Mohammad Kakhi, Amir Hakouk, Rakan al-Khadr, Wasim al-Adawi
With the deadline for the March 10 agreement expiring at the end of 2025, its provisions remain on hold. Neither side has implemented any of them, and both have traded accusations over delays and obstruction in recent months, without reaching concrete steps to move the agreement forward
Despite repeated meetings at various levels, most notably the meeting between Syria’s transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi on 7 October, the agreement has made no progress, neither on handing over state institutions nor on integrating the SDF’s military and security forces into Syrian state bodies.
A series of clashes also erupted in the al-Ashrafiyah and al-Sheikh Maqsood neighborhoods (in Aleppo, northern Syria) between the SDF-affiliated Internal Security Forces (Asayish) and the Syrian army, despite an agreement signed in April between the Syrian government and the SDF, which included a clause on halting hostilities in the area.
In this file, Enab Baladi examines the fate of the March 10 agreement, the potential scenarios if its provisions fail to be implemented, and the reasons preventing it from becoming a reality that would end the Syrian-Syrian dispute, return large parts of northeastern Syria to the control of the central authority in Damascus, and place the region’s natural resources in the hands of its people on an equal basis.
A deadline nearing its end, and proposals left pending
A source at the Ministry of Information, who requested anonymity because they are not authorized to speak to the media, told Enab Baladi that the Syrian Ministry of Defense recently presented the SDF with an official proposal based on the spirit of the March 10 agreement and taking into account the SDF’s organizational specificity, by giving it an opportunity to gradually integrate into the structure of the Syrian army. The American side also reviewed the proposal.
According to the source, the SDF rejected the Syrian government’s proposal and submitted an alternative proposal on 22 December. It calls for forming three separate brigades, counterterrorism, border security, and women.
The source said this response reflects the SDF’s desire to maintain organizational independence outside the framework of the Syrian army, which contradicts the essence of the March 10 agreement. The Syrian government is currently studying this proposal, along with other issues linked to the file.
The source also told Enab Baladi there is a possibility of an upcoming meeting between Damascus and the SDF, but discussions in that meeting would focus first on the Syrian proposal, not the SDF’s proposal.
Poll, What scenario is expected as the deadline nears for implementing the agreement between the government and the SDF
Enab Baladi conducted an online poll on its website about Syrians’ expectations as the deadline approaches for implementing the agreement between the government and the SDF at the end of 2025. A total of 770 people participated, and the poll ran from 24 to 27 December.
Of those surveyed, 41% said the military option is the most likely scenario, while 34% expected the agreement’s timeframe would be extended, and only 25% believed implementation steps would begin.
Syrians see a military option as the most likely scenario as the deadline for the agreement between the government and the SDF nears (Enab Baladi edit).
What happens after the deadline?
Experts’ views converge around several scenarios if implementation of the March 10 agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) stalls. Chief among them is the risk of sliding into limited or wide security escalation, even if this option appears costly and fraught with danger. Failure of the agreement could reopen the door to the language of military threats as a negotiating tool from Damascus, or create an entry point for limited Turkish military operations under the pretext of security concerns, particularly if Ankara considers that the integration track does not meet its conditions related to dismantling the SDF’s leadership structure.
A source at the Ministry of Information, who requested anonymity because they are not authorized to speak to the media, told Enab Baladi that the March 10 agreement is the governing framework for integrating the SDF’s forces with the Syrian army. The source added that it is not necessarily the case that the state will resort to military escalation after the deadline expires, despite attempts by the SDF to push matters in that direction, noting that options vary if the agreement fails without military confrontation being among them.
In this context, researcher and political analyst Anas Shawakh said the future of the March 10 agreement theoretically oscillates between three main scenarios, though the chances of each are not equal on the ground. Full implementation within the set timeframe through at the end of 2025 seems almost impossible given the lack of time and the complexity of the files. Even achieving a limited portion of the agreement’s provisions is now outside practical calculations.
The scenario of the agreement failing and shifting toward escalation or the military option remains strongly present, Shawakh told Enab Baladi, particularly with the rise in official threatening rhetoric in recent weeks. However, it collides with international, regional, and Arab pressures pushing to preserve the ceasefire and avoid opening a new front. Between these two options, a third scenario stands out as the most likely, according to Shawakh, namely partial implementation of the agreement while rescheduling and detailing its provisions within a clearer roadmap and a new timeframe. This would allow disputes to be managed gradually and prevent a slide into open confrontation, while keeping the political track as a less costly option for all parties.
The agreement is moving toward implementation
Tariq Hamo, a researcher at the Kurdish Center for Studies, ruled out the scenario of the March 10 agreement failing, suggesting that recent developments have pushed the track toward more progress rather than retreat.
Hamo told Enab Baladi that the presence of trained forces numbering tens of thousands of fighters, who have accumulated years of experience fighting the Islamic State group, constitutes a national asset that the Syrian state should benefit from through an organized integration process in line with the agreement. He warned that any political or security setback would give the group an opportunity to reorganize its ranks, particularly given the sensitivity of the prisons and camps files.
According to Hamo, it has become possible to move beyond the fear of failure, with mutual understanding in place, including regarding Turkish concerns, and anticipation of new announcements before the end of 2025 that could open the door to broader understandings and resolving pending files within a Syrian-Syrian political environment based on agreement rather than confrontation.
March 10 agreement
Based on a meeting held between Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi on 10 March, the following was agreed:
Guarantee the rights of all Syrians to representation and participation in the political process and all state institutions based on competence, regardless of their religious or ethnic backgrounds. The Kurdish community is an indigenous component of the Syrian state, and the Syrian state guarantees its right to citizenship and all constitutional rights. A ceasefire across all Syrian territory. Integrate all civilian and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the administration of the Syrian state, including border crossings, the airport, and oil and gas fields. Guarantee the return of all displaced Syrians to their towns and villages, and ensure their protection by the state. Support the Syrian state in its fight against “Assad remnants” (the regime of Bashar al-Assad).Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa meets US Central Command commander Brad Cooper and US envoy Thomas Barrack in Damascus, 12 September 2025 (Syrian Arab Republic Presidency).
Clashes and pressure messagesThe period from the signing of the agreement last March until now has seen sporadic clashes between the two parties along various contact lines, most notably the fighting that erupted in al-Sheikh Maqsood and al-Ashrafiyah neighborhoods (in Aleppo, northern Syria) last October. This prompted a visit to Damascus by SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, during which he met President Ahmed al-Sharaa, in the presence of the US Special Envoy to Syria, Thomas Barrack, and US Central Command commander Brad Cooper.
Syrian Defense Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra said at the time, in a post on X, that he met Mazloum Abdi and that they agreed to a ceasefire across all axes and military clash points in northern and northeastern Syria.
Clashes returned to the same area on 22 December, just days before the deadline for implementing the integration agreement, leaving five people dead and 32 others injured.
The fighting continued for hours before calm returned, after orders were issued by both sides to halt fire.
Clashes and their link to the deadline
Military analyst Brigadier General Abdullah al-Assaad believes the periodic clashes between the Syrian government and the SDF are driven by foreign elements within SDF ranks. He said these fighters, Iranians, Iraqis, and Turks, do not want any agreement between the Syrian state and the SDF.
According to al-Assaad, another driver is Israel’s role and its desire to play on the “minorities” card in Syria to reach its broader goal of dividing the country, with Israel fueling disputes whenever it senses progress in the diplomatic track and negotiations.
Al-Assaad added a third factor, namely the SDF’s wager on certain internal Syrian files, such as the Suwayda file (southern Syria), and some operations carried out by elements affiliated with the former regime, in an attempt to secure a role and an entity within the state. However, al-Assaad said this issue is a red line Damascus cannot accept, as a party seeking integration cannot maintain a separate entity of its own.
For his part, Ammar Jallo, a researcher at the al-Hiwar Center for Research and Studies, argues that most clashes between the Syrian government and the SDF are linked to the presence of Turkey-backed Syrian National Army factions, which have been integrated into the Syrian army, on the front lines with the SDF. These confrontations tend to be larger, and the hostility expressed through these factions is stronger.
Jallo told Enab Baladi that the latest clash between Syrian forces and the SDF in al-Sheikh Maqsood and al-Ashrafiyah was tied to several factors, including the approaching deadline for implementing the March 10 agreement, which stipulates the SDF’s integration into the Syrian army, as well as the recent visit to Damascus by a Turkish delegation that included Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Defense Minister Yasar Guler, and intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin.
Jallo believes Damascus may have wanted to send the SDF a message that it cannot withstand Turkish pressure if the integration agreement is not implemented.
Jallo pointed to another factor, the negotiating exchanges between the two sides referenced by Reuters on 18 December, citing several Syrian, Kurdish, and Western sources. The report discussed a proposal from Damascus indicating readiness to allow the SDF to reorganize 50,000 fighters into three main divisions and smaller brigades. These proposals, deemed unacceptable at the negotiating table, helped heat up the confrontation, as each side sought to impose its conditions.
From a graduation ceremony for an SDF training course in Raqqa (northern Syria), 27 November 2025 (Syrian Democratic Forces).
International parties push toward integrationInternational actors active in Syria pushed both the Syrian government and the SDF to sign the agreement. These parties, represented by the United States, Turkey, and France, are pressing for implementation through negotiations and a peaceful solution, without turning to a military option.
This overlap among influential actors has produced contradictory roles. Some seek to move the track of understanding forward, while others work to obstruct it or steer it in ways that serve their own agendas. According to a report by the American website Al-Monitor on 8 August, Turkish French competition appeared to have disrupted the “mediation” led by the United States between Damascus and the SDF.
France has shown interest in supporting the SDF through meetings it held in recent months, including plans for a meeting between the two sides on French territory in August. Turkey, meanwhile, presents support for the government in Damascus, repeatedly hinting at a military option despite the peace agreement it concluded with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party on its own territory.
As for the United States, it is trying to play a mediating role between the two sides to achieve political integration and implement the March 10 agreement, as reflected in American rounds aimed at narrowing gaps between the parties.
A playground for international competition
Nawaf Khalil, director of the Kurdish Center for Studies, said the American and French roles remain positive in the Syrian file, in contrast to what he described as the negative roles of Russia and Turkey.
Moscow continues to incite against the SDF, Khalil said, and works to deepen the Syrian crisis, while trying to preserve its influence by playing on contradictions between the Autonomous Administration and the SDF on one hand, and the Syrian government on the other, without achieving meaningful success, much as it failed to do previously with the former regime.
On Turkey, Khalil said its involvement in Syrian affairs has not declined, but has increased. Every Turkish visit or move is accompanied by military escalation and attacks carried out by armed groups loyal to Ankara, foremost among them what used to be called the Syrian National Army.
“Every Turkish visit or move is accompanied by military escalation and attacks carried out by armed groups loyal to Ankara, foremost among them what used to be called the Syrian National Army.”
Nawaf Khalil Director of the Kurdish Center for Studies
Khalil added that Turkey’s role remains negative, despite recent calls by SDF commander Mazloum Abdi for Turkey to play a positive role.
The divergent nature of these roles cannot be understood without examining the motives driving each international actor. Their interventions are not rooted in purely humanitarian or abstract political considerations, but are governed by security and strategic calculations tied to their direct interests in Syria and the region.
Political writer Darwish Khalifa told Enab Baladi that the clearest role was that of the United States, through the March 10 agreement, when it brought SDF commander Mazloum Abdi to Damascus. He considered that the eight clauses of the agreement had been written in advance, and that the only discussion was about signing.
The Americans are the sponsors of this agreement, in Khalifa’s words, and they have the greatest interest in integrating the two sides, or placing them within a single military institution, to confront and combat the Islamic State group. This is especially the case because the SDF is responsible for guarding al-Hol camp (in al-Hasakah governorate, northeastern Syria), al-Sinaa prison (in al-Hasakah city, northeastern Syria), and all detention facilities holding Islamic State members and their families, Khalifa added.
Turkey, by contrast, has an interest in the integration of SDF members as individuals, not as a military bloc, contrary to what is currently being promoted internationally. However, Khalifa argued this has become very difficult, given the stark differences in military doctrine between the SDF and the Syrian government. The Syrian army has an Islamist jihadi orientation, while the SDF has an ethnonational, factional character, making fusion in this form extremely hard and potentially leading to infighting among local forces within the Syrian army if pursued.
“Turkey has an interest in the integration of SDF members as individuals, not as a military bloc, contrary to what is currently being promoted internationally, but this has become very difficult due to the complete divergence in military doctrine between the SDF and the Syrian government.”
Darwish Khalifa Political writer
In contrast, countries such as France, the United States, or Britain may have a different vision, seeking stability in Syria with a view to investing in it and bringing it into the Western orbit, while also not wanting the Syrian government or its security and military apparatus to remain the only dominant force in the country, according to Khalifa.
Nawaf Khalil also argued that actors within Turkey, especially those opposed to the internal Kurdish Turkish peace track, are trying to undermine the agreement, viewing its implementation as a gain for Kurds inside Turkey as well, something that conflicts with their domestic political calculations, particularly given the next presidential contests after 2028.
Russia and a “functional” role
Russian political analyst Dmitry Bridzhe believes Russia’s role in the March 10 agreement is more functional than leading. Moscow is not the owner of the agreement nor the party that drafted its provisions, but it remains a player that is difficult to ignore in northeastern Syria due to its military and political presence.
Bridzhe told Enab Baladi that Russia’s positioning near Qamishli (northeastern Syria) and its airport gives Moscow the ability to prevent friction and regulate escalation, while also serving as a channel of communication between Damascus and Ankara, reducing the risks of miscalculation and a slide into a wider confrontation.
In Bridzhe’s reading, Russia is primarily concerned with preventing the area east of the Euphrates from turning into an open arena of conflict that would scramble the situation and drain everyone. For that reason, it tends to push toward interim settlements that reduce costs and provide a measure of stability, without implying it has absolute decision making power over the agreement’s trajectory.
Bridzhe concluded that any potential Russian role will remain constrained by international and regional balances, and may be limited to narrowing gaps over implementation mechanisms and scheduling, rather than imposing a final, comprehensive settlement.
Internal disagreements within both sides of the agreementDespite the declared consensus around the March 10 agreement as a political framework for addressing the file of northeastern Syria, statements by the parties and experts reveal disputes and divergences within the agreement’s sides themselves, and between them.
While the SDF leadership insists its internal position is unified and denies the existence of factions that reject the deal or are subject to external influence, leaks periodically circulate about an internal split led by a foreign wing affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which rejects integration with the Syrian government under the proposed formula.
On the other hand, the Syrian government appears caught between its desire to restore sovereignty at the lowest possible cost and Turkish pressure that repeatedly hints at a military option. Turkey rejects the SDF joining as a single bloc and wants to break up its structure by integrating its members as individuals into the Syrian army. According to Reuters, the Syrian government agreed to incorporate the SDF into the Syrian army in the form of brigades and divisions, on the condition that it relinquish certain command chains and open the areas under its control to units of the Syrian army.
From Turkey’s perspective, the key point of divergence with the Syrian government is linked to ensuring that negotiations with the SDF do not negatively affect Turkish security or the trajectory of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), particularly regarding the concessions the Syrian government might make within the negotiation process.
Ayman al-Desouki Political researcher and analyst
Military vehicles belonging to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), 14 February 2024 (YPG Media Center)
Does the PKK wing reject the agreement?
Tariq Hamo, a researcher at the Kurdish Research Center, does not see any internal disputes or foreign wings within the SDF that oppose the March 10 agreement. He described such accounts as circulating accusations promoted by parties close to the authorities in Damascus and, in his view, based on inaccurate pretexts.
Hamo argues that the SDF’s leadership structure is known and clear, and that the decision to sign the agreement came from the military leadership and the relevant councils, with the participation of administrative officials from the Autonomous Administration. The agreement, Hamo said, was a “bright spot” in a year marked by deep fractures in Syria’s internal front.
Hamo told Enab Baladi that if the existence of influential external power centers within the SDF were real, it would not have been possible to reach an agreement or open a track of rapprochement and dialogue with Damascus.
“There is no foreign wing inside the SDF that opposes the March 10 agreement. These are accusations we are used to hearing from people close to the authorities in Damascus. SDF leaders are known by name, and they are the ones who approved the agreement, which represents a lifeline for Syria and the bright spot that has emerged since the fall of the former regime.”
Tariq Hamo Researcher at the Kurdish Research Center
By contrast, political researcher and analyst Ayman al-Desouki believes the talk of a current within the SDF that rejects the idea of integration and the March 10 agreement carries a “credible” viewpoint. He frames it as a divide between those who see the SDF question being resolved within a national framework and those who link it to a broader regional framework. This may be among the factors affecting negotiations with the Syrian government, alongside others. He also said there is a connection that cannot be ignored between the negotiation track with the SDF in Syria and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) track in Turkey.
For his part, political analyst Anas Shawakh argues that the issue of the SDF relinquishing command chains linked to the PKK is the most sensitive knot in implementing the March 10 agreement, as it touches the core of the SDF’s leadership structure and directly affects its political and security commitments.
“The issue of the SDF giving up command chains linked to the PKK represents the most sensitive knot in the implementation track of the March 10 agreement, because it touches the essence of the SDF’s leadership structure and directly affects its political and security commitments.”
Anas Shawakh Political analyst
Shawakh explained that this point is not only tied to internal factors, but also carries regional dimensions, foremost among them Turkish concerns. Ankara monitors this file closely as part of its national security. Despite the practical difficulty of fulfilling this commitment, Shawakh believes the international and regional climate supporting the agreement, especially from the United States and Turkey, compels SDF leaders to proceed down this path, even if through complex formulas.
However, Shawakh does not rule out the SDF resorting to workarounds, by keeping the influence of certain leaders indirectly, or through something like “shadow forces” that control military, security, and civilian levers even after implementation begins, drawing on accumulated experience in managing such sensitive transitions.
Diverging Syrian Turkish views
Experts’ views reveal divergence between Ankara and Damascus regarding the March 10 agreement, centered less on the principle of a solution and more on its limits and mechanisms.
According to Ayman al-Desouki , the Turkish approach is driven by an immediate security concern, namely ensuring that any negotiations between the Syrian government and the SDF do not reproduce a threat linked to the PKK. This pushes Ankara to press for its concerns to be taken into account in any potential settlement.
In contrast, Tariq Hamo rejects this logic, arguing the agreement is a Syrian-Syrian matter that should not be subjected to external dictates. He believes linking it to Turkish national security constitutes unjustified interference, especially given Turkey’s own internal political track aimed at resolving the Kurdish issue.
Political analyst Dmitry Bridzhe places the dispute in a more pragmatic frame, arguing that Damascus and Ankara theoretically converge on rejecting the continued existence of an independent armed force in northern Syria, but differ over the method and pace. Turkey pushes for dismantling the SDF and integrating its members as individuals with strict security guarantees, while Damascus favors a gradual path that reduces the cost of confrontation and avoids opening a new war of attrition front.
Damascus and the SDF: Rescheduling March 10 or Escalation? Enab Baladi.
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