Mowaffaq al-Khouja, Mohammad Kakhi, Mohammad Deeb Bazt
The file of northeastern Syria, defined by negotiations and clashes between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is nearing a decisive stage, following a military operation that led to broad control by the Syrian army, backed by Arab tribes, across eastern Syria.
While the war is being fought with bullets, the two sides are waging a parallel battle at the negotiating table, sponsored by international actors. These actors have not hidden their inclination to support the government, yet they still try to strike a balance. They have not disavowed their past partnership with the SDF, but in their statements they have clarified that this partnership was tied to specific circumstances and limited reasons, now being overturned by pragmatism and interests.
In this file, Enab Baladi discusses the developments in northeastern Syria and analyzes what happened in recent days, including the SDF’s retreat, international positions, the region’s future, and the dream of federalism and self rule, with experts and specialists on the issue.
Eastern Syria enters the confrontation
Fighting shapes the negotiationsThe eastern governorates of Syria, Raqqa (northern Syria), Deir Ezzor (eastern Syria), and al-Hasakah (northeastern Syria), have entered a military confrontation between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), after warnings and statements by both sides. This has unfolded amid agreements and understandings that delay the battle at times, only for it to return at other times with a stronger pace that threatens to undo what was agreed upon, and signals that the gun may become the final solution to the unresolved file in northeastern Syria.
The government has made its decision in the east, to take control and close the file, either peacefully through negotiations, or through war on the ground, where momentum has shifted in its favor, alongside a major decline in the SDF’s influence. The SDF had controlled Syria’s reservoir of oil and food, one of its most important sources of power.
On the other side, the military confrontation revealed the fragility of forces that received high level training by the US army and were supplied with advanced weapons during the battles to defeat the Islamic State group in 2019.
Meanwhile, negotiations and talks continue under the buzz of bullets and shells, and amid the readiness of soldiers on both sides of the front, their fingers still on the trigger, while their leaders sit at the tables, face to face at times and through mediators at others.
SDF members in al-Hasakah city in eastern Syria, 22 January 2026 (AFP)
Who wants a military solution?
Syrians, along with international actors, had hoped the file of northeastern Syria would be resolved without bloodshed. But events took a different course, and indicators consistently suggested that the military option was the most prominent and the closest to what was realistic on the ground.
This raises recurring questions about which party benefits from escalation, what factors drive away peaceful solutions, and which side is being intransigent and obstructing the path.
Journalist and political analyst Firas Allawi believes the government did not want a military solution and placed it at the bottom of its priorities. It was seeking a political settlement through an understanding with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that would lead to arrangements under the March 10 agreement. But what he described as the SDF leadership’s intransigence and its refusal to accept this agreement pushed matters toward a military solution.
Allawi added that the government was not aiming for a comprehensive military resolution, but rather a gradual one that began in the Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods in Aleppo (northern Syria), then moved to areas west of the Euphrates in Maskanah, Deir Hafer, and al-Tabqa (all in the eastern Aleppo countryside, northern Syria). However, the rising pace of clashes and the failure to reach a genuine political solution, or to agree to the government’s conditions, led to heightened tension and expanded military operations.
As a result, the social base in Raqqa (northern Syria) and Deir Ezzor (eastern Syria) moved against the SDF and took control of its areas, allowing the Syrian army to enter with fewer losses and to seize control more quickly.
For his part, Dr.Tariq Hemo, a researcher at the Kurdish Center for Studies, linked the military escalation in eastern Syria to what he said was agreed with Israel in Paris, through Turkish mediation.
He argued that the March 10 agreement was overturned under Turkish pressure, noting that the authorities had always said they preferred dialogue over military escalation, especially after what happened on the coast and in Suwayda (southern Syria).
Hemo told Enab Baladi that the confrontations between the government and the SDF were not real, because the SDF began withdrawing, amid the presence of what he called an “inciting media discourse” and fears of ethnic clashes between Kurds and Arabs.
He noted that the SDF agreed to withdraw to the east bank of the Euphrates, but the government continued its offensive, and the confrontation expanded into Raqqa.
SDF limited to Kurdish majority areas
The SDF’s influence in northeastern Syria has shrunk, after it withdrew from strategic positions and became confined to areas with a Kurdish majority, in addition to the center of al-Hasakah city (northeastern Syria).
Researcher Hemo considered the SDF decision to withdraw a correct one, accusing Syrian official media, Turkish Arabic language media, and part of the Gulf media of publishing reports that fueled fear in the region. He also pointed to pressure from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to prevent Arab Kurdish clashes from spreading from Afrin (northwestern Aleppo countryside, near the Turkish border) to Kirkuk (northern Iraq) and crossing the Syrian border.
He said the SDF does not want clashes with the Arab component, warning of the “danger” of confrontations and bloodshed between Kurds and Arabs, given the demographic intermingling between Arab and Kurdish villages and towns, its extension into Iraq, and the area’s tribal nature.
He added that more than 80% of the SDF has become Kurdish, after many Arab fighters defected, while only a few formations remained, most notably the Northern Democratic Brigade led by “Abu Omar al-Idlibi.”
SDF insists on fighting
The SDF continues to confront the Syrian government despite its losses on the ground. It announced a general mobilization and called on the Kurdish component within the Autonomous Administration to take up arms and join the fighters.
It also appealed to Kurds in Syria, Iraq, and Turkey, and even in Europe, triggering clashes and protests in European and Turkish cities. Some attempted to cross borders, fueling intense polarization and warning of nationalist conflicts.
On the ground, however, it has made no gains on any front against the Syrian army or the tribal forces that supported the government and facilitated its entry into eastern cities.
Researcher on eastern Syria affairs Amer al-Methqal does not believe there is real resistance from the SDF, arguing that the label has effectively ended after the recent events.
What is unfolding now is a growing exposure of the role of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), especially its most hardline wing within the SDF, according to al-Methqal, who points to the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the backbone of the forces, and one that has an organic link to the parent party, the PKK.
He believes the PKK’s choice of confrontation is not tied to a realistic reading of the battlefield, but to broader ideological calculations, aimed at inflaming Kurdish street mobilization across the region, including Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, under the slogan of protecting Kurdish nationalism.
Al-Methqal also pointed to Damascus’s repeated insistence that the confrontation is against the SDF as an armed organization and against the PKK, not against Kurdish society.
Ahead of the military operation, Damascus repeated its messages about its clash with the SDF. Among the most notable steps in this context was Presidential Decree No. 13, issued this year, which included decisions related to Kurdish issues, long among the key demands of Kurdish activists and politicians in Syria.
What is Decree No. 13?
Syrian transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa issued Decree No. 13 on 16 January, granting citizenship to all residents in Syria of Kurdish origin, including those registered as unregistered residents (maktoumeen al-qayd).
The decree also annulled all laws and exceptional measures resulting from the 1962 al-Hasakah census.
It declared a national holiday on Nowruz, celebrated by Kurds on 21 March, as a day of fraternity and spring.
It affirmed that Syrian Kurdish citizens are an essential and authentic part of the Syrian people, and that their cultural and linguistic identity is an integral part of Syria’s diverse and unified national identity.
According to the decree, the state commits to protecting cultural and linguistic diversity, and guarantees Kurdish citizens the right to revive their heritage and arts and develop their mother tongue within the framework of national sovereignty.
It also considers Kurdish a national language, and permits its teaching in public and private schools in areas where Kurds form a notable share of the population, as part of optional curricula or as a cultural educational activity.
The decree further commits state media and educational institutions to adopting an inclusive national discourse. It legally prohibits any discrimination or exclusion on an ethnic or linguistic basis, and stipulates punishment under applicable laws for anyone who incites sectarian or nationalist strife.
In contrast, the Autonomous Administration did not receive the decree positively, saying rights are not safeguarded by temporary decrees, but are protected and entrenched through permanent constitutions that reflect the will of all peoples and components.
Political analyst Firas Allawi said these decisions are longstanding Kurdish demands and remove one of the SDF’s negotiating cards.
He added that they also support the military track and contribute to division within the SDF’s base, as it loses some leverage through support for these decisions and through producing alternatives other than military solutions.
He argued that if these decrees are properly invested in and implemented, they would reduce tensions on one hand and speed up winning negotiations on the other.
Factors behind the SDF’s weakness
On the factors that, in al-Methqal’s view, exposed the SDF’s weakness in recent days, he pointed to three main reasons.
First is the popular base. Most areas the SDF withdrew from do not have a supportive social and demographic base, and he said the SDF had held, by force and with US military backing, areas with an Arab majority without establishing any form of participatory, democratic governance or fair distribution of wealth.
Therefore, when military operations began, its forces collapsed quickly. He also pointed to major defections among its Arab component, something he considered expected given the compulsory recruitment it had imposed in recent years.
Another factor, he said, was the lifting of US cover and the loss of the counterterrorism partner card.
A third factor was the cohesion of the Syrian army, its operational planning, and its precise monitoring of SDF military positions, as well as what he described as a legal basis for launching operations after the March 10 agreement ended, and the SDF’s repeated violations against residential neighborhoods and government facilities.
Is integration still possible?
After the shift to a military solution, researchers interviewed by Enab Baladi say it is still possible to return to agreements and talks on integration.
Amer al-Methqal said the government still prioritizes political solutions, and this is also the preference of the United States, whose negotiations are led by the US envoy to Syria, Thomas Barrack.
According to al-Methqal, it is clear that the terms of the latest talks did not appeal to SDF leaders and the PKK, who had counted on at least a form of self rule in areas under their control. But the US withdrawal from Deir Ezzor and areas in the al-Hasakah countryside, and the lifting of political cover for the SDF as a counterterrorism partner, stripped it of the cards it relied on.
As a result, integration becomes a proposed option to avoid further bloodshed, but the process will be difficult, particularly given the severe hostility between the two sides, the battles that left dead and wounded, and the PKK’s clear role in steering the current developments.
Al-Methqal argued that meaningful integration cannot happen unless PKK leaders are removed, otherwise matters may head toward a military operation to expel the party by force from al-Hasakah city and its northern countryside, and also in Ayn al-Arab, Kobani (northern Aleppo countryside, near the Turkish border), especially amid reports of violations against the Arab component.
Meanwhile, Tariq Hemo of the Kurdish Center for Studies said there is still room for integration based on the latest agreement reached in Erbil (Kurdistan Region of Iraq) between Thomas Barrack and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, which included a special status for al-Hasakah governorate.
He considered this agreement a good “de escalation” step that prevents clashes and bloodshed and lifts the siege on Ayn al-Arab, Kobani, which is facing difficult humanitarian conditions.
If trust is strengthened and intentions are sincere, he said it could also enable the return of displaced people to Ras al-Ain (northern al-Hasakah countryside, near the Turkish border) and Afrin, complete integration, and close the file.
Civilians celebrate the entry of the Syrian government into Raqqa city in northern Syria, 19 January 2026 (Enab Baladi, Eyad Abdeljawad)
A climate supportive of the Syrian government
According to a Reuters report, the Syrian government planned this operation diplomatically in the same way it planned it militarily, holding a series of high level meetings in Damascus, Paris, and Iraq earlier this January.
Sources familiar with the matter told Reuters on 21 January that these meetings had not appeared in any previous media coverage, and that the United States did not obstruct the operation, even though it produced a fundamental shift in the balance of power inside Syria, at the expense of forces that had previously been considered Washington’s allies.
The United States “betrayed us”
According to a US diplomat and two Syrian sources who spoke to Reuters, Washington began, two weeks after the outbreak of the offensive, sending clear signals to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that it was withdrawing its years long support.
The three sources said the US envoy to Syria, Thomas Barrack, met on 17 January with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and told him that US interests now lie with President al-Sharaa, not with the SDF.
Kurdish political official Hediya Yusuf said, “What coalition forces and US officials are doing is unacceptable, do you really lack principles, and are you ready to betray your allies to this extent.”
Political researcher and analyst Nader al-Khalil believes US policy in northeastern Syria is going through a phase of gradual repositioning, consistent with supporting Syria’s territorial unity under Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, while reducing reliance on the SDF as a field partner in the fight against the Islamic State group, which had been used to justify the SDF’s role and support.
Al-Khalil also said US President Donald Trump made clear that US support for the SDF was situational and temporary, tied to a specific phase at the time, whereas the current stage requires, in US interests, moving toward a direct partnership with the Syrian state, a state to state relationship.
Al-Khalil told Enab Baladi that transferring Islamic State detainees to Iraq reflects a US desire to reduce security risks in Syria, and weakens the SDF by stripping away one of its most prominent negotiating cards.
Political researcher and analyst Ayman al-Dsouqi argued that the US National Security Strategy issued at the end of 2025 explains the movement in US policy in Syria, in terms of reducing direct engagement in the Middle East, sharing burdens, empowering partners, and moving past non state actors toward a more sustainable partnership with states, dealing with them as they are without imposing external expectations or visions.
After the fall of the Assad regime, the Trump administration viewed conditions as more favorable for reducing direct US involvement in Syria, in favor of a more selective presence in areas tied to the direct protection of US interests and the ensuring of regional understandings on Syria. Remaining unresolved files include the fate of the SDF, which the Trump administration tried to integrate into the Syrian state to avoid an Afghanistan like scenario, and to secure transitional arrangements for the eastern region to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State group, according to al-Dsouqi.
Al-Dsouqi added that the Trump administration believed turning its back on the SDF could push it toward a more realistic position in negotiations with the Syrian government. It could also help reduce Türkiye’s concerns about the SDF in Syria by shrinking its presence and size, and strengthen Türkiye’s positive role in post Assad Syria.
“The SDF’s main role as the leading force fighting the Islamic State group on the ground has ended, with a recognized central government that has joined the international coalition.”
Thomas Barrack US envoy to Syria
Turkish support
Türkiye continued to threaten the SDF with the use of force if it refused to implement the March 10 agreement. Turkish politicians stated on more than one occasion they were ready to intervene militarily against the SDF, and Türkiye reinforced its military presence in northern Syria, as monitored by Enab Baladi in September 2025.
However, Türkiye officially distanced itself from participation in Syrian army operations. According to a statement from the Turkish Defense Ministry on 8 January, during the Sheikh Maqsoud and al-Ashrafieh battles in Aleppo (northern Syria), the latest counterterrorism operation in Aleppo was carried out by the Syrian army to protect civilians, and Ankara is ready to provide support if requested by the Syrian government.
After Syrian army operations began in northeastern Syria, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan praised the Syrian army’s performance in the battle. On 19 January, he said he was reassured that the Syrian army had managed this “sensitive operation” with utmost care at every stage, acting with almost surgical precision throughout to ensure no harm came to civilians, something worthy of praise.
During a meeting of the parliamentary bloc of his Justice and Development Party in parliament on 21 January, Erdogan said Türkiye “has defended from the beginning the existence of a Syrian state that preserves its territory and its political unity,” adding that Ankara does not covet anyone’s land and supports the unity of the Syrian state.
Erdogan added that Turks, Kurds, and Arabs will unite and solve the region’s problems together as they have throughout history, and that the only shared umbrella between them is “Islamic brotherhood.”
He said, “As long as the Republic of Türkiye exists and is strong, there is no need for anyone to look for protectors or to chase other friends and partners.”
Nader al-Khalil said Türkiye’s calm is “the silence of confidence, not of negligence.” Despite the absence of Türkiye’s usual fiery rhetoric, he said this does not mean a lack of interest. Rather, it reflects Ankara’s confidence that ongoing understandings, whether with Damascus or through other channels, are moving in a direction that serves its security interests, foremost dismantling and ending the organization linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), without the need for direct military intervention.
Al-Khalil told Enab Baladi that Turkish calm should not be seen as a retreat, but as part of a calculated strategy based on “balancing diplomatic support for Damascus with full readiness to intervene if necessary,” alongside close monitoring of the gradual dismantling of the SDF.
Paris and Erbil back Syria’s territorial unity
France and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq became involved in the battles between the Syrian government and the SDF in northeastern Syria, which resulted in the Syrian government gaining control over large areas that had been under SDF control.
French President Emmanuel Macron, during a call with President al-Sharaa on 9 January, affirmed France’s commitment to supporting Syria’s unity and sovereignty. He stressed the importance of backing Syrian state efforts to consolidate stability and extend the rule of law.
Ayman Dasouki said France is trying to reposition itself in post Assad Syria through the role of mediator. He suggested the Syrian government’s acceptance of France as a mediator may have aimed to neutralize Paris’s support for the SDF, in other words, dismantling external backing for the SDF, while also seeking to ease European concerns by involving Europeans in negotiation tracks related to Syria.
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq also played the role of mediator and host for negotiations between the two sides. Thomas Barrack met in Erbil with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masoud Barzani, and they agreed there on the terms of the 18 January agreement that President al-Sharaa signed in Damascus.
Barzani considered Decree No. 13, issued by Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, which guarantees Kurds’ civil and cultural rights, a step in the right direction, and he repeatedly affirmed his support for Syria’s territorial unity.
In this context, Ayman Dasouki said Barzani’s position reflects a realistic approach aimed at preserving at least minimal Kurdish gains, amid a US trend supportive of the Syrian government, to avoid a Kurdish setback in Syria that could negatively affect the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. He also pointed to Barzani’s desire to use the moment to strengthen his role at the expense of the other Talabani aligned current, something Dasouki said Barzani was able to do by leveraging his strong relations with Türkiye, the United States, and the Syrian government.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa signs an agreement to integrate the SDF into state institutions, 18 January 2026 (Syrian Presidency)
A new ceiling,
Has the federalism dream ended?
The latest shifts in northeastern Syria, especially the decline in the influence of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian government taking over the administration of large areas east of the Euphrates, have reopened questions about the future of the political formula that governed the region in recent years. The project once raised under banners such as the “Autonomous Administration” or “federalism” now appears to be facing a real test, as regional and international balances of power change.
In practical terms, the current scene points to the area moving toward a more centralized model of governance, based on the Syrian state reasserting authority over institutions, services, crossings, and resources, alongside the retreat of political proposals built on self rule or broad decentralization. This shift does not necessarily mean the file has been definitively settled, but it does set a new ceiling for debate.
Questions remain open about whether this trajectory can continue without addressing unresolved issues, foremost the shape of local administration and guarantees for the rights of different components, especially in areas with distinctive social and cultural characteristics such as the Syrian Jazira (northeastern Syria). The absence of an inclusive political approach could reproduce latent tensions, even if there is temporary security stability.
Accordingly, the “federalism dream” in its previous form appears to have receded significantly, if not ended for now, replaced by a different track, reintegrating the region into the structure of the state, while leaving room for negotiations over less ambitious administrative formulas, tied more to services and local governance than to major political projects.
The real challenge, however, lies in how this return is managed. Reproducing earlier patterns of rule based on exclusion or purely security driven governance could revive latent tensions within society, even if the scene looks stable on the surface. Controlling geography does not necessarily settle the relationship with society, nor does it guarantee long term stability.
The dream is not buried
Journalist and political writer Raed Mahmoud believes the setback of the SDF project and the dream of “federalizing” Syria, after the Syrian government took control of Raqqa (northern Syria), Deir Ezzor (eastern Syria), and parts of al-Hasakah (northeastern Syria), does not necessarily mean the project has been buried for good. He argues its fate is still difficult to determine amid the ambiguity of existing political and security understandings.
Mahmoud told Enab Baladi that the uncertainty surrounding the 18 January agreement, the SDF’s attempts to evade its commitments, and the subsequent understanding on al-Hasakah, alongside the Syrian army’s pledge not to enter Kurdish majority areas, raise questions about the meaning of that pledge and its practical limits. He asked: What if the SDF does not accept integration terms? Does that mean the army will actually refrain from entering? Or are we facing a prolonged deadlock represented by the SDF’s hard core, backed by cross border popular support?
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s statement describing the continued presence of the SDF and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in al-Hasakah as “unacceptable” reflects the scale of regional complexity surrounding the file. It suggests that any formula based on the army not entering and on sharing the region’s resources with the SDF would, in practice, mean the self rule project has not been buried, despite a severe military and moral blow, according to Mahmoud.
He said the SDF and the PKK are seeking to frame the confrontation as an existential war against Kurds in Syria, a narrative that resonates among wide segments due to continuous incitement and heavy media pumping. This further complicates the scene and weakens chances for a quick solution.
He also pointed to clear confusion in official discourse, with government statements oscillating between threatening military decisiveness if there is no compliance, and pledging not to enter Kurdish majority areas.
He argued the danger of this contradiction is that the pledge was issued publicly by the president, even during direct communication with the US president, restricting later room for maneuver.
Mahmoud added that Mazloum Abdi’s absence from the signing of the 18 January agreement, and the lack of confirmation of his presence the next day, created political embarrassment for the presidency and served as practical evidence of the limited ability of the SDF and the PKK to implement the agreement, alongside a return to buying time and betting on external support.
He concluded that the days after the four day deadline the government gave the SDF under the al-Hasakah understanding, coinciding with coalition arrangements to transfer Islamic State fighters to Iraq, will reveal the true direction of events, though he said he is not optimistic about the SDF’s ability to respond.
What can be affirmed, he added, is the collapse of the psychological and military “balance” that once seemed to exist between the government and the SDF, which proved illusory. The project was struck at its backbone, and hopes of those who wagered on it have been disappointed.
US disengagement
Political writer Jaafar Khaddour told Enab Baladi that Syria is currently working to reintegrate itself into a new regional order, in parallel with a US approach that now sees the Syrian government as a partner in advancing regional economic and political projects.
The understandings reached between Washington and Ankara on one hand, and between the United States and Damascus after the latter joined the international coalition on the other, contributed significantly to the decline of the Autonomous Administration dream. Under these conditions, any talk of similar projects led by the SDF has become unrealistic, especially with continuing internal divisions within its ranks, making Damascus the stronger party in the equation.
Khaddour said the decree issued by Syrian transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa regarding the Kurdish component is an important step toward a potential political solution, through recognizing this component’s rights, teaching their language, and respecting the particularity of their areas. He stressed, however, that the success of this step depends on time and practical conditions, as obstacles remain on the other side.
He argued that one of the most prominent tools used to threaten sovereignty was the creation of separatist entities with international and regional support, as occurred with the SDF, which tried to turn the military crisis, previously backed by the United States, into a political tool to establish an entity parallel to the state and an independent political alliance.
On the future of al-Hasakah governorate, Khaddour said the city represents the Kurdish geographic depth, and that there is a possibility to apply decentralized governance through Local Administration Law No. 107. He noted, however, that removing human and food resources from the authority of the central state weakens the effective application of the law, as control over resources is a core factor in local governance.
What is Law No. 107?
It is a legislative decree issued by the former regime in 2011. The law aims to apply decentralization of powers and responsibilities by placing them in the hands of segments of the population, as an application of the democratic principle that the people are the source of all authority. It does so by expanding and clearly defining the powers and mandates of administrative unit councils, enabling them to carry out their responsibilities in developing the administrative unit economically, socially, culturally, and urbanistically.
Khaddour said the SDF’s political project is no longer aligned with the new US vision toward Syria, nor with the Syrian state’s role as a practical partner in the region. Washington prefers a unified central system capable of implementing general policies consistent with its new strategy, ensuring reduced societal fears and the formation of a unified national army.
On potential gains, Khaddour pointed to the lifting of US cover from the SDF and the lack of Israeli enthusiasm to invest in Kurdish moves during the military operation as factors that shaped the next stage. This indicates the file has entered a new phase under Syrian state dominance, with priorities being rearranged in line with national and regional interests.
The End of the Balance, Eastern Syria Charts Its Course Toward Damascus Enab Baladi.
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