The most striking feature of the September summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington was not what was discussed—trade, tariffs, technological competition—but what was not. Taiwan was not absent entirely—both sides touched on it in the low-key “agree to disagree” framing register that has come to define the issue—but it was conspicuously absent from the top tier of the agenda.
Pundits continue to portray the Taiwan Strait as the world’s most dangerous flashpoint; the summit’s agenda suggested otherwise.
That does not mean the Taiwan issue has disappeared. Taiwan remains the “core of core interests” for Beijing, and tensions across the Strait remain a central feature of U.S.-China relations. Precisely because the issue is so sensitive, both Washington and Beijing have strong incentives to preserve stability.
For years, the Western world has been counting down to 2027. The year has acquired a talismanic significance for China watchers, military planners, and commentators who see it as the moment Beijing could move against Taiwan.
The “2027” narrative distorts global priorities and triggers unnecessary panic. Countdowns shape budgets and deterrence postures—which is why getting the timeline wrong has serious consequences, for all parties in the relationship.
The gap between those predictions and the reality on the ground suggests many observers have overstated the likelihood of war.
I grew up in Fujian, the Chinese province directly across the Strait from Taiwan, when the shadow of military confrontation shaped daily life. Back then, war felt less like a possibility than an expectation.
The Fujian coastline today tells a very different story. The province is in the middle of a civilian infrastructure boom: Xiamen Xiang’an International Airport—located just three kilometers from Taiwan-controlled Kinmen—is expanding. New high-speed rail corridors are running parallel to the existing coastal lines.
Industrial parks, logistics hubs, and technology clusters are springing up. Most of the money is government-led, but private capital is piling in alongside it.
The construction is transforming what was once a coastal defense zone into one of China’s most prosperous regions. Fujian now ranks among the top eight provinces in total GDP and fourth nationwide in per-capita GDP. Such long-term investment is difficult to reconcile with the notion of an imminent military confrontation.
The boom does not prove that conflict is impossible, but it does reveal the assumptions guiding Beijing’s planning horizon. States preparing for an imminent war prioritize military mobilization and strategic hardening; Fujian, by contrast, is being developed as a long-term engine of economic integration, innovation, and cross-Strait connectivity.
That is why I have long been skeptical of the much-discussed “2027 invasion scenario.” Beijing continues to modernize its military and to preserve the option of force. But the physical landscape of Fujian reflects a strategy calibrated for patience rather than urgency.
Beijing is playing a patient game of chess, not checkers. Despite a slowing economy and domestic labor-market pressures, China continues to subsidize and incentivize companies in Fujian to recruit young Taiwanese to work in the province.
The strategy pairs economic carrots with gray-zone pressure. If Taipei refrains from crossing the ultimate red line of declaring formal independence, Beijing appears confident in its long-term strategy of integration. That is not a fringe view: Many geopolitical analysts, economists, and scholars agree that Beijing will refrain from using force due to the immense political and economic costs of conflict.
Trump’s second term has changed the tactical management of Taiwan. For this transaction-minded White House, the long-delayed $14 billion arms package to Taipei is treated less as an ideological tripwire than as a bargaining chip for a “better deal.”
One historical barometer of the Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangle is how Taiwanese leaders are treated when transiting through the U.S. Periods of closer U.S.-Taiwan political engagement have often been accompanied by more visible and politically significant transit arrangements. By contrast, recent restrictions or delays suggest a greater emphasis on managing relations with Beijing and avoiding unnecessary escalation. For example, in the summer of 2025, the Trump administration reportedly declined to greenlight a high-profile transit stop in New York—and a second in Dallas—for Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te, prompting Taipei to call off the trip, even though Taipei denies that was the reason for the cancellation.
None of this means the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship has collapsed. As Taiwanese friends joke to me over coffee, spend enough time in the lobbies of Taipei’s five-star hotels and you will cross paths with American defense contractors, executing the logistical and bureaucratic work tied to ongoing arms sales.
Yet these quiet preparations reveal a strategic paradox: Washington and Beijing are both preparing for a conflict that they are actively trying to avoid. Taiwan remains the most explosive issue in the relationship—and its very danger is what creates the mutual incentive to keep it stable.
Taiwan’s central role in the global semiconductor ecosystem is another reason to doubt the countdown. Conventional analysis treats chip dominance as a source of instability.
Yet we should take opposite argument seriously: That the economic and technological costs of disrupting Taiwan’s chip industry create powerful reasons for restraint for both Washington and Beijing.
Call it “Silicon Mutual Assured Destruction.” The term is imperfect, but the logic is straightforward: neither side can easily disable the semiconductor ecosystem centered on Taiwan without inflicting severe damage on its own economic and technological future.
Skeptics will object that none of this changes Beijing’s ultimate objective. They are correct. Chinese leaders have never abandoned the goal of reunification, and no one should dismiss the possibility of force. Economic integration, semiconductor interdependence, and diplomatic engagement also do not eliminate the possibility of miscalculation.
Still, the evidence for an imminent conflict is much weaker than the predictions suggest. As 2027 approaches, the Taiwan Strait remains fraught. But the countdown to war that dominates so much public commentary looks like a mirage.
The opinions expressed in Fortune.com commentary pieces are solely the views of their authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Fortune.
This story was originally featured on Fortune.com
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