That door should stay shut. Over 33 years, Huang built the company at the center of the AI era, but in our view, his conduct nevertheless made his position untenable. He misled directors about undisclosed relationships and oversaw a firm no one could check—a breakdown in trust that was magnified in China, where he advocated loosening export controls even as restricted chips reached Chinese military units and a Shanghai facility tied to Alice Huang’s network.
In the spirit of the transparency we ask of Huang’s advocates, we note that our upcoming book, When Machines Act: The Promise and Peril of Our Agentic AI Future, includes Huang’s own words, drawn from his commentary at our Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute CEO forums.
The Megaspeed entanglement posed a textbook conflict of interest. Megaspeed bought billions of dollars of scarce processors and is under federal investigation, and Nvidia's own code of conduct flags personal relationships as a conflict risk. Nothing currently in the public record indicates Huang ever disclosed the affair or stepped aside from a single decision involving Megaspeed.
Those lapses unfolded inside an organization seemingly engineered to leave its leader unchecked, with roughly 60 direct reports, family in senior posts, and no clear successor, board chair, or chief compliance officer. When a board of directors can no longer trust a chief executive, removal is their duty. We would argue that Huang’s conduct would be unacceptable of any chief executive, founder or not.
China’s record
Far more alarming, other top-tier Nvidia hardware reached a blacklisted institution with ties to China’s military, where American technology could be turned against the United States. Procurement records document A100 and H100 purchases by People’s Liberation Army units, and Reuters reports that a blacklisted defense university bought two H200s through a reseller in September. Neither source says Nvidia made the sales. Exporting controlled silicon to China’s military or blacklisted entities without a license is illegal regardless.
Even without smuggling, Chinese companies tap advanced chips in Southeast Asian data centers built expressly for them, a loophole that was legal until the Commerce Department’s recent rule. The Wall Street Journal reports that Nvidia told many overseas cloud partners to keep Chinese customers below a ceiling of 30% to 49%. A supplier policing that ratio knows the figure, and disclosing it would be an elementary first step toward accountability.
In financial statements, Nvidia has said that over 99% of controlled data-center revenue billed in Singapore came from US-based customers. But a buyer that books orders through a U.S. entity is not the same as an American end user. Megaspeed bought most of its hardware through Aivres, the California arm of Inspur, a Chinese server maker which has been blacklisted for supporting China’s military. Suggesting that Singapore’s surging billings reflected nothing beyond American demand strains credulity.
Under Huang, Nvidia remade itself into its customers’ chief financier, “a central banker for start-ups that needed chips and funding,” as The New York Times phrased it. Through July, its equity stakes ballooned from about $7 billion to $99 billion. It has agreed to conditionally guarantee up to $105 billion in leases for OpenAI’s Ohio campus, and one economist calculates it backstops up to $125 billion of a $500 billion financing program with Wall Street firms.
Without Huang, smaller “neocloud” operators could face a painful reckoning. Nvidia's backing was widely seen as a hedge against capture by its largest customers—hyperscalers such as Microsoft, Amazon, and Google, which together account for about half its revenue. Heavily indebted neoclouds such as CoreWeave, in which Nvidia holds a 7% stake, depend on a patron, and Huang was among their biggest champions.
Of course, financial exposure does not automatically make these investors wrong, but readers deserve to weigh their appeals to due process beside their stake in keeping the financing spigot open. “Many of those deals were a handshake with Jensen,” Musk warned over social media. Supply deals that hang on one man’s handshake leave an enterprise only as sound as his judgment.
Let Nvidia's board do its job
No more persuasive is the rallying cry offered by Anduril founder Palmer Luckey: “China wants Jensen out, so I want him in.” In reality, China wanted Huang to stay in. True, Beijing’s security agencies curbed Nvidia purchases to favor Huawei, but whatever Beijing’s industrial planners may have wanted, China’s AI companies wanted Huang’s chips, and got them. Administration hawks, including Rubio and Scott Bessent, pressed to enforce the very restrictions Huang lobbied to loosen.
Huang’s defenders fall back on a related fatalism, arguing Washington had no choice except to keep selling advanced processors to China in exchange for rare earths. However, America depends less on China for these minerals than commonly imagined. What it lacks is sustained investment to extract and process them. One industry estimate puts a domestic mine-to-magnet supply chain at tens of billions of dollars, rising toward $100 billion over time. Against the $1.9 trillion erased from Nvidia's market value since its October peak, roughly 20 times that top figure, building domestic capacity looks cheap.
Economists across the political spectrum, from Karl Marx to Joseph Schumpeter, have argued that the rapacious nature of capitalism leads to its own demise. History has proven them wrong so far.
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