the use of nuclear weapons by Russia acceptable.
Putin appears to be waiting for Ukraine’s resources to become depleted by or during the winter, partly as a result of Russian strikes on its energy and transport infrastructure. Meanwhile, his approval ratings are declining, albeit slowly, as frustration among both the public and the elites over the lack of visible success in the war is growing. Problems in the Russian economy, including in the financial sphere, are mounting as well.
The aftermath of a Ukrainian drone strike in St Petersburg in June. Kyiv has managed to degrade Russian transport and energy capabilities by several long-range attacks this year (Photo: AP)I believe that as we emerge from the winter, unless there has been a decisive change on the battlefield, we are likely to see an escalation by the Kremlin. This could take the form of a serious provocation against a Nato country — for example, a missile strike on a factory or warehouse supplying weapons to Ukraine.
It could also be a nuclear threat more credible than anything we have seen so far, perhaps even the actual use of a nuclear weapon. Such an escalation might start with preparations for and the resumption of nuclear testing. It is important to understand that neither Putin nor Russia’s establishment experts who publicly advocate such ideas appear to regard the use of nuclear weapons as taboo. What matters instead is calculation of the potential costs and benefits — and at some point that calculation could tilt towards the perceived benefits.
As for mass mobilisation immediately after the 18–20 September State Duma elections, I do not believe it will happen. This is not only because it would be politically costly – hundreds of thousands of Russians fled the country in response to a previous mobilisation in September 2022 – but also because, given the way the military now operates, it does not yet need it. Over four years, the system has learnt to maintain a steady flow of manpower through contract recruitment and volunteers, while increasingly targeting people with the specific skills it needs — for example, specialists for the unmanned systems forces. Year-round conscription further expands the military’s ability to select personnel and train reserves. The 2022 decree on partial mobilisation has never been rescinded, and the legal framework for mobilisation remains in force. But instead of another mass campaign on the model of autumn 2022, the military’s manpower requirements are for now being met through a permanent system of recruitment that is much more targeted and spread out over time.
Putin is a wartime president who exercises not merely the powers of commander-in-chief but, in effect, those of a wartime dictator. He has no incentive to end the war and revert to being simply the elected leader of the country. On the contrary, ending the war would confront him with a host of socioeconomic and political problems — from the return of hundreds of thousands of people accustomed to killing and with access to weapons, to the need to explain to the nation what the bloodshed, all the sacrifices and the results achieved were ultimately for. As long as Putin remains in power, Russia’s increasingly hostile confrontation with the West may change in form and intensity, but it will never end.
Nikolai Petrov is senior research fellow, head of analysis of transformation processes at the New Eurasian Strategies Centre (Nest)
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