Croatia have reached at least the semi-finals of the past two FIFA World Cups. But as they cling to the end of a ‘golden generation’, are they holding themselves back in the process?
Croatia‘s past two World Cups have arguably challenged some of football’s universally accepted truths. In an era defined by intensity, pressing and transition, the Vatreni reached a World Cup final and then another semi-final behind a midfield that controlled rather than overwhelmed.
A team and footballing nation that traditionally merged craft and guile, they were and remain different.
In 2018, Croatia came close to being crowned world champions. They entered half-time 2-1 down in the final despite France registering just a solitary shot: Antoine Griezmann’s 38th-minute penalty. Les Bleus went on to win 4-2, denying Croatia a famous win.
Yet few expected Croatia to make another semi-final four years later in Qatar, particularly after a disappointing Euro 2020 campaign. The football remained possession-heavy, but unlike the fluidity of Russia, it had become increasingly attritional.
That’s been followed by a group-stage exit at a 24-team Euro 2024, recurring questions over generational transition, and Zlatko Dalić switching formations twice in the final international windows of the two-year cycle.
Going into the 2026 World Cup, there are more questions than answers.
Why the Formation Changes?
Throughout the UEFA Nations League and World Cup qualifying campaigns in this cycle, Dalić has shifted between three- and four-man defensive setups.
In March friendlies against Colombia and Brazil, and then against Belgium in this month’s dress rehearsal, Croatia went with a 3-4-3, only to switch back to a 4-2-3-1 for their final friendly against Slovenia.
As ever with the Vatreni over the past two decades, though, the discussion is not merely one of shape but of the specific profiles available and how to optimise them. If anything, increasing depth at centre-back has only reinforced Croatia’s traditional dilemma: an abundance of creative midfield talent mitigating a dearth of natural width.
In those three friendlies with a 3-4-3, the shift in formation naturally produced tactical tradeoffs, most notably a compromised ability to defend wide areas, which can ultimately translate into conceding territory. This becomes particularly pertinent against four-man setups. Against a Colombia side lined up in a 4-2-3-1, Croatia conceded inside three minutes from precisely one of these situations.
Before Jhon Arias’ opener, Nikola Moro implored right wing-back Petar Sucic with limited options in front of him. The ensuing turnover left the defensive line scrambling to recover, but fortunately for Croatia, Luis Suárez scuffed the eventual finish.
The territorial and positional tradeoff becomes less problematic against three-man setups, where Croatia can more readily go man for man. As such, against Belgium earlier this month, Croatia’s regain in a wide area deeper on the pitch created an early opening for Mateo Kovacic alongside Modrić and Marcelo Brozović made Croatia considerably more laboured in possession.
The theory is relatively simple; the midfield that once claimed real estate between the lines via Modrić and Rakitić gradually retreated deeper. This both compromised ball progression and kept opposition defences in front of the ball, which then made Croatia increasingly susceptible to transition upon losing possession.
This pattern continued against Belgium earlier this month. Croatia finished with close to 60% possession, but comparatively little to show for it against stronger opposition. Tellingly, their best chance of the match came immediately after Modrić and Kovačić were both brought off.
Between the Euro 2020 and 2024 qualifying campaigns, Croatia sputtered in competitive fixtures with 60+% possession. Context is important, given disparities in opposition quality and personnel. Underlining that complication between talent and balance, the returns remained underwhelming for Croatia in comparison to their peers.
Over that span, Croatia claimed 63.0% of available points in those games as the active team in possession, while the teams with similar ranking and possession volumes trended at 73% and above. Among the 13 teams with 20 or more games at 60+% possession over those two cycles, Croatia (1.24) also averaged the lowest net xG.
Successive long-term injuries for Kovačić meant consistent experimentation during qualification for this World Cup. However, the likes of Sučić, Moro, Nikola Vlašić and Mario Pašalić were either left on the outer or needing to find roles on the fringes. The case of Pašalić is particularly relevant here, with his role at Atalanta as box-crashing midfielder effectively shoehorned out onto the right wing.
How Do Sučić and Baturina Best Fit?
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