Farther south, another part of Iran’s regional network was gaining ground. In Yemen, the Houthis seized territory along the Red Sea coast, bringing them closer to controlling the approaches to Bab al-Mandab, the passage connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.
Iran’s efforts to control passage through the Strait of Hormuz are only one part of the picture. The Houthis’ expanding reach in the Red Sea gives Tehran’s partners leverage over a strategic waterway, while Iran-aligned armed groups in Iraq can threaten oil pipelines built to bypass these maritime chokepoints.
From the Mediterranean to the Red Sea
In 2014, Yahya Rahim Safavi, a senior adviser to Iran’s then Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, was at a conference of Iran-Iraq War veterans that was broadcast live on state television. He spoke of Iran’s growing reach through Syria and Lebanon. Iran’s “strategic depth” had stretched to the Mediterranean coast and just to the north of Israel, he declared. Hezbollah’s arsenal and the supply corridor through Syria were central to Iran’s “forward defense,” a strategy intended to deter adversaries and keep conflicts away from Iranian territory.
But Iran has been adapting. Even while fighting its own direct war with the U.S., Tehran has worked to develop other sources of regional leverage. On Jun. 8, Esmail Ghaani, commander of the Quds Force, the overseas operations arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced a “new security belt” extending from the Strait of Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab and from “the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.” His statement pointed to a growing emphasis on the ability of Iran and its partners to threaten maritime transit across both waterways.
They do not need to halt all traffic to exert influence over the passage. Although the Houthis claim they are targeting only Saudi-linked vessels, the threat of attack alone has driven up insurance costs and forced shipping companies to choose longer routes.
Still, the ties between the Houthis and Tehran have deepened since Oct. 2023, and Iranian support has been central to the development of Houthi military capabilities. Some reports suggest Tehran has sent IRGC commanders, military advisers, and missile and drone equipment to Yemen to strengthen the Houthis’ ability to threaten Red Sea shipping.
These interests are reinforcing one another. Iran’s disruption of Hormuz has increased the strategic importance of Red Sea export routes, giving the Houthis greater leverage over Saudi Arabia and forcing the kingdom to shift exports back to Hormuz, where—despite a recent significant uptick in traffic—passage remains uncertain. From Iran’s perspective, the goal of pressuring Saudi oil exports is to raise the costs of war for Washington and the global economy, giving President Donald Trump another reason to think twice before escalating the campaign.
As with the Houthis and Bab al-Mandab, Tehran need not close the strait entirely: intermittent attacks can sustain uncertainty and raise shipping costs. Given Houthi advances in Yemen, diverting exports to Red Sea ports is not necessarily a safer option. Riyadh can shift between routes but cannot entirely evade the risk of disruption.
Among some Iranian strategists, the attack was also interpreted as a broader warning against building pipeline routes to carry Iraqi oil toward Europe through Turkey and Syria: diverting oil away from the straits would not necessarily put it beyond the reach of Iran and its partners.
There may well not be a unified chain of command across the Iranian, Yemeni, and Iraqi fronts, yet attacks from Iraqi territory must be seen as part of a broader campaign, adding to both Houthi pressure in the Red Sea and Iranian disruption in Hormuz. The cost to Baghdad is high, as it is unable to prevent armed factions from launching attacks that expose Iraq to retaliation and undermine its relations with Gulf neighbors. The resulting tensions could also serve Tehran’s interest in limiting its Gulf rivals’ influence in Iraq.
This has strengthened the argument within the Iranian leadership that they should hold firm and, with time, improve their bargaining position in potential negotiations with Washington. The problem with this argument is that mounting costs for its adversaries do not necessarily mean Iran can afford a prolonged confrontation.
The costs of waiting
But Tehran risks drawing the wrong conclusion from this dynamic. Recent developments may encourage Iranian leaders to demand more and offer less, believing that mounting economic costs will eventually force Trump to retreat. But such a scenario is far from being inevitable. Washington might instead respond with further attacks or tighter enforcement of the blockade. Each side would then treat the other’s refusal to concede as reason to intensify pressure, prolonging an uneasy standoff while making an agreement even more difficult.
Saudi resistance to a planned Oman meeting among Iranian and Gulf officials earlier this month already points to limitations in Iran’s strategy. An emerging Iran-Oman agreement over the Strait of Hormuz ostensibly offered a basis for negotiations over maritime passage, but Gulf governments—and notably Riyadh—resisted arrangements that, in their eyes, would legitimize Iran’s unacceptable claim to control transit in the waterway.
Iran’s expanding regional reach, both directly and through its partners, strengthens its position in negotiations. But it also makes it all the more necessary to reassure its neighbors. A settlement will remain difficult as long as Tehran expects those neighbors to accept lasting uncertainty over their legitimate maritime rights in exchange for relief from the immediate threat of disruption.
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