China’s military intelligence services are using websites like LinkedIn and Indeed to recruit unwitting British jobseekers to supply sensitive information, MI5 has warned.
Britain’s Security Service and its counterparts in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance have laid out a series of warning signs for potential targets to look out for when using online jobs sites to avoid being recruited.
In a bulletin, the Five Eyes – which includes the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – warned that a wide range of people were at risk of disguised approaches, from military personnel and security-cleared officials working in intelligence and foreign affairs, to people with only “indirect or peripheral access to government information” such as academics, think tank employees and journalists.
The information unknowingly sent to Chinese spies can be collected and combined to “place the lives of frontline military or other personnel at risk, weaken our economic prosperity, and enable interference in our democratic processes,” the bulletin said.
It also warned that people conducting the work can compromise their own privacy by handing over sensitive personal information in CVs and bank account details.
“Individuals engaged in the unauthorised disclosure of sensitive or classified information could face a number of consequences, including prosecution,” the document said.
The i Paper previously revealed how LinkedIn accounts connected to a Chinese intelligence operation targeting MPs had approached senior officials within the Home Office, Foreign Office and Nato.
MI5 issued an espionage alert to MPs and peers in the House of Lords in November, which identified two LinkedIn accounts as part of “relentless” efforts by Chinese intelligence services to influence Parliament.
MI5 previously identified one of the LinkedIn profiles seeking to recruit informants in British politics as a ‘Shirly Shen’, who posed as a ‘global headhunter’ (Photo: LinkedIn/PA)The alert said Chinese spies – under the account names Amanda Qiu and Shirly Shen – were using “false personas”, posing as headhunters and connecting with individuals in Parliament to “collect information and lay the groundwork for long-term relationships”.
MI5 has identified a series of patterns for people to beware of if they are approached on LinkedIn, following analysis of the recruitment and attempts made so far.
Step 1: ‘Aggressive strategy’
Intelligence officers or their affiliates pose as employees of private consultancies, think tanks or human resources firms, representing cover companies that appear legitimate and may claim to be based in countries outside of China, the Five Eyes bulletin said.
They place online job adverts on professional networking platforms, including LinkedIn, Indeed and Upwork, for posts they believe could yield access to sensitive information useful for China’s strategic aims.
The advertised posts may be for analysts specialising in foreign policy, defence, or similar subject areas.
Step 2: Virtual interviews
If interviews take place, they are held virtually, the bulletin said. It added: “Recruiters conceal their identity, and may start probing applicants about access to government contacts.
“Military members may be asked about their roles and unit activities, home base or naval vessel.”
As part of the supposed job application process, candidates may be asked to write a “trial report” on a specified topic.
Step 3: Follow-up request
The bulletin said that after initial interviews and work, recruits may be informed that the client “requires more privileged information” and can be asked to move from emails to more secure platforms like encrypted messaging apps.
The operations do not seek only secret and classified information, but also non-sensitive information covering government policy or military strategy and capabilities that can be “combined with more sensitive reporting to form a comprehensive operational picture”.
Step 4: Strange payments
Fees for each requested report can range from hundreds of pounds to several thousand, the bulletin said, and payments can rise in return for increasingly sensitive information.
But the payments are likely to come through third-party payment platforms, such as PayPal, Zelle, Wise or Western Union, or use cryptocurrency.
Additionally, the document said that people will often receive payments from “an account belonging to an individual they have not met as part of the recruitment process”.
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