Enab Baladi- Muwafaq al-Khouja | Bisan Khalaf
The March 10 agreement has resurfaced in negotiations following signs of a rift between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which had stalled implementation of key terms for four months.
Exchanges between the Syrian government and the SDF suggest renewed momentum in the complex negotiation process, despite persistent divergences and growing indications of a potential for partial understandings.
While both sides attempt to build bridges on the foundation of the deal reached between transitional Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi—which promised institutional integration and guarantees of rights—core issues remain unresolved, particularly military arrangements and the concept of decentralization.
This report outlines recent statements, the background of the March 10 agreement, and the obstacles and drivers shaping the negotiation track—especially following the bloody events in Suwayda, another key player in the equation of central governance in Damascus and across Syria.
A Step ForwardAn interview with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi on Saudi-owned al-Hadath TV, aired on July 29, hinted at new understandings in the ongoing negotiations with the Syrian government.
Abdi addressed several key issues, disclosing preliminary agreements on matters such as cultural and linguistic rights, and signaling convergence on long-contested concepts—most notably decentralization.
However, other files remain under negotiation, particularly concerning the integration and future of military institutions.
His remarks followed a July 10 round of talks that ended with negative signals and confirmation from Damascus of no progress, alongside U.S. envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack’s remarks accusing the SDF of stalling integration efforts.
Despite intermittent breakthroughs and setbacks, the negotiations remain unstable and inconsistent.
The talks began after the so-called “historic” agreement between transitional President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Abdi on March 10, which comprised eight main provisions—most significantly, the integration of civil and military bodies into state institutions.
The remaining seven points focused on societal themes, including recognition of the Kurdish community as an integral part of Syria, guaranteeing its constitutional rights and citizenship, and ensuring equal political representation for all Syrians based on merit, regardless of religious or ethnic background.
The Internal Security Forces (Asayish), affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), organize a military parade in Qamishli following the Suwayda events – July 21, 2025 (Photo: Dalil Suleiman / X)
Ceasefire and Year-End Timeline
The agreement includes a nationwide ceasefire and mandates that joint executive committees implement the terms by the end of 2025.
Abdi pledged that his forces would fulfill all obligations before the year’s end and affirmed that daily communication with the Syrian government continues. However, the slow progress stems from issues on both sides, he said.
Osama Sheikh Ali, a researcher on non-state actors at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, told Enab Baladi that Abdi’s statements added little new content but included positive signals—especially concerning decentralization and cultural rights—which could serve as a foundation for broader consensus.
He believes a deal is possible but will require mutual concessions.
Positive Rhetoric Meets Political Gridlock
The “positivity” expressed by some circles within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) regarding their meetings and negotiations with the government was met with negative remarks from the latter. The most recent of these came from Qutaiba Idlabi, Director of the American Affairs Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, who hinted at stalled negotiations.
In an interview with the state-run Ikhbariyah TV channel on July 25, Idlabi stated that the March 10 agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF “does not require months to implement, but rather genuine willingness.”
He added that the Syrian government still believes in the power of reason to reach a clear solution with the SDF and implement the terms of the agreement. He said it is betting heavily on a political solution and relies on wisdom and reason in its response to international efforts and its reading of the current reality.
“The problem with negotiations with the SDF right now is the lack of a unified vision within its leadership, and Paris is ready to pressure the SDF to reach the solution Syrians want,” Idlabi said, noting that the current priority is for the SDF to come to the table through French and American mediation efforts.
He argued that both the United States and France are determined to advance the steps necessary to preserve Syria’s unity, adding that the U.S. is in full understanding with the Syrian government. Meanwhile, the SDF is “trying to impose a social and cultural reality in Deir Ezzor and has seized the province’s resources,” he claimed.
For his part, the U.S. envoy to Syria, Thomas Barrack—whose attendance at the July 9 round of negotiations was reported by media outlets—stated that the Syrian government is eager to incorporate the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into its ranks, while the SDF has been slow to accept, negotiate, and move forward on the matter.
In an interview with Rudaw, Barrack said the Syrian government is “eager to incorporate the SDF” and described Damascus’ approach as “generous.” In contrast, he criticized the SDF as being slow to engage and move the process forward.
“My advice to them is to speed up—there is only one road, and it leads to Damascus,” Barrack said.
A scheduled meeting between Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani and an SDF delegation led by Abdi, planned for July 25 in Paris, was canceled at the last minute at Damascus’ request due to the recent violence in Suwayda.
“My view of the relationship between the SDF and the Syrian government is that the latter has been extraordinarily eager to bring the SDF into a unified state, one nation, one army, one government.The details of how to achieve that have been handled very well, and I think Damascus has shown great generosity.Frankly, I believe the SDF has been slow to accept, negotiate, and proceed. My advice is simple: move faster. There is only one path forward—and that path leads to Damascus.”
— Thomas Barrack, U.S. Envoy to Syria
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi attends an interview with Reuters in al-Shaddadi, Syria – June 13, 2025 (Reuters/Orhan Qereman)
Deir Ezzor… Signs of a Possible UnderstandingThe Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control northeastern Syria, specifically the entirety of al-Hasakah and Raqqa provinces—excluding the cities of Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad, which are under Turkish influence.
They also control parts of eastern rural Aleppo and the eastern bank of the Euphrates River in Deir Ezzor province.
In an interview with the Saudi-owned al-Hadath channel, SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi hinted at a potential unification of the eastern and western banks of the Euphrates in Deir Ezzor, suggesting an imminent institutional merger. He previously discussed the idea with local Arab tribes in the area.
Abdi noted that residents employed in security and military institutions have demanded to keep their posts and roles during the integration process.
Osama Sheikh Ali, a researcher at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, interpreted Abdi’s comments as an indication of an upcoming agreement and a preliminary step to merging civil, security, and military institutions—possibly paving the way for broader integration in Raqqa and al-Hasakah.
He believes the coming weeks could bring a breakthrough in the eastern Syria file, with Deir Ezzor serving as a testing ground for future integration steps elsewhere.
Preparatory Meeting
On July 27, a leaked meeting took place in al-Shaddadi, southern al-Hasakah, where Abdi met with military commanders, heads of local councils, and tribal leaders from Deir Ezzor.
A source who attended the meeting told Enab Baladi—on condition of anonymity for security reasons—that the gathering aimed to discuss the SDF’s full withdrawal from rural Deir Ezzor to enable the Syrian government to assume control of the city and its countryside.
The source claimed this decision came under U.S. pressure on the SDF.
However, the withdrawal—if it takes place—would not be immediate. It would begin with a three-month trial phase to evaluate administrative and military implications. The outcome of this phase would determine future control over Raqqa and al-Hasakah as well.
While this step has not been finalized, it suggests a strategic shift in the SDF’s role within the evolving regional arrangements in Syria—potentially placing the future of the Autonomous Administration at risk, especially in areas like Deir Ezzor and Raqqa that lack strong local support for self-rule.
For years, the SDF has faced significant challenges in Deir Ezzor, particularly public rejection of its governance structure, accusations of marginalizing the Arab population, and persistent security tensions since the fall of the previous regime.
No Official Intention to Withdraw
Amid official silence over the reported “withdrawal meeting,” a military source within the SDF told Enab Baladi (also anonymously for security reasons) that Abdi’s statements affirm the need for national unity but do not indicate an SDF pullout from Deir Ezzor.
The source explained that the talks between Damascus and the SDF revolve around institutional integration, not surrender. The SDF reportedly aims to empower local communities to manage their own civil and military affairs—implying a continued presence but with a greater role for Arab tribal entities.
He emphasized that Deir Ezzor’s strategic value lies in its oil wealth, making it a vital economic resource for the Syrian government. As such, Damascus may push for an SDF withdrawal as part of any agreement. However, the SDF remains opposed to a full exit and prefers a decentralized governance model, indicating that negotiations may be prolonged.
Political analyst Hassan al-Nifi told Enab Baladi that the SDF is not opposed to transferring administrative control of Deir Ezzor to the new Syrian government—especially in sectors like education and healthcare—but two contentious issues remain: the SDF’s weapons and control over oil and gas fields.
These unresolved issues have prompted external actors, including France, to step in and help bridge the gap between the SDF and the Syrian government.
According to al-Nifi, the government aims to assert full control over all eastern provinces—not just Deir Ezzor. Selective control of specific areas undermines the government’s political narrative and approach.
He believes any future SDF role must be defined through negotiated agreements. If decentralization is agreed upon, the SDF’s administrative role should be limited to predominantly Kurdish regions.
Popular Rejection Signals Escalation
The SDF’s presence in Arab-majority Deir Ezzor faces growing popular rejection, alongside escalating security tensions—including armed clashes between regime forces west of the Euphrates and the SDF to the east. These tensions have raised fears of a military confrontation that could forcibly remove the SDF.
The SDF, however, insists on retaining its position in Deir Ezzor, citing concerns over a potential resurgence of the Islamic State group. Its latest counter-ISIS operation took place on July 25 in al-Busayrah, eastern Deir Ezzor.
A non-authorized military source in the SDF told Enab Baladi that the security situation in Deir Ezzor is complicated, largely due to local dissatisfaction and demands for the SDF’s departure. Residents also blame the SDF for lawlessness, including the assassination of activists and tribal leaders.
The source said clashes between regime forces and the SDF stem from mutual military maneuvers. The region, he said, currently follows two parallel paths:
Negotiation Track: Ongoing talks between the SDF and the Syrian government, with regional and international mediation, aimed at a political solution and avoiding conflict.
Military Track: Simultaneously, the SDF is reinforcing its military presence in Deir Ezzor—potentially to pressure Damascus if talks fail.
The area may see a temporary de-escalation due to negotiations, but the contest over influence and resources keeps the risk of conflict alive.
Concerning fears of an ISIS resurgence, the source confirmed that the group still poses a threat in eastern Deir Ezzor’s desert. Despite ongoing SDF operations targeting sleeper cells, the group’s activity could intensify.
However, analyst al-Nifi argues that ISIS returning to its 2018 strength is highly unlikely. While some sleeper cells remain, they do not pose the existential threat the SDF claims.
He believes the SDF has a vested interest in exaggerating the ISIS threat, while also noting that under Turkish-American understandings, the new Syrian government is now responsible for confronting the group in coordination with Turkey.
Maintaining the narrative of an ISIS threat, he added, could serve as a pretext for the SDF to retain its weapons and delay full integration into the Syrian state.
A Previous Model in Aleppo
This is not the first time the Syrian government has sought to enter SDF-held areas. A similar arrangement occurred in Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods in early April, which researchers described as a “test balloon” for the broader deal between Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Abdi.
That agreement, composed of 14 clauses, involved the SDF withdrawing its military forces while Internal Security Forces (Asayish) remained as a transitional step toward integration into the Interior Ministry.
Two batches of SDF fighters—around 900 individuals—were redeployed to northeastern Syria under the protection of the Syrian Ministry of Defense. The deal also included prisoner exchanges and mutual prison evacuations.
By mid-April, the government and negotiating committee began implementing service-related provisions in the two Aleppo neighborhoods, including the removal of sand barriers and reopening of streets.
To date, Asayish continues to handle security matters, while local councils manage services—bringing relative calm and stability to both districts.
Military training of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in al-Hasakah – April 5, 2025 (SDF Media Center)
How the Suwayda Conflict Shaped NegotiationsThe recent violence in Suwayda has cast a shadow over several political and security files inside Syria and beyond, including the ongoing negotiations between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi described the Suwayda events as a sign of the need for dialogue and political agreement, emphasizing a shift from ceasefire to comprehensive peace.
According to researcher Osama Sheikh Ali from the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, Damascus is likely to approach the eastern Euphrates region with increased caution, especially in light of the far-reaching consequences of the coastal uprising and Suwayda violence, both domestically and internationally.
“There is no room for a repeat of such unrest east of the Euphrates—which would be on a much larger scale. If military operations were to occur, what happened in the coast and Suwayda would seem minor by comparison,”
— Osama Sheikh Ali,
researcher at Omran Center
Sheikh Ali attributes this risk to several factors, including the vast geography of northeastern Syria and its complex demographic makeup, where Arab and Kurdish communities coexist. He believes these dynamics could fuel a large-scale security and military explosion with dire consequences.
So far, both parties have avoided military confrontation, insisting on peaceful dialogue and making progress in negotiations—especially in the wake of the coastal clashes and the recent Suwayda unrest.
Background of the Suwayda Conflict
The Suwayda events stemmed from reciprocal kidnappings between residents of the al-Maqous neighborhood—predominantly Bedouin—and local Druze factions. The situation escalated on July 13 into armed clashes, prompting the government to deploy reinforcements under the pretext of restoring order. However, these government forces committed abuses against civilians, prompting a retaliatory response from local factions.
Israel intervened by striking targets in southern Syria and Damascus—including the General Staff building and the vicinity of the Presidential Palace—in support of local factions aligned with Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. Subsequently, forces from the Syrian Interior and Defense Ministries withdrew from the province under a deal with local actors.
The withdrawal triggered retaliatory attacks by local factions against Bedouin civilians, sparking widespread anger across tribal communities in Syria. Armed tribal fighters were dispatched to participate in the fighting.
These scenes evoked memories of the coastal conflict in western Syria in March, when military movements by former regime officers—described as an “attempted coup”—led to mass mobilizations by pro-government factions and armed civilians. The violence resulted in the deaths of over 1,400 people in sectarian killings, according to the government’s official fact-finding commission.
The second batch of fighters from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) departs from Aleppo toward eastern Syria – April 9, 2025 (Aleppo Governorate/Telegram)
Decentralization Takes Shape
The issue of decentralization and federalism has long hindered progress in negotiations. While the SDF insists on these principles, Damascus continues to advocate for a centralized state.
Despite public assurances from SDF leaders and affiliated political and governance bodies affirming Syria’s territorial unity, the Syrian government remains wary of separatist intentions.
In his interview with al-Hadath, Mazloum Abdi hinted at a shift in the SDF’s understanding of decentralization, stating that some ministries—especially sovereign ones—must remain centralized.
His statements echoed those of Ilham Ahmed, co-chair of the Autonomous Administration’s Foreign Relations Office, who told Rudaw on July 27 that airports and border crossings should fall under central authority, while services and internal affairs should remain decentralized.
“Education, health, internal security, and the economy—all of this should operate under a decentralized system.
Responsibilities should be given to regions, cities, or provinces so they can build and manage themselves. People should bear responsibility for their own governance.
If we continue with a centralized model where every decision is imposed on everyone, this will deepen the crisis.
That’s exactly what the former regime did, and that’s how the crisis began. Doing the same thing now will lead to the same result.
When we talk about decentralization, we don’t mean everything is decentralized. Some matters—like border security and airports—should be centralized,”
— Ilham Ahmed,
co-chair of the Autonomous Administration’s Foreign Relations Office
July 27, Rudaw
Osama Sheikh Ali, a researcher at the Omran Center, considered the remarks made by Mazloum Abdi—and earlier by Ilham Ahmed—regarding administrative decentralization and the expansion of local governance, in contrast to the emphasis on the centralization of sovereign affairs, to be a positive indicator that could form the basis for an understanding with Damascus.
He believes that Damascus now realizes that a return to the absolute centralization that previously governed Syria is no longer viable, especially after 14 years of war and the emergence of various local administrations. He notes that Damascus has started to understand the difficulty of reestablishing absolute centralized rule, and that administrative decentralization is becoming increasingly tangible and will be discussed more broadly.
Some ministries in the Syrian government are already moving toward reinforcing the principle of administrative decentralization, notably the Ministry of Education, which began implementing it in the first week of last May.
Challenges in Military Integration
Integrating the SDF’s military forces into the new Syrian army remains one of the most significant hurdles to implementing the March 10 agreement.
While Abdi has expressed support for a unified government, army, and flag, he noted that integrating 100,000 fighters (by his estimate) into the Ministry of Defense is a “major process” that requires extensive discussions.
He confirmed that Kurdish factions are aligned with the SDF’s positions, though there are concerns about merging into the Syrian military without constitutional guarantees.
Abdi also revealed that an upcoming round of negotiations in Paris would focus on the military integration mechanism, affirming that the SDF would become part of the Syrian Ministry of Defense.
Ilham Ahmed linked the integration issue to broader negotiations with Damascus. She argued that it’s not as simple as handing over weapons or fighters without dialogue, stressing that Damascus must understand the will of the people in northeastern Syria and work toward shared responsibility.
Researcher Osama Sheikh Ali pointed out that many specifics remain unknown—for instance, how military integration would work alongside the existing Deir Ezzor Military Council and the intelligence and security institutions under the SDF and the Autonomous Administration.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are preparing to send an aid convoy to the people of Suwayda and are requesting safe passage for its delivery – July 19, 2025 (Syrian Arab Red Crescent).
What Is the Difference Between Political and Administrative Decentralization?
In discussions on governance reform—particularly in post-conflict states or those seeking to restructure power—the term “decentralization” often emerges as a key to democratic reform and a means of balancing central authority with local governance. However, decentralization is not a one-size-fits-all concept. It comes in several forms, most notably political decentralization and administrative decentralization, each with distinct legal and institutional characteristics.
1. Political Decentralization: Local Governance with Legislative and Constitutional Authority
Political decentralization refers to a system of governance where a region, state, or territory is granted broad autonomy—politically, economically, socially, and culturally—within clearly defined geographical boundaries. Local entities operating under political decentralization typically have:
Their own legislative authority, allowing them to issue local laws;
Regional governments and parliaments, independently elected;
A local constitution regulating the functions of regional authorities, provided it does not contradict the country’s federal constitution.
This form of decentralization is commonly found in federal or compound states, such as the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, where power is constitutionally divided between central and regional governments.
Political decentralization is considered the deeper and more impactful form, as it limits federal intervention in regional affairs except in constitutionally defined circumstances. Because it is constitutionally enshrined, it is also harder to amend or roll back.
2. Administrative Decentralization: Service Delivery Under Central Supervision
In contrast, administrative decentralization refers to a governance system in which local authorities or municipal councils are granted limited delegated powers to manage their own affairs—but within a framework defined and controlled by the central government.
These delegated powers typically include:
Management of public services, such as education, healthcare, transportation, and utilities;
Allocation of local budgets and resources;
Oversight of human resources and development planning.
Unlike political decentralization, local administrations under this model do not possess independent legislative authority. They implement national laws uniformly applied across the country and remain subject to central oversight. Moreover, their powers can be amended or revoked through ordinary administrative decisions or legislative changes.
Administrative decentralization can be applied in both unitary states (like France and Egypt) and federal systems, but it does not grant full self-rule.
Core Difference: Constitutional vs. Administrative Authority
The fundamental difference between the two lies in the source of their authority and guarantees:
Political decentralization derives its legitimacy from constitutional provisions that are difficult to alter.
Administrative decentralization is governed by regular laws or policies, which can be revised or restricted at the government’s discretion.
Additionally, political decentralization restricts central government oversight and allows for legal and legislative pluralism, while administrative decentralization maintains a unified legal framework and subjects local administrations to supervision and accountability by the capital.
Whether in the context of restructuring local governance or laying the groundwork for a political transition in Syria or other states, understanding the distinctions between forms of decentralization is essential. It clarifies the scope of powers, ensures genuine local representation in decision-making, and helps prevent conceptual confusion that may result in flawed or misleading political and administrative outcomes.
With Quiet Steps… Damascus Moves East Enab Baladi.
Hence then, the article about with quiet steps damascus moves east was published today ( ) and is available on ُEnabbaladi ( Syria ) The editorial team at PressBee has edited and verified it, and it may have been modified, fully republished, or quoted. You can read and follow the updates of this news or article from its original source.
Read More Details
Finally We wish PressBee provided you with enough information of ( With Quiet Steps… Damascus Moves East )
Also on site :