The Interior Ministry: Between Security Setbacks and Abuses That Threaten Public Trust ...Syria

Enab Baladi – Mowaffak al-Khouja | Wasim al-Adawi | Mohammad Kakhi

The security file remains one of the most pressing concerns for Syrians in the period following the fall of the former Syrian regime, a time marked by security chaos manifested in kidnappings, thefts, and the spread of both “ideologically motivated” and “non-ideologically motivated” gangs.

For decades under the former regime, the reputation of Syria’s security services was associated with fear and intimidation due to practices widely described as “repressive,” especially evident during the years of the Syrian revolution.

With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, questions loom over whether the nascent state has truly brought the security situation under control—particularly in critical areas such as dismantling the drug trade, which had flourished under Maher al-Assad, the ousted president’s brother, and pursuing the regime’s remaining loyalists.

Despite what are described as positive steps taken by the Ministry of Interior in restructuring itself, the institution still suffers from weak performance. This has translated into violations and abuses by its personnel against civilians, which researchers attribute to institutional weaknesses as well as psychological factors linked to the nearly 14-year-long Syrian war.

In this report, Enab Baladi examines the Syrian Ministry of Interior’s performance during the eight months following the regime’s collapse, exploring the reasons behind recurring abuses, and discussing the ministry’s structure and the measures needed to improve its effectiveness with input from researchers and experts.

Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab meets with the Bar Association – August 6, 2025 (Syrian Ministry of Interior)

The Ministry of Interior’s performance has ranged between acceptable and only partially effective control over the security situation, despite the challenges and vacuum left by the regime’s sudden collapse. However, security forces have also been implicated in violations against civilians.

The most prominent abuses occurred during events in Suwayda, southern Syria, in mid-July, and earlier in Syria’s coastal region in the west.

The coastal events began on March 6, when groups described by the Syrian government as “remnants of the former regime” launched coordinated attacks on General Security Administration checkpoints and Syrian Ministry of Defense positions.

Following these attacks, the General Security Administration and Defense Ministry forces carried out sweeping and search operations in coastal villages. According to an investigation by Reuters, violations against civilians took place during these operations, some committed by government forces.

More than 1,400 members of the Alawite community were killed in these incidents, in what a government-appointed fact-finding committee described as sectarian-based killings.

On July 14, the Syrian government sent forces from both the Defense and Interior Ministries to Suwayda to end fighting that had erupted between local factions and armed Bedouin groups.

The United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, expressed concern over reports received by the UN Human Rights Office pointing to violations and abuses, including executions, arbitrary killings, kidnappings, destruction of private property, and looting of homes.

He noted that “reported perpetrators include members of the security forces and individuals affiliated with the authorities.”

The Syrian Network for Human Rights documented the killing of at least 814 Syrians—including 34 women, 20 children, six medical personnel, and two media workers—in Suwayda province since tensions began on July 13.

Violations Linked to the Integration Process

Nawar Shaban, a researcher at the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, told Enab Baladi that these violations are linked to the process of integrating and re-framing personnel within both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense. He stressed that the integration remains incomplete, with internal conduct files still unfinished and no clear military doctrine in place.

Shaban believes the focus should be on restructuring both ministries from the bottom up—not only at the leadership level—by reintegrating and screening personnel, and tightening the chain of command through which they receive orders.

Fears of a Return to Security-State Repression

In Syrians’ collective memory, the security apparatus is tied to the practices of the former Syrian regime, which destroyed its reputation through repression, torture, and killings inside security centers during the rule of Hafez and Bashar al-Assad.

After Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and allied factions took control during the Repelling the Aggression battles, security officers’ conduct varied—ranging from good treatment, praised by many Syrians, to abuses against others, including deaths under torture, according to human rights networks.

One of the most notable cases was that of Syrian national Yousef al-Labbad, who returned from Germany to Syria and died in a Ministry of Interior guard room near the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus on July 29.

Although the ministry denied he was killed by mosque security personnel, suspicion remains over alleged “rough” treatment by Interior Ministry officers that may have caused his death.

Other incidents described as “violent” were reported during security operations—most notably the case of Abdel Qader Thalji, whose home was raided by security forces amid gunfire and violations against the residents.

Interior Minister Anas Khattab apologized to the family and confirmed that the patrol leader and his accompanying officers were arrested. Still, questions remain about the ministry’s ability to control such personnel and curb future abuses.

Human rights organizations have also accused the ministry of arbitrary arrests (without warrants) for various reasons, including freedom of expression.

Success in Combating “Remnants of the former regime” and Narcotics

On the other hand, the Ministry of Interior has achieved notable success in several security files, including arresting members and officers of the former Syrian regime, combating narcotics, and limiting attacks by non-government groups with sectarian motives.

In Homs city, General Security forces protected the predominantly Alawite neighborhoods of Wadi al-Dahab, Akrama, Zahra, and al- Nuzha from an attempted attack by non-government groups on March 8.

Security forces closed side entrances to these neighborhoods, set up checkpoints at main access points, and banned motorcycles after many riders had committed murders in the city.

According to residents interviewed by Enab Baladi, the security presence restored safety and allowed businesses to stay open late into the night, rather than closing around 5 p.m. out of fear of violations.

The ministry also dismantled numerous facilities producing Captagon pills, seizing 121 tons of raw materials and 320 million pills, according to a ministry statement on Facebook.

Additionally, it arrested several individuals accused of war crimes linked to the former regime, including Wasim al-Assad, Mowafaq Haidar, Mizer Sawwan, and Nabil Driousi

A “Relatively Acceptable” Security Situation

Nawar Shaban, a researcher at the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, believes that the security situation in Syria is “relatively acceptable,” despite the existing violations. He noted that the prolonged period of conflict in Syria requires a “massive” effort to restructure the personnel of the Ministries of Interior and Defense in line with proper military and security frameworks to prevent such abuses.

Shaban argued that these measures would help eliminate any conditions that could allow such violations to occur. He added that, after such a long conflict, many security personnel still harbor personal grudges, making it essential for the ministry to employ individuals who demonstrate the highest levels of discipline and professionalism.

Obstacles to Discipline

The main obstacles to discipline, Shaban said, are past grievances—both old and newly developed—due to what he described as “sectarian and destructive terror tendencies” among the adversaries these officers face. This creates an environment ripe for violations.

He stressed that the state must rise above sectarian or retaliatory behavior, avoid responding to opponents’ abuses with similar actions, and ensure the military and security forces transition from a revolutionary state to building a strong, law-based state.

Factors Affecting Security Performance Assessment

According to Maen Tallaa, a researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, assessing security actors involves several theories and approaches tied to various indicators.

For example, the Paris School of International Relations and Security Studies focuses on organizational and legal structures, as well as the concept of civil-security relations.

Tallaa noted that the Interior Ministry has increasingly focused on reorganization, codes of conduct, and the philosophy of internal security work.

He also observed a significant return of defectors—either reinstated to their positions to benefit from their experience, made advisers, or assigned to various committees investigating criminal cases or community disputes.

However, despite this series of measures, the local and regional context imposes on the Interior Ministry an agenda and priorities that go beyond purely organizational or technical issues.

Syrian Interior Minister Anas Khattab, during a working session with the Syrian Bar Association on August 6, highlighted the challenges the ministry has faced, including updating organizational structures and enhancing security capacities.

He confirmed the ministry’s plan to involve the Bar Association in drafting and amending laws related to its work, ensuring they keep pace with developments and align with the requirements of the current stage.

Syrian security seizes a quantity of drugs prepared for smuggling into Iraq – July 30, 2025 (Syrian Ministry of Interior)

Following the fall of the former regime, the Syrian Ministry of Interior moved quickly to open recruitment for the police force, as part of a broader plan to rebuild the security sector and bring in new, trained personnel to meet the growing need for public safety.

The ministry began deploying the recruits across various police branches, including the civil police, traffic police, and public security units.

According to the application requirements, candidates had to meet criteria related to age, physical fitness, educational background, and a clean criminal record.

Recruits began service after completing an intensive, accelerated training course lasting 10 to 15 days at police academies, covering military and police skills as well as interpersonal skills and effective communication with the public.

Former Interior Minister in the Syrian Interim Government, Ali Keda, told Enab Baladi in an earlier interview that Syria needs more than 50,000 security personnel, while each course graduates between 800 and 1,000 officers.

Maen Tallaa, a researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, told Enab Baladi that the security apparatus must deliver a professional service while adhering to ethical and professional standards—a goal that requires multiple training programs and procedures to develop human resources in the Ministry of Interior.

Tallaa considered that, in the exceptional circumstances Syria faced, deploying security personnel with minimal training and knowledge was “somewhat acceptable.” However, he stressed that more than eight months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the ministry should now have established a unified and clearly defined training plan.

Enab Baladi reached out to the Ministry of Interior’s spokesperson, Nour al-Din al-Baba, and media officer, Mustafa al-Abdo, to inquire about the ministry’s training steps and possible future programs, but received no response at the time of publication.

Four Pillars of Ideal Training

According to Tallaa, security training falls under the educational and preparatory function of human resources in the security and defense sectors. In its ideal form, it should include four main pillars:

Understanding the security role

Security doctrine

Essential security skills for all personnel

Specialized training

Two Additional Pillars

Tallaa also proposed adding two more pillars:

Human rights and security conduct – Upholding human values, applying related procedures and laws, and being familiar with both local and international legal frameworks.

General cultural awareness – Strengthening the police officer’s overall knowledge base.

Seizure of a quantity of drugs and hashish in Latakia – July 28, 2025 (Syrian Ministry of Interior)

Weapons and uniforms…

Members of the Syrian Ministry of Interior use a single type of weapon for all their security tasks—the Kalashnikov—as observed by Enab Baladi. This is the same weapon used by the military establishment under the Ministry of Defense, contrary to the usual practice of using light weapons such as pistols or light rifles.

The type of weapon used by the Internal Security Forces is linked to the nature of the mission, according to researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Maen Tallaa,. Certain security tasks, such as counterterrorism, require advanced weapons, surveillance equipment, tracking devices, night-vision scopes, and other conventional and unconventional arms.

As for the Criminal Security police, there is a range of weapons available for them, and likewise, the Civil Police have their own light weaponry.

Linked to budget and control

The issue of armament in the Ministry of Interior is linked to several factors, according to Tallaa. The first relates to the state budget, which today lacks military industries, noting that what remains of military sites and weapons depots has been struck and rendered out of service.

He also believes that the issue of armament is tied to the control of weapons, regardless of their type, given that the police are an executive force for enforcing the law. This means that the proliferation of uncontrolled weapons in the state presents a challenge for them.

The security uniform… a hasty decision

The Ministry of Interior adopts a black uniform for its General Security personnel, which has also been applied to Internal Security, while police officers wear blue. However, the ministry has not designated a uniform for the rest of its divisions and specialties, and some personnel wear camouflage military clothing.

Tallaa believes there was haste in approving the adopted uniform within the Ministry of Interior and that it requires review, with a Syrian touch that incorporates standards related to conveying strength and safety, stressing the need for a unified uniform.

He explained that there are different schools of thought when choosing police uniforms—some tend toward sleek, sports-like clothing in defined colors consistent with military tones, while another school sees it as an extension of the military model regardless of color.

Impersonating security personnel

The widespread use of black uniforms, in addition to military clothing sold in markets, has led to the emergence of groups impersonating security personnel to carry out theft and kidnapping operations. This is despite the Syrian government’s announcement on January 13 of allocating security IDs and official arrest warrants to be carried by any force executing the arrest of any Syrian.

A resident of Qudsaya Suburb, who preferred not to publish his name for security reasons, told Enab Baladi that a group attempted to raid and search his home, using inappropriate conduct toward him. When he filed a complaint with the Qudsaya Police Station, they informed him that the patrol did not belong to the General Security and that they had not sent anyone for the raid, warning him about groups wearing General Security uniforms attempting theft and kidnapping.

On August 3 of this year, a video circulated showing individuals impersonating security personnel to steal money from a Portuguese tourist on the Aleppo–Latakia road. The Ministry of Interior was later able to arrest them and refer them to investigation.

Three steps to address the problem

The issues of uniforms and weapons can be addressed in three main steps, according to researcher Tallaa.

The first step is approving the logistical needs for all of Syria, which requires a series of workshops rather than personal estimates, according to Tallaa.

This step also requires activating the security apparatus in the governorates and assessing its logistical needs—whether in infrastructure, intelligence and military devices, or criminal analysis tools.

The second step relates to controlling, organizing, and archiving weapons, while the third step involves organizing uniforms based on the concept of the police cadet, the graduating officer, and the nature of the security function assigned to them—whether combating drugs, guarding borders, or fighting organized crime and smuggling.

There should be color distinctions, as this is part of the concept of civil-security relations, where citizens should be able to identify, from a police officer’s uniform, their specialty and role.

Maen Tallaa,Researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies

Syrian security arrests a former member of the Syrian regime after clashes in Latakia – March 8, 2025 (Mohamad Daboul – EPA)

The seed of the current security apparatus in Syria was planted on June 10, 2020, with the announcement of the establishment of the Public Security in areas controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its political umbrella, the “Salvation Government.”

The apparatus was launched to meet the community’s need for a unified security system to maintain safety and contribute to building and developing society, according to its spokesperson at the time, Diaa al-Din al-Omar.

Al-Omar stated that the apparatus does not belong to any military faction and operates independently, despite ongoing debate over its affiliation with HTS.

The North’s seed expands

The apparatus was initially formed from several units and offices tasked with collecting data and information about criminals, monitoring and following up on events, conducting surveillance, and carrying out arrest and investigation operations.

During its presence in northwestern Syria, it managed to make a qualitative leap in maintaining security in the region through its various departments, focusing on demonstrating a high level of institutionalism in its publications and statements, and controlling the mechanisms of transforming information into an arrest warrant signed by the Public Prosecutor, leading to the case being presented to a judge and a verdict issued against the accused.

Following the control of Aleppo province on December 6, 2024, the Ministry of Interior of the “Salvation Government” announced the opening of applications to the Public Security Administration through enrollment in the Police Academy. This was later followed by recruitment announcements in other provinces after the fall of the Syrian regime on December 8, 2024.

On January 24, Police Academy trainer in Damascus, Hisham Hilal, stated that the number of applications to the ministry exceeded 200,000 across all provinces, to meet the apparatus’s need for personnel across all Syrian territories, after the dismissal of former regime police officers.

On March 12, 2024, a meeting between former HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Syrian Transitional President Ahmad al-Sharaa) with military personnel, civilians, and figures from the “Salvation Government” and the “Shura Council” resulted in the merger of the “Public Security Apparatus” with the Ministry of Interior.

In the past months, the ministry worked on restructuring itself following consultations with legal experts and researchers. Ministry of Interior spokesperson Nour al-Din al-Baba announced during a press conference attended by Enab Baladi on May 25 that the police and public security had been merged, new ID cards with a renewed visual identity were being prepared, a complaints office was being established, and a prisons and reformatories administration had been created.

Fears of declining trust in security

Amid the rapid changes in Syria, political and security analyst Firas Allawi stressed the importance of expediting the restructuring of the Ministry of Interior’s security apparatus in line with best international practices, to ensure internal stability and strengthen citizens’ trust in official institutions.

According to Allawi, delays in restructuring could pose several risks, most notably “weak crisis response, the growth of organized crime, declining public trust in public security forces, and international isolation due to non-compliance with international human rights and security standards.” These risks, he said, are unacceptable in the coming phase amid escalating targeting of Syria and attempts to stir unrest, as well as individual mistakes.

Any delay in regulating the performance of personnel within a clear functional hierarchy and strict laws could also hinder the establishment of security due to existing shortcomings in human and logistical resources. It is also important to have a visible and enforced hierarchy in the Ministry of Interior.

Among the key principles the Syrian Public Security should implement, according to Allawi, are: “responding to security incidents without causing public resentment, ensuring transparency in procedures by clarifying the reasons for security intervention, respecting human rights and avoiding excessive use of force, strengthening effective communication with the media to provide a clear official narrative, relying on community mediation through dignitaries and local leaders to ease tensions, training security personnel to manage crowds and crises professionally and humanely, and recruiting individuals from diverse backgrounds to better represent society.”

Effective communication with citizens

When dealing with security incidents, the ministry should adopt a transparent and humane approach that respects human rights and relies on networking with citizens to ensure crisis management, said Allawi. He also stressed the need to adapt to social and demographic changes by developing flexible security policies, hiring qualified staff, and updating awareness programs in line with Syrian society’s aspirations.

Allawi warned that future security challenges will be more complex, including issues such as migration and internal displacement, social protests, natural disasters and climate change, cross-border crimes such as human trafficking, drugs, cyberattacks, and extremism. This requires proactive preparedness and high-level training, making it essential to continue developing the skills of security forces and police in crisis management.

Partnership with friendly security agencies

In the same context, Allawi considered that strengthening partnerships between the Ministry of Interior and the security agencies of friendly countries in providing security services could represent a strategic shift in the ministry’s work, enabling the exchange of expertise and the development of innovative solutions. He also emphasized the need to provide modern technologies and benefit from artificial intelligence and data analysis to improve the operational efficiency of security forces and make security decisions based on accurate, non-misleading information.

Allawi believes that one of the most important future priorities for the ministry, once security and stability are established, should be “creating specialized units in cybersecurity, data analysis, and community outreach, to protect citizens from cybercrimes, and forming rapid response teams to enhance readiness and positive engagement with the community.”

The most crucial factor for the Ministry of Interior’s success, he said, remains strengthening trust with citizens and cooperating with them in keeping pace with developments, and participating in building a modern, effective security system based on mutual trust between the citizen and the state.

Ten steps to qualify the “Interior”

Security and political analyst Firas Allawi proposed ten steps to rehabilitate and train Ministry of Interior personnel:

Recruit police and public security personnel according to precise selection criteria, including physical and psychological fitness, ethical background, education level, and communication skills, and hold training courses for officers with attention to hierarchy.

Ensure transparency in announcing recruitment needs and open applications for volunteering through a centralized electronic portal available to all qualified citizens.

Subject personnel to multi-stage tests, such as psychological evaluation, cognitive tests, and physical fitness tests.

Provide moral and ethical training by enrolling personnel in courses on professional ethics, integrity, and the ethics of using authority, and involving them in workshops to promote a culture of respecting citizens and human rights.

Educate personnel on citizenship rights and involve them in theoretical and practical training on the Syrian Constitutional Declaration and laws related to civil and political rights, as well as real-life scenarios for interacting with citizens professionally and respectfully.

Train personnel technically and logistically on equipment, communication tools, firearms, security vehicles, and introduce them to managing security situations using non-lethal techniques and de-escalation strategies, under specialized trainers.

Train personnel in forensic and technical analysis, focusing on criminal investigation, evidence collection, and the use of information systems and cybersecurity, as well as advanced specializations such as anti-narcotics, criminal security, cybersecurity, traffic security, and community policing.

Send personnel or some of them on training missions abroad and cooperate with countries with successful experiences in security sector reform, identify community needs requiring security attention, and assign experienced officers to lead central or provincial branches of public security.

Continuously evaluate personnel and develop their performance, while strengthening independent internal and external oversight over them, possibly by creating an independent body to monitor performance and violations.

Create an incentive system and award bonuses for positive performance, with clear mechanisms for accountability.

The Interior Ministry: Between Security Setbacks and Abuses That Threaten Public Trust Enab Baladi.

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