Al-Sharaa and Trump, understandings that shape the contours of a new Syria ...Syria

Omar Alaa Eldin | Amir Huquq | Mowaffak al-Khouja | Wasim al-Adawi

The visit by Syria’s transitional president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, to Washington, and his meeting with US President Donald Trump, did more than end years of estrangement from the White House, it also carried deeper messages that went beyond political protocol and opened the door to potential shifts on several sensitive Syrian files.

In the US capital, al-Sharaa put forward a new Syrian narrative, seeking to anchor Damascus as an indispensable player on regional security issues, foremost among them the indirect negotiations with Israel, the complex question of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and the issue of US sanctions that are blocking Syria from entering a new post war phase.

While al-Sharaa’s categorical refusal to join the Abraham Accords was clear, he also signaled a willingness to negotiate a security agreement on the condition that Israel withdraw to the positions it held before 8 December 2024, a stance that drew mixed reactions in Israel, most notably from Benjamin Netanyahu, who summed up his position with the phrase, “Trust, do not trust, but verify.”

The most notable shift came with Syria’s announcement that it is joining the International Coalition against the Islamic State, a step many political circles read as an attempt to recast Damascus’ international role and rehabilitate its security profile, amid US talk of supporting the restructuring of the army and security institutions. Al-Sharaa’s visit also opened a new track in negotiations over integrating the SDF into state institutions, alongside clear US insistence on implementing the 10 March agreement, at a time when researchers doubt the parties’ ability to stick to the agreed timelines.

In the background, Washington’s decision to suspend the Caesar sanctions sparked a political and economic uproar, reviving debate over the future of sanctions and the possibility of lifting them, amid divisions in Congress and investor concerns.

Following the meeting between the two presidents on 10 November, the Syrian Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that the more than hour long talks between Trump and al Sharaa covered several issues, including a potential security agreement between Syria and Israel.

According to the ministry, the US side affirmed its support for reaching a security agreement with Israel aimed at strengthening regional stability.

In an interview with Fox News on 11 November, Syrian President Ahmad al Sharaa ruled out Syria joining the Abraham Accords, explaining that “the situation in Syria is different from that of the countries that signed the agreement.”

Al Sharaa said, “We share a border with Israel, which has occupied the Golan Heights since 1967, and we are not about to enter into direct negotiations at this time, perhaps the United States under President Trump can play a role in this file.”

In his interview with the Washington Post, the Syrian president went into greater detail on a possible agreement with Israel, criticizing its expansionist policy and its demands for demilitarization in southern Syria.

The president reiterated that Syria is engaged in indirect talks, saying, “We are engaged in negotiations with Israel, and we have come a long way toward reaching an agreement, but to arrive at a final deal, Israel must withdraw to the lines that existed before 8 December 2024.”

He again stressed that the United States supports these negotiations, along with many international actors “who back our position in this regard, and today, we found that Trump also supports our view, and he will push as fast as possible to reach a solution to this issue.”

US President Donald Trump told reporters after his meeting with al Sharaa that the United States is working with Israel on its relationship with Syria, saying, “We are also working with Israel on reaching an understanding with Syria and an understanding with everyone.”

As for Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that judging Syria’s new president, Ahmad al Sharaa, “cannot be done through photos or statements, but through what he actually does on the ground,” in reference to al Sharaa’s recent visit to Washington and his meetings with US officials.

In an interview with Australian journalist Erin Molan on 13 November, Netanyahu voiced his desire “to reach an arrangement that guarantees demilitarization in southwestern Syria and provides lasting protection for the Druze minority there.”

Syrian transitional president Ahmad al-Sharaa meets US President Donald Trump at the White House, 10 November 2025 (Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic/Telegram)

Holding firm to demands

The demand for a demilitarized zone was one al Sharaa had rejected in his interview with the Washington Post, when he said, “If this demilitarized zone is used by some parties as a launching pad to strike Israel, who will be responsible for that?”

“In the end, this is Syrian land, and Syria must be free to deal with its own territory,” al Sharaa said.

When asked about his trust in the Syrian side, Netanyahu cited a phrase used by former US President Ronald Reagan in dealing with the Soviet Union, “Trust, but verify,” adding, “As for me, I say, trust, do not trust, but verify.”

Syrian academic and political analyst Ahmed al Kinani believes the current climate is not conducive to reaching a security agreement between Syria and Israel, because the two sides have not agreed on the basic principles and key points.

According to what al Kinani told Enab Baladi, Israel sees itself as “not bound” to sign a security agreement, given that it is using a “strategy of overwhelming power” against Syria. He pointed out that agreeing on a formula for a demilitarized zone in southern Syria has become almost impossible, in light of Israel’s insistence, on the one hand, on what Netanyahu has stated, and Syria’s insistence, on the other, on rejecting the idea.

Researcher Mohammad Suleiman, from the Jusoor Center for Studies, agreed with al Kinani that reaching an agreement at this stage is not possible, as Syria, under the “current circumstances,” cannot conclude such an agreement except in the presence of international guarantors capable of compelling Israel to implement what is agreed upon.

Suleiman sees a “genuine” American desire to pressure Israel to reach either a peace agreement or a de escalation agreement that would temporarily halt Israeli incursions until conditions are ripe for “broader agreements.” However, this, he said, “will take a long time.”

Al Kinani believes that what is blocking progress toward an agreement is the rising ceiling of Israeli demands, starting with a demilitarized zone, then ground incursions in the south and the establishment of military bases, followed by demands for a humanitarian corridor to Suwayda (in southern Syria). He added that Israel set these conditions to pressure Damascus and push it toward rejection.

This, according to al Kinani, has been met by Syria holding firmly to its main demands, most notably full Syrian control in the south and a return to the situation that existed before 8 December 2024. He added that the international community is increasingly pushing toward recognizing Syrian sovereignty over the Golan Heights and a return to the 1974 disengagement agreement.

If an agreement is reached, al Kinani expects Israel to retain Mount Hermon (Jabal al Sheikh), with direct talks between the two sides over the positions Israel has newly established in southern Syria.

If no agreement is reached, which the Syrian academic sees as the more likely scenario, Israel will seek to turn southern Syria into the country’s “soft underbelly” by imposing its own agenda, whether in Suwayda or in the south more generally.

From the meeting of Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and US envoy Thomas Barrack with US President Donald Trump, 10 November 2025 (Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic)

Syria announced that it was joining the International Coalition to fight the Islamic State group, in parallel with President al-Sharaa’s visit to the White House, a step that was among the main topics on the table in talks between the two sides.

The US envoy to Syria, Thomas Barrack, confirmed on his account on X on 13 November that the Syrian president is committed to joining the International Coalition against the Islamic State group.

Syrian Information Minister Hamza al-Mustafa said in a post on X on 11 November that Syria had signed a political cooperation declaration with the International Coalition, affirming its role as a partner in combating terrorism and supporting regional stability.

A new phase of alliances

Syria’s accession to the International Coalition to fight the Islamic State group is a strategic step whose implications go beyond the immediate military dimension, laying the groundwork for a new phase of regional and international relations and alliances, according to writer and political analyst Darwish Khalifa.

The analyst told Enab Baladi that this step is not a temporary gain, but rather a turning point that will shape what comes next at both the political and security levels.

However, in the Syrian context, which has seen multiple Islamist projects over the years of the revolution, it is not enough to fight terrorism militarily, he said, adding that extremist ideology must also be confronted intellectually and socially.

This, according to Khalifa, requires working to entrench the concept of societal security by producing a unified national discourse in which the media plays a role through awareness raising and public interest programming that helps rebuild trust between the state and society.

For his part, political analyst Hassan al-Neifi believes that Damascus joining the International Coalition to combat terrorism is first and foremost a move with political implications, signaling Syria’s shift from the camp of states once classified as rogue under international law and seen as a source of evil and corruption, to the camp of states that contribute to establishing security and stability while also participating in efforts to combat terrorism.

Damascus recognizes that there are internal obstacles posing major challenges to joining the coalition, chief among them the fact that the Ministry of Defense is still in the formative stage of its institutional development, that army recruitment still suffers from limited capacity to properly vet the backgrounds of new recruits, and that there is a general weakness in military capabilities.

These structural challenges make it difficult for the coalition to fully trust the Defense Ministry’s ability to carry out joint operations, something reflected on the ground, where coordination currently takes place primarily between the coalition and the Interior Ministry, rather than the Defense Ministry.

Middle East Institute for Strategic Studies in Washington

Scenarios

The scenarios for accession and the steps that will follow differ. Darwish Khalifa believes that once Syria officially joins the International Coalition, it will become necessary for the coalition to take charge of restructuring and supporting Syria’s armed forces, both army and intelligence services, and to provide them with the information, communications, and equipment needed to defeat the group. Under UN Security Council Resolution 2178, the coalition is also tasked with preventing the movement of foreign fighters and monitoring their financing and travel.

According to the political analyst, accession will be based on criteria and procedures, the first of which is Syria’s commitment to a complete break with states that export terrorism, as well as to cutting the corridor linking Iran with its militias in Lebanon. It also means showing full intelligence cooperation on the movements of the Islamic State group, hardline jihadist factions, and Islamist Palestinian factions inside Syrian territory.

The main obstacles to Damascus joining the International Coalition are the “jihadist factions” that previously had partnerships with Hayat Tahrir al Sham and still maintain a strong and visible presence across Syrian territory. The ways of confronting them will likely rely on gradual containment leading to their dissolution, rather than direct military confrontation.

Hassan al NeifiPolitical analyst

Legitimacy as the main gain

Damascus’ entry into the International Coalition brings strategic advantages and political and military interests, and will move it into the category of states that cooperate and contribute to combating the Islamic State group.

Moreover, accession is a basic condition for the United States and Europe to recognize the legitimacy of the political system in Syria, according to al-Neifi.

He added that the question of lifting sanctions is largely tied to the Syrian government’s cooperation with Washington in fighting the remnants of the group and other factions that threaten US interests in the region, making the issue one of mutual interests for both sides.

Al-Neifi believes that breaking with Syria’s troubled past and entering a new phase aimed at economic development and achieving security must take place through new regional and international alliances, which in turn impose numerous commitments on the Syrian government that it cannot avoid or evade.

Writer Darwish Khalifa considers that the recent US opening toward the Syrian authorities stems from a security angle, centered on the issue of foreign fighters and, naturally, on Israel’s security. However, he believes this approach could evolve into a more realistic outlook and a political partnership at the moment when the US flag is raised once again over its embassy on al-Mansour Street in the Abu Rummaneh neighborhood (in Damascus).

From the meeting between Syrian transitional president Ahmad al-Sharaa and Congressman Brian Mast, 9 November 2025 (Yasmin Naamo/Facebook)

The negotiations between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were on the table during al Sharaa’s meeting with Trump at the White House, as well as in other meetings held by the Syrian delegation in Washington with US diplomats, most notably envoy Thomas Barrack.

The 10 November meeting between al Sharaa and Trump produced no detailed public statements on the course of talks with the SDF beyond a renewed emphasis on implementing the 10 March agreement.

In a trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting between Damascus, Ankara, and Washington, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan raised the SDF file, stressing the importance of these talks for determining the future of those areas.

For his part, al Sharaa told the Washington Post that the best solution would be for US forces present in Syria to oversee the integration of the SDF into the government’s security forces, with responsibility for protecting Syrian territory resting with the state.

His comments to the US newspaper came in the context of a discussion about fighting the Islamic State group, as he argued that the presence of any military force outside government control creates the ideal environment for the group to flourish.

Enab Baladi conducted an online poll asking whether Syria’s accession to the International Coalition would pull the rug out from under the SDF. Around 2,000 people took part, with 63% answering “yes” and 37% answering “no.”

In the same context, the US envoy to Syria stressed the need to integrate the SDF into Syria’s new economic, defense, and civilian structures, in remarks made following al Sharaa’s visit to Washington.

These US statements indicate a desire to resolve the SDF file and fold it into state institutions, suggesting that Washington stands alongside the government. However, researchers interviewed by Enab Baladi said the United States is not serious about pressuring the forces in control of northeastern Syria to dissolve themselves and integrate.

The head of the Policy Analysis Department at the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies (now the Arab Center for the Study of Contemporary Syria) told Enab Baladi in a previous interview that the United States is trying to play the role of mediator in the negotiations, even though it is the actual decision maker for the SDF and can impose whatever it sees fit on it.

He added that the United States does want to see the agreement implemented, but at the same time does not wish to sacrifice the SDF, and is seeking to preserve a special status for it within the Syrian army and even within the Syrian administration.

On the other hand, political researcher Anas Shawakh said that al Sharaa’s visit to Washington had an impact on the course of negotiations between the government and the SDF, and on speeding them up.

He told Enab Baladi that raising this file represents a renewed affirmation of the role of the key actors, namely the United States and Turkey alongside Syria, and of the need to adhere to the 10 March agreement and adopt it as the sole solution for northeastern Syria and the Syrian Jazira region (in northeastern Syria).

SDF welcomes the visit

The SDF, for its part, welcomed al Sharaa’s visit to Washington. SDF commander Mazloum Abdi expressed his thanks to the US president for his “leadership on the Syrian file.”

In a post on X on 11 November, Abdi said he had held a phone call with the US envoy to Syria in which they discussed the outcomes of al Sharaa’s meeting with his counterpart Trump at the White House. During the call, he reaffirmed the SDF’s commitment to speeding up the process of integrating into Syrian state institutions.

Meanwhile, Bedran Çiya Kurd , deputy co chair of the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria, the SDF’s governing arm, said that the understandings reached between al Sharaa and Trump lay the foundations for a new phase in Syria, describing Washington’s position as “positive and supportive” of integrating all institutions into the Syrian state.

Çiya Kurd  told al Arabiya in an interview on 12 November that the Autonomous Administration would soon be in Damascus. He stressed that there would be no going back on the 10 March agreement and said there is a verbal understanding with Damascus to integrate the SDF into the Syrian army as full divisions and units, a process that would also include the civilian, service, and political institutions in northeastern Syria.

Will the agreement be implemented?

The 10 March agreement between al Sharaa and Abdi included eight points, chief among them the integration of the SDF’s civilian and military institutions into the Syrian state.

One of its provisions stipulates that joint committees formed under the agreement must implement it before the end of the current year.

Although no clear, detailed outcomes have been announced from the talks between Damascus and Washington, what has emerged in public suggests a push to accelerate integration and implement the terms of the 10 March agreement. At the same time, there are no clear indications that the agreement can actually be implemented before the end of December.

Asked whether the SDF could complete integration before the end of the year (in a month and a half), political researcher Anas Shawakh said this is not enough time to merge military, security, governance, and administrative structures.

He pointed to the presence of factions and formations with external ties and a particular ideological background (left wing Kurdish nationalism), and said it remains unclear how they would be handled or integrated into the new Syrian state structures.

He also noted the presence of what he called a “spoiler current” that opposes the 10 March agreement and could slow down the implementation of its terms.

Political researcher Bassam al Suleiman previously told Enab Baladi that there is a current linked to leading figures in the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), headed by party leader Cemil Bayik and senior cadres Duran Kalkan and Murat Karayilan, both of whom are of Turkish origin and based in Sulaymaniyah (in northern Iraq). According to al Suleiman, they seek to “obstruct” the negotiations and pressure other currents that want to join the Syrian state.

Internal movement within the SDF

Shawakh believes there will be what he described as “major and visible” steps in the coming days, such as announcing a timetable, launching integration measures, or ending the separation imposed by checkpoints and crossings that isolate the Syrian Jazira region (in northeastern Syria) from the rest of the country’s provinces.

He also expects preparatory meetings to be held either between the joint committees representing both sides or internally within the SDF’s own structure, factions, and institutions, in order to discuss and prepare for the integration process in practical terms.

He anticipates that the implementation period will be extended and that a new timeline will be set for completing the integration process.

A trilateral meeting between the SDF, the Autonomous Administration, and the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) was held on 13 November to discuss the course of the 10 March agreement.

The meeting did not produce clear outcomes beyond a discussion of mechanisms to advance implementation of the 10 March agreement, which the Autonomous Administration described in a statement as “a strategic step for consolidating stability.”

According to the Administration, participants reviewed the steps taken so far in this direction and affirmed their commitment to continuing on the “consensual path” and encouraging Damascus to adopt dialogue as a national option for resolving outstanding issues.

Decentralization, and how it is defined, along with the mechanism for integrating the SDF into the army, remain among the most contentious issues between the two sides.

The SDF wants to preserve its influence in the areas under its control while negotiating a consensual model of decentralization, pushing for a federal arrangement, whereas Damascus insists on a centralized state.

On the question of integrating forces in northeastern Syria, the SDF is seeking to enter the Defense Ministry as a single bloc, while the Syrian government wants the SDF to dissolve and its fighters to join the army as individuals. However, there are indications that Damascus is backing away from this demand, reflected in talk of integrating three SDF divisions under a compromise formula.

From the meeting of Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa with members of the Syrian community in Washington, 10 November 2025 (Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic)

One of the most significant outcomes of the Syrian president’s visit to the United States was the US Treasury Department’s decision to partially suspend sanctions on Syria under the Caesar Act for 180 days.

The Caesar Act was passed by the US House of Representatives on 15 November 2016 and signed into law by US President Donald Trump (in his first term) on 21 December 2019.

In a joint statement on 12 November, the US State and Commerce Departments and the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced the suspension of the Caesar Act and authorized the transfer of most US origin goods for civilian use, as well as software and technology, to Syria or within Syria without needing a license.

Syrian American lawyer and expert on congressional affairs Samir Sabounji told Enab Baladi that the Caesar Act, which Congress passed in 2019, obliges the US president to impose sanctions on Syria, but allows him to suspend or freeze the implementation of any provision of the Act for six months, renewable. However, it does not allow the president to repeal the law itself, and since it was passed by Congress, repealing it also requires a similar vote in Congress.

Following the announcement, individuals and foreign companies can support Syria without fear of being subjected to US sanctions under the Caesar Act, Sabounji said.

He revealed that discussions are currently under way in Congress about the Caesar Act, renewing Syrians’ hopes, both in the United States and abroad, that it might be scrapped by the end of the current year.

Because the Trump administration does not want to see the obstacles created by the Caesar Act reemerge, it has found itself compelled to suspend the law once again, according to Sabounji.

The Syrian American lawyer sets out three possible scenarios regarding the fate of suspending or freezing the Caesar Act:

He sees a clear risk facing investors, namely that the suspension may not be renewed after its six month term ends, describing this as “the greatest risk to capital.”

Mapping opposition and support for ending Caesar

From Sabounji’s perspective, there is no one in either the House or the Senate who completely rejects the idea of ending the Caesar Act, especially given President Trump’s support for this direction. Rather, he says, there are two camps, one that supports unconditional repeal, and another that rejects ending Caesar without conditions, meaning that it supports repeal, but only conditionally.

Among those he describes as cautious about unconditional repeal, and known for their staunch support for Israel, are Lindsey Graham, Mark Lawler, Brad Sherman, and Brian Mast (who served in the Israeli army). However, the main and most serious obstacle, he says, is Mast.

Congressman Chris Van Hollen, meanwhile, is “in the gray zone,” and there are attempts to persuade him to support unconditional repeal of Caesar. Van Hollen is a critic of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies, but remains cautious regarding the rights and treatment of minorities in Syria.

Syrian American lawyer Samir Sabounji, 10 November 2025 (Samir Sabounji)

The difference between the May and November Caesar decisions

Syrian American lawyer Samir Sabounji explained that the May decision to ease Caesar, issued earlier this year, is referred to as a “waiver,” which falls under a specific clause in the sanctions law itself and exempts certain parties from sanctions based on US national interest criteria.

The new decision issued this November is referred to as a “suspension,” and it falls under a different clause of the Caesar Act. This suspension depends on whether the US State Department decides that the Syrian government has met the standards set out in the law, which is what has now happened.

In Sabounji’s view, the legal effect of both decisions is the same, namely that Caesar sanctions are not currently in force. What is notable, however, is that through the second decision, the State Department has sent a “subtle message” to Congress that the Syrian government has met the benchmarks specified in the law, meaning that the prohibitions it contains are no longer necessary and can be suspended, and therefore the law itself could be repealed.

Economic impact, investment concerns

Louay al Homsi, economic adviser at the US Syrian Business Council, outlined to Enab Baladi the economic effects of the suspension adopted by the US Treasury, including:

Opening new investment channels in theory, since suspending sanctions on certain transactions may open doors for international financing, banks, and investment in infrastructure such as electricity, telecommunications, water, sanitation, and transport, as stated in the US guidance. This may encourage some foreign companies or investors to begin exploring opportunities or reconsider their decision to stay out of Syria.

Reducing risk costs and raising profit expectations, since sanctions related risks such as loss of access to the US financial system, asset freezes, and reputational damage have been a major brake on investment in Syria. The suspension partially reduces this factor, which could motivate some investors.

Sending signals to the Syrian economy, as the suspension of Caesar may be seen economically as a chance to launch reconstruction projects in a heavily damaged country like Syria, increasing demand for infrastructure, services, and financing.

An analysis by the Wilson Center, a research institution recognized by Congress, pointed out that sanctions have been a major obstacle to reconstruction in Syria, while several reports have suggested that lifting or easing sanctions could create an “opportunity” for the Syrian economy.

However, risks remain despite the suspension or freeze. A long list of individuals and entities is still blacklisted, meaning investors must navigate complex compliance procedures and face ongoing exposure to risk.

Al Homsi argued that “Syria’s financial and monetary infrastructure is weak,” and that the legal, tax, and investment frameworks are not necessarily ready to absorb large scale investments smoothly.

As a result, he said, operational risks including political instability, currency volatility, and conflict remain “high,” and if investors feel this is merely a “temporary suspension,” they may hesitate to make major or long term commitments.

Al-Sharaa and Trump, understandings that shape the contours of a new Syria Enab Baladi.

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