Mowaffak al-Khouja | Mohammad Deeb Bazt
The Syrian government has moved to close the file of Aleppo’s Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods, following a three-day military battle that ended with the withdrawal of Internal Security Forces (Asayish) fighters affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to northeastern Syria, bringing to an end one of the most complex control arrangements Aleppo has seen in years.
The fighting that erupted in early January was not entirely surprising. It followed intermittent rounds of clashes and de-escalation deals that quickly collapsed, before the latest confrontation escalated widely and reshaped control lines in the city’s north.
Between declared reasons and unspoken explanations, the battle carried implications that went beyond its military dimension, touching on sensitive political, security, and humanitarian issues.
In this report, Enab Baladi discusses the narrative of the battle, from the reasons behind its outbreak and its field trajectory, to its impact on the March 10 agreement and the future of understandings between the Syrian government and the SDF. It also examines how the SDF and the Autonomous Administration addressed the events through their statements and official rhetoric, alongside monitoring international reactions, particularly the US position that supports both the Syrian government and the SDF, and the limits of that stance in shaping what happened in Aleppo.
Battle repercussions
Failure to implement agreementsThe clashes in Aleppo reflect the failure to implement previous agreements, most notably the 1 April agreement, which aimed to remove armed forces from the neighborhoods and place government forces in charge of overseeing civil administration. Another key deal was the 10 March agreement at the national level, which sought to integrate troops into the army and allow the government to enter eastern Syria. Differing interpretations of these agreements among the parties, however, contributed to mounting tension and turned the process into open military confrontation, with military decisiveness becoming a primary tool to reduce armed influence and impose the government’s terms.
The gradual consolidation of control in northern Aleppo means any final settlement will remain tied to military and political pressure together, rather than to formal agreements alone.
The operations displaced about 150,000 civilians, amid civil and government relief efforts, 10 January 2026 (Enab Baladi, Mohamed Masto)
Strategic and political files are intertwined with the military situation. Aleppo remains a pivotal point in northern Syria, and any outcome there will affect the rest of the SDF-held areas in the northeast. At the same time, the SDF tried to set conditions for the withdrawal of its elements, reflecting an attempt to resist and entrench positions before accepting any settlement.
Developments in Aleppo also cannot be separated from the regional and international dimension, whether through the constraints imposed by the guarantor parties of earlier agreements or through attempts by external actors to invest in the military scene to achieve political goals, including Israeli, Turkish, and US perceptions of the future of the Autonomous Administration and of Syria more broadly.
This framing helps explain the current confrontation not as a limited military episode, but as one link in a broader chain of political and military tensions, making any assessment of what comes next dependent on the ability to balance military and political pressures on the ground.
Political journalist and writer Raed Mahmoud told Enab Baladi it remains unclear who began the “provocation” and shelled other neighborhoods, but most indicators suggest SDF elements inside Sheikh Maqsoud targeted surrounding areas in Aleppo with snipers and mortar shells, forcing forces positioned around the two neighborhoods to respond.
“Continuous violations over the past year by the SDF disrupted public life in the affected neighborhoods and impacted civilians,” Mahmoud said, arguing that finding a solution was necessary, and that properly implementing the 1 April agreement was essential, away from the SDF’s own interpretation of the deal.
He added that the SDF saw the agreement as a deadline or an opportunity to solidify its influence inside the neighborhoods, granting it a special status that would allow it to keep governing these areas within a framework that appears legally valid on paper, which could be described as a “state within a state.”
Mahmoud said that what happened since the start of the military operation and the evacuation of the neighborhoods could be considered acceptable in terms of the speed of the outcome, with a limited number of casualties recorded. He added there was clear concern for civilian lives, reflected in extending deadlines and allowing SDF elements to withdraw safely to northeastern governorates.
It appears the government received a green light, or at least informed partners and allies, especially Washington and the European Union, which followed the battle with media support for the Damascus government. Any retreat from a decisive outcome, he said, would have negatively affected the government’s position.
In contrast, the SDF, through escalation and calls for resistance, signaled it would not give up any ground easily, and that the cost of removing the Asayish from Aleppo would be high. Field realities, however, showed the outcome came relatively quickly and at a lower cost than the SDF appeared to expect.
The SDF was effectively present in the neighborhoods, possessed and used heavy weapons, and violated the agreement, which was evident on the ground, Mahmoud said. Still, he argued, the reassuring element was that Aleppo would gradually cease to be an open arena of conflict. He added the operation would have repercussions for SDF-held areas in northeastern Syria and for implementing the 10 March agreement. Meanwhile, he expects the SDF to harden its positions and block handover and integration even if its backers abandon it, which he described as the first lesson from Aleppo’s battle.
Mahmoud said the final resolution would most likely be military, and that the government and Syrian society must prevent the operation from being portrayed as targeting the Kurdish component.
He added that Israel is waiting for opportunities to strike at Syria and will not hesitate to exploit the Aleppo file to cast doubt on the new government. He argued that agreements and behind-the-scenes arrangements, along with the speed of the operation, prevented direct investment by external parties.
Mahmoud said Israel is working diplomatically and militarily, behind the scenes and openly, to convince the international community that the new government is unfit and to argue it remains “extremist,” claiming there is no solution except “federalization” or dividing Syria.
“The future is still ambiguous, and the crisis with the SDF requires a fundamental solution,” Mahmoud said, warning Syria could face hurdles and dilemmas similar to Suwayda’s events, where external parties exploit the crisis to push the government into further concessions and to exhaust the state and society, further booby-trapping the internal situation and complicating political and military solutions.
A complex scene
International relations academic Mohammad al-Jabi told Enab Baladi that the scene in Aleppo is complex, and it is still too early to offer an accurate assessment of what is happening on the ground, particularly given the lack of clear information on the stance of the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria toward the fighters who were stationed in Sheikh Maqsoud and refused to leave.
Al-Jabi added that it is not possible at this stage to say the trajectory is inevitably toward escalation. There may be an opportunity for de-escalation and for fighters to withdraw. Even so, he said, the battle for Aleppo appeared militarily decided, while the bigger bet is linked to the Jazira region in northeastern Syria.
He noted the cause of the clashes in Aleppo could be viewed as a negotiating card or a bargaining tool, especially since the neighborhoods under SDF control, both inside Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh and beyond them, constituted a strategic pressure point on the Syrian government.
From this perspective, the government settled the Aleppo file to strengthen its negotiating position regarding demands for decentralization.
Al-Jabi also pointed to Turkey’s role, saying Ankara’s position on Kurdish forces is settled, and that there is a green light from the United States. He said the Syrian foreign minister’s recent meeting in Paris also reflected a form of understandings on this point.
He concluded that the speed of events on the ground prevents firm conclusions about where things will ultimately go, and that field and political variables remain under monitoring, especially amid contradictory positions among local, regional, and international actors.
What impact on the 10 March agreement?
Amer al-Methqal, a researcher on eastern Syria affairs, does not expect developments in Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud to lead to a full collapse of the main lines of the 10 March agreement, particularly given the active US role in it.
However, he suggested the ongoing developments in Aleppo may encourage the Syrian government to push the SDF out of new positions west of the Euphrates, pointing to Deir Hafer as an area that has become a launch point for SDF drone attacks into the heart of Aleppo.
If the Syrian government proceeds, al-Methqal said, it would gain legitimacy in the eyes of guarantors to halt SDF escalation, in addition to the possibility of removing the SDF from eastern Raqqa countryside, especially as it lacks the ability to resist or hold out in flat terrain.
The battles in Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh also revealed the SDF’s fragility in holding ground, particularly given that both neighborhoods are elevated areas in Aleppo overlooking wide swaths of the city, he said.
He added that frequent attacks by the SDF against the Syrian army in the Maadan area encourage efforts to push it out of eastern Raqqa countryside.
Still, al-Methqal argued that any battles that erupt would not be quick, because SDF supply lines are open, unlike in Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh. The SDF may therefore choose confrontation if it decides not to relinquish these areas, in order to strengthen its negotiating leverage.
Government vehicles head toward the Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood to conduct sweep operations, 10 January 2026 (SANA)
SDF denial not backed by factsSince the start of the battle, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) repeatedly denied that any of its fighters were present in Aleppo’s Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods, insisting that those fighting were Asayish forces, described as a civilian police force. However, the nature of the battle, images of military equipment carried by official media, and shelling that hit nearby areas point to the presence of heavy weapons, which security services do not typically possess.
The SDF’s denial is linked to the 1 April 2025 agreement, which stipulated the gradual withdrawal of all SDF military elements to areas east of the Euphrates while keeping only Asayish forces, which were supposed to be integrated into the Interior Ministry under the deal.
After the April agreement, two convoys departed carrying around 900 fighters with light and medium weapons. The agreement then entered a long period of stagnation marked by back-and-forth, and did not go beyond activating joint checkpoints, opening some roads, and exchanging two convoys of prisoners.
A narrative lacking facts
Amer al-Methqal, a researcher on eastern Syria affairs, said the SDF and Autonomous Administration narrative is built on denying the presence of its military fighters inside Aleppo and portraying the neighborhoods under its control as being run exclusively by the Asayish, in an attempt to frame that presence as policing and strip it of a military character.
He added this narrative lacks facts, particularly because the Asayish are a structural part of the SDF system, operating under its political and military leadership, and cannot be separated from it in decision-making or tasks.
The contexts of the latest battle made this clear, al-Methqal said, whether through the Syrian government’s talk of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) elements being involved in obstructing the entry of evacuation buses, or through the large quantities of weapons, mines, and ammunition seized inside the two neighborhoods, equipment that goes far beyond the tasks of a conventional internal security force.
The fortifications discovered in the neighborhoods, the SDF’s combat methods, sniper attacks against civilians, and the level of weaponry seen during clashes also confirm the areas were not security deployment zones, but actual military positions hosting elements and formations directly tied to the SDF’s fighting structure, even if repeatedly wrapped politically and in media messaging in an Asayish facade through SDF media, al-Methqal said.
Government media reported that forces that withdrew from Ashrafieh to Sheikh Maqsoud refused to leave on buses secured by the Syrian government to transport them to northeastern Syria, despite an agreement that included a ceasefire and the transfer of fighters.
The co-chair of the Autonomous Administration, Ilham Ahmed, also welcomed an offer by international forces to redeploy the forces stationed in Sheikh Maqsoud in northern Aleppo to areas east of the Euphrates.
Al-Methqal said the battle’s course shows a real split within SDF ranks in Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh, a division that appeared clearly through defections and escapes recorded during the fighting.
He explained that the faction that left saw the battle as militarily decided and without prospects, and that continuing would lead to futile losses. It chose departure as a lower-cost option, whether through announced settlements or unofficial arrangements. Another faction insisted on confrontation, composed largely of more hardline elements with ideological ties to the PKK.
He noted that official statements spoke of suicide operations by some SDF elements against the Syrian army. Even so, reports have circulated of an undeclared understanding that allowed hundreds of fighters to leave at night toward northeastern Syria, while some were left to face their fate.
How the confrontation erupted
Aleppo has seen rapidly accelerating field developments since mid-last week, ending with the Syrian army taking control of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh and the withdrawal of elements linked to the SDF and its internal security forces, the Asayish, from the two neighborhoods.
These developments were preceded by intermittent clashes between the two sides over recent months, which would quickly end with temporary de-escalation deals without producing a fundamental change in the control map. The first clash between the parties was recorded on 6 October 2025, followed by another on 22 December, before confrontations resumed more broadly in early January.
These developments ended a situation imposed by the SDF in the two neighborhoods, which had been linked to it since the Syrian landscape shifted with the start of the Syrian revolution. For years, Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh represented a special case in terms of local governance, resource provision, and management of security and service files through SDF-affiliated institutions, separate from the institutions of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. This reality continued even about a year after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
The clashes began on 6 January after a series of mutual accusations between the Syrian government and the Asayish, with each side blaming the other for shelling residential neighborhoods and violating the de-escalation agreement in place between them that morning.
Tensions escalated later that day, with heavy-weapons and machine-gun clashes erupting around the al-Layramoun and al-Sheikhan roundabouts, continuing until late at night without changing the control map at the time.
On the morning of 7 January, two humanitarian corridors were announced to allow civilians to leave Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh.
When the deadline for civilian departures ended at 3:00 pm, Aleppo saw the fiercest clashes since the escalation began. Several neighborhoods were hit by artillery shelling, as clashes expanded around Ashrafieh.
These developments ended with the Syrian army announcing at dawn on 8 January that it had entered Ashrafieh and taken full control of it, as well as the Bani Zaid neighborhood.
The army’s advance produced a new field reality, after which SDF forces concentrated in Sheikh Maqsoud. The Syrian army later announced there was an agreement to relocate SDF elements in the neighborhood to northeastern Syria, with their light weapons.
The agreement stalled, according to a military source who spoke to Enab Baladi, due to disagreements within SDF ranks and additional conditions the SDF set, including demands to relocate security detainees and remove its vehicles. This prevented implementation, along with gunfire on buses planned to be used to evacuate fighters on 9 January.
Following this, the Syrian army announced that, after all deadlines granted to the SDF in Sheikh Maqsoud expired, it began sweeping operations in the neighborhood. It said that once operations ended, the neighborhood would be handed over to security forces and state institutions to begin direct work.
On the morning of 10 January, the Syrian army announced it had fully taken control of Sheikh Maqsoud, ending the SDF’s presence in the two neighborhoods.
Residents leaving Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, 10 January 2026 (Enab Baladi, Mohamed Masto)
International climate watches without interveningEvents in Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud drew broadly similar international reactions. Most statements called for de-escalation and restraint, addressing both sides, the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), but without a clear effort to halt the fighting.
The UK’s envoy to Syria, Ann Snow, expressed her “deep concern” over the clashes in Aleppo, the civilian casualties, and displacement, at a time when “Syria’s stability is extremely important.”
As for UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, his spokesperson conveyed his “deep concern” over reports of civilian deaths and injuries in Aleppo.
Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani also urged the Syrian government “not to turn a political disagreement into a national conflict,” and not to allow Kurdish citizens in Aleppo to face pressure, repression, or displacement from the land of their parents and grandparents.
He called on Kurdish parties, especially the SDF, to “do everything possible to stop the fighting and clashes, prevent further bloodshed, and for both sides to work seriously toward adopting dialogue and negotiation to resolve problems.”
Barzani noted, however, that the “dangerous” situation and the fighting and violence currently unfolding in Aleppo “raise deep concern and pose a threat to the lives of civilians and innocent citizens,” amid what he described as threats of ethnic cleansing against Kurds in that area.
Positions more supportive of the government
In contrast, the government received more supportive positions, notably from Jordan’s Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi and his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan, who affirmed continued cooperation and coordination to support the Syrian government and its efforts to “rebuild its country and protect its security, stability, sovereignty, territorial unity, and the safety of its citizens.”
Turkey was the most supportive. Its defense minister offered support to fight the forces controlling Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud, if Damascus requested it.
Turkish support comes in a familiar context, as Ankara considers the SDF and affiliated factions to be an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), its long-standing adversary.
Balanced positions
Journalist and writer Basel al-Mohammad told Enab Baladi that international reactions to what happened in Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud were limited and cautious, and generally took the form of monitoring rather than condemnation or intervention.
He added that most Western capitals treated the events as an internal security matter tied to restoring stability in Aleppo. No sharp political stances or direct diplomatic pressure on the Syrian state were recorded.
He said this approach reflects an international understanding that what is happening falls within the framework of asserting state sovereignty and addressing tension hotspots, not within a trajectory of broader escalation or military operations outside the local context.
What is the US position?
The US position appeared balanced between the Syrian government and the SDF. Washington is the SDF’s main backer and provides funding and military training as part of the fight against the Islamic State group.
At the same time, Damascus has developed a distinct relationship with Washington that progressed rapidly and unexpectedly immediately after the fall of the former regime.
Regarding the two neighborhoods in northern Aleppo, the US stance was reflected in successive remarks by the US envoy to Syria, Thomas Barrack, who initially called for restraint and for tensions to stop.
Barrack welcomed the ceasefire decision announced by the Syrian government unilaterally.
The most notable development, up to the time this report was written, came on 10 January, with Barrack’s visit to Damascus and his meeting with Syria’s transitional president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani.
Barrack arrived carrying messages from US President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, to discuss the latest developments in Aleppo and the broader trajectory of the historic transitional phase Syria is going through.
Barrack’s messaging was balanced, offering support to both sides and emphasizing moving forward with the 10 March 2025 agreement.
“The government of the United States welcomes the historic transition in Syria, and expresses its support for the Syrian government headed by President Ahmed al-Sharaa in its efforts to consolidate the country’s stability, rebuild national institutions, and meet the aspirations of all Syrians to achieve peace, security, and prosperity.
The United States has long supported efforts aimed at defeating the Islamic State group and strengthening stability in Syria, including through Operation Inherent Resolve and our partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose sacrifices were a fundamental pillar in achieving sustainable gains against terrorism.”
Thomas BarrackUS envoy to Syria
The US position, and especially Barrack’s remarks, carried clear signals that can be read in more than one direction, according to Basel al-Mohammad.
Most importantly, Washington did not adopt hardline or escalatory rhetoric toward the Syrian state, and did not signal that what happened crossed known US red lines.
This suggests the United States understands that Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud lie outside the scope of direct US protection or influence, which is concentrated exclusively in northeastern Syria, al-Mohammad said.
He believes security moves in these two neighborhoods do not, from the US perspective, undermine Washington’s military or political arrangements with the SDF elsewhere.
He also sees the stance as reflecting a US desire not to expand disputes with Damascus at this stage, and to settle for monitoring developments without direct engagement.
Will Damascus, Washington, ties be affected?
From a political assessment standpoint, it is unlikely that Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud events will lead to direct tension in the relationship between Damascus and Washington, Basel al-Mohammad said.
He explained that the events took place in a geographic area that is not a US priority, and did not directly affect US forces or interests in Syria.
On the contrary, this calm US approach can be seen as an indicator of separating files, as Washington tries to keep channels of engagement with Damascus governed by a defined political and security ceiling, without being dragged into side confrontations.
Accordingly, these developments may reinforce a reality in which the Syrian state proceeds with reimposing its authority across the national geography, within regional and international equations that have become more pragmatic and less inclined toward escalation.
US envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack holds talks with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa on Aleppo developments, 10 January 2026 (Thomas Barrack, X)
Damascus closes Aleppo file, eyes shift east Enab Baladi.
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