But you might begin to doubt the pessimistic thesis that Latin America’s underwhelming economic performance is eternal once you compare the continent’s economic performance in the last quarter of the 20th and the first quarter of the 21st centuries. In the late 1980s, unsustainable government debt in Peru fueled price increases that peaked at nearly 3000% annually. But by the early 2000s, Peru had capably reduced the level and the composition of its public debt to the point where credit rating agencies classified its government debt as “investment grade.”
Latin America’s experience of the past two and a half decades provides reasons for optimism for the next 25 years. As in the Peruvian example, the optimism stems in part from improved economic statecraft. Latin American countries weathered the 2007-2009 financial crisis better than most of the rich countries. And a mixture of changes in labor markets and aggressive and innovative anti-poverty policies led to historic declines in economic inequality.
Over the past quarter century, growth in many Latin American countries has been driven by a deepening dependence on commodities such as petroleum, copper, and soybeans, increasingly exported to China. That reliance has delayed the shift toward higher-productivity industries such as manufacturing—the path that led many Asian countries to rapid growth and development.
Latin America’s improved economic statecraft can be seen in its stronger fiscal performance: in taxation, spending, and the management of public debt. This progress is rooted in improved economic institutions and a pragmatic approach to ideology. Mexico’s economic reforms of the 1990s provide a telling example: entering the North American free trade area, granting autonomy to the central bank and the Supreme Court, and creating an autonomous electoral authority.
Recent decades have also seen the emergence of pragmatic approaches to economic policymaking in Latin America in what economist Javier Santiso has called “possibilist” states. Often, such states pursue orthodox macroeconomic policies—fiscal restraint, anti-inflationary monetary policy and cautious management of public debt—reassuring global capital markets. Yet this macroeconomic conservatism is paired with a progressive set of policies aimed at combating poverty and inequality in ways that Cold War-era governments were reluctant to pursue.
President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s governments in Brazil added a third element to the possibilist recipe: “neo-developmentalist” strategies intended to transform the structure of the economy itself, with the country’s colossal national development bank taking the lead.
Tomorrow’s challenges
Neo-developmentalist states seek to avoid the fiscal mismanagement that too often undermined their predecessors. Possibilist and neo-developmentalist states are not only feasible but likely necessary to address the challenges ahead. Their tasks include transforming low-productivity economies dependent on commodities into high-productivity economies driven by manufacturing. They must also confront the emerging 21st-century challenges that Latin America’s first generation of developmentalists could scarcely have imagined.
The third, and perhaps most fundamental, challenge is to establish a new model of social cohesion. Too many people in Latin America and the Caribbean live with a pervasive sense of insecurity. That insecurity is closely related to economic inequality: people with precarious incomes often move in and out of work in the low-productivity informal economy, and are poorly equipped to weather life’s ups and downs.
Greater security and richer social cohesion can grow out of improved economic statecraft. A reasonably functioning system of taxation and public spending constitutes a form of social contract. In exchange for publicly provided goods and services—transport, education and health care—citizens agree not to evade taxes and may even support political parties that advocate raising more tax revenues.
The converse is a broken social contract: a vicious circle of bad government, poor public services and low tax revenues. The shift from the bad to the good state of affairs remains tentative, but it is underway and political actors and international organizations should foster it. Only then can recent gains be translated into a foundation for lasting social transformation and finally dispel the reflexive pessimism of those who doubt Latin America’s potential for progress.
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