Throughout history, networks have shaped power. Roads, rivers, shipping lanes and trade routes made the movement of people, goods and ideas easier and more reliable.
Those who controlled networks could tax, regulate and profit from exchange, strengthen political authority, and project influence beyond their borders. Those who did not were vulnerable to disruption, to exploitation and the steady erosion of their economic and strategic positions.
The digital revolution has accelerated this logic to an unprecedented degree: since the spread of the internet, and especially since so much of modern life moved fully online, societies have become more closely connected than at any point in human history.
That has created extraordinary opportunities for trade, communication and innovation. But it has also opened new avenues for exploitation.
Digital networks are not just conduits for commerce and collaboration. They are ideal terrain for espionage, cyber crime and sabotage. Phishing attacks, ransomware, data theft and system infiltration are now routine tools not only for criminal gangs but for state agencies.
As early as 2012, the head of US Cyber Command, Keith Alexander, warned that cyber espionage amounted to “the greatest transfer of wealth in history”, surpassing even the riches taken back to Europe by those who followed Columbus after he crossed the Atlantic in 1492. The stark warning went largely unheeded.
Keith Alexander, who was head of US Command between 2010 and 2014, said cyber espionage amounted to ‘the greatest transfer of wealth in history’ (Photo: Andrew Harrer/Bloomberg)China, by contrast, moved early and decisively.
Over the past two decades it invested heavily in digital infrastructure and the technologies that make global connectivity possible: routers, switches, servers, mobile networks, sensors and software. Much of this equipment was subsidised or sold at a loss, enabling Chinese firms to undercut competitors and gain market share across the world.
The goal was not only a commercial success that built up industries, expertise and giant corporations. It also created strategic advantages – such as insights into how networks function, where vulnerabilities lie, and how data flows can be accessed, monitored or disrupted.
For a long time, many countries welcomed this development. Cheap, reliable equipment helped modernise networks quickly. But what gradually became apparent was that dependence created vulnerabilities. When the backbone of communications, energy systems or transport networks is built using foreign technology, questions of security cannot be separated from economics, because infrastructure is never neutral. Rather, it reflects the interests and assumptions of those who design and supply it.
Alongside this technological expansion came broader Chinese engagement with the outside world, including the UK. Universities deepened research partnerships, companies sought investment and politicians and institutions explored closer ties.
That openness brought benefits, but it also created opportunities for influence and intelligence-gathering.
In recent years, UK authorities have investigated allegations of Chinese espionage involving parliamentary researchers. Universities have been warned about the risks of intellectual-property transfer and about covert pressure on students – especially those of Chinese heritage – while intelligence agencies have highlighted concerns about cyber intrusion, data harvesting and the vulnerability of critical national infrastructure.
Cyber attacks can take the form of friendly approaches on LinkedIn, or carefully worded emails designed to trick people into revealing information (Photo: Matt Cardy/Getty)The disclosure in December that the Foreign Office had been targeted by a serious cyber attack, privately attributed to a China-linked group, brought these risks into sharper focus. So too have warnings about attempts to map or monitor sensitive sites, from defence facilities to energy installations.
Stories from elsewhere in Europe – such as repeated sightings of suspicious activity around naval bases or nuclear facilities – underline how intelligence work does not always involve dramatic cyber attacks. Instead, it can take the form of friendly approaches on LinkedIn, carefully worded emails designed to trick people into revealing information, casual conversations that build trust over time, or repeated visits to sensitive locations to observe routines and security arrangements.
When combined, these small, apparently harmless actions can produce valuable intelligence without triggering alarms.
The question now is how the UK should respond. There are few easy options. Britain operates on a far smaller scale than China, with fewer resources and a much smaller population. Our open society is a blessing but also a back door.
Chinese students know far more about Europe and the UK than the other way around. Only around three hundred students a year study Chinese at universities here, whereas there are two hundred times that number of Chinese nationals taking undergraduate courses in the UK. Not surprisingly, China knows a lot more about us than we do about them.
That asymmetry of access, knowledge and presence shapes everything from intelligence gathering to influence and leverage – and leaves Britain forced to react far more often than being able to set the terms of engagement.
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