Enab Baladi – Shaaban Shamieh
Since Syria’s major shift following the fall of the former regime, Lebanese Syrian relations have entered an unprecedented phase in terms of the opportunities available, not the results achieved.
This transformation has not been limited to a change of faces in Damascus, it has also affected the political philosophy that shapes Syria’s approach to its neighbors, foremost among them Lebanon, which has long paid the price for an imbalanced relationship and for being used as an arena for influence and score settling, according to Lebanese researcher and journalist Sohaib Jawhar, who spoke to Enab Baladi.
Jawhar believes that Damascus, under Syrian transitional president Ahmed al-Sharaa, is now presenting a different model in dealing with Lebanon, one based on separating the past from the present and building a relationship grounded in mutual sovereignty and shared interests.
This approach, Jawhar said, is not only reflected in al-Sharaa’s public rhetoric, it is also confirmed by a series of practical steps, most notably direct political engagement with Lebanese officials without security intermediaries or parallel channels, a precedent the relationship has not seen in decades.
In this context, the visit by Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri to Damascus came as a practical test of this new track, and the meetings Mitri held with President al-Sharaa and the ministers of foreign affairs and justice were not limited to diplomatic pleasantries, they tackled the sensitive files that have long been a source of tension between the two countries, the Lebanese journalist added.
He continued that this visit helped reestablish a positive political climate that had begun with the visit of Asaad al-Shibani to Beirut, followed by direct meetings between the two presidents and regular contacts, particularly regarding the eastern border and sensitive security files.
What distinguishes this phase, according to Jawhar, is that the broader political environment has become, at least in theory, conducive to real breakthroughs. The governments in Beirut and Damascus converge in their regional orientations, distance themselves from confrontational bloc politics, and seek to reposition themselves in the Arab and international arenas.
Jawhar noted that border cooperation, long considered a weak point in the relationship, is now seeing notable progress under Saudi sponsorship, reflected in security agreements and direct meetings between the two countries’ military institutions.
As for the refugee file, it has entered a practical track after the launch of the voluntary return program, with return figures that, until recently, lay outside realistic political calculations, Jawhar said.
What stands out in Syria’s new approach toward Lebanon, according to Jawhar, is that it clearly moves away from one of the defining practices of the “Assad era,” namely opening doors to leaders, power brokers, and political figures outside the framework of the state, and using these channels to bypass official institutions or bend Lebanese decision making from within.
A contradiction between the Syrian offer and Lebanese retrenchment
The positive scene, Jawhar argued, collides with a highly complex Lebanese domestic reality. The slow pace of progress does not seem to stem from a lack of Syrian intent or political hesitation in Damascus, as much as it reflects the Lebanese state’s inability to make clear decisions on files still managed through the logic of sectarian balances and fear of internal backlash, a contradiction that today forms the core of the problem in bilateral relations.
Jawhar said this dysfunction is most clearly visible in the file of Syrian detainees and convicts in Lebanese prisons, considering it a test, for Syria’s new rulers, of Lebanon’s genuine intentions to turn the page on the past, rather than a purely legal or procedural issue.
Damascus has expressed explicit readiness to cooperate, including signing a judicial agreement that takes into account all Lebanese reservations and excludes sensitive cases linked to terrorism or major crimes.
Syrian flexibility, Jawhar added, collides with Lebanese domestic calculations where sectarian fear overlaps with political exploitation and pressure from influential forces that see no interest in opening this file at this stage.
On highly sensitive issues such as the Shebaa Farms, Jawhar believes al-Sharaa adopts a realistic discourse that acknowledges the complexities of border demarcation and its connection to regional and international factors, especially the Israeli presence, while at the same time not backing away from the political principle that the Farms are Lebanese.
This “balanced discourse,” according to Jawhar, reflects a Syrian desire to remove the pretexts previously used to justify the continued existence of weapons outside the Lebanese state, without entering unproductive political clashes.
The file of remnants of the former regime present in Lebanon also emerges as a silent factor in the relationship. Damascus views with suspicion the presence of former officers and officials implicated in grave violations, whose exit to Lebanon was secured and who have been granted political and security protection.
Although this file is not publicly raised as a political condition, according to Jawhar, addressing it seriously by the Lebanese side would send an additional message of confidence to Syria’s new rulers and confirm that Beirut is truly ready to sever ties with a closed chapter.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa meets Lebanese President Joseph Aoun on the sidelines of the emergency Arab Islamic summit held in Doha, 15 September 2025 (Presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic)
Iran’s grip in Lebanon, the main challenge
Lebanese journalist and political analyst Dr Ziad Alloush told Enab Baladi that it has become necessary to address Lebanese Syrian files given their political, security, economic, and thus broader development impact, especially amid massive discoveries of hydrocarbon resources, oil and gas, along the eastern Mediterranean coast. Regional and international powers, he said, are pushing strongly to intensify investments in Syria and Lebanon and to create the necessary conditions for stability.
According to Alloush, the most significant challenge obstructing this step lies in Tehran’s grip on the Lebanese file. Even if that grip has loosened somewhat due to geopolitical shifts in the region, it will still seek to obstruct matters on the Syrian track.
French and Saudi mediation to demarcate the border
Another challenge is the issue of border demarcation, Alloush said, noting that since 1923 Lebanon has not demarcated the border because of the lack of realistic, clear, documented historical maps or any previous demarcation through the United Nations. He pointed out that the 1920 decree has a descriptive geographic character rather than a topographic and cadastral determination, in addition to geographic and demographic overlap. He spoke of ongoing work at Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry to secure the legal foundations, documents, and records.
Alloush also pointed to talk of British and French maps that were recently handed over to Lebanon in this regard, alongside information about French mediation. He stressed that the Lebanese Syrian file is under clear Saudi sponsorship within the framework of Saudi Vision 2030 for the Middle East, considering that Syria has declared its alignment with this direction, while “Lebanon is still trying, with difficulty, to break out of the cocoon of the Iranian role.”
Syrian reservations about handing over prisoners
A recent visit by a Lebanese judicial delegation to Damascus did not achieve the desired results in terms of reaching a new judicial treaty regulating the mechanism for transferring Syrian prisoners detained in Lebanon. This came after wide divergence emerged in how both sides approached the draft agreement’s provisions. There is a Syrian desire to complete the detainees’ trials at home or to have convicts serve their sentences on Syrian territory, according to Alloush.
Alloush estimates the number of Syrian detainees in Lebanon at between 2,200 and 2,600 people, including about 200 to 220 detainees considered prisoners of conscience.
He explained that the draft agreement is limited to those already convicted and does not include those still on trial, because transferring pre trial detainees requires a law issued by the Lebanese parliament, which is not currently possible.
Among Syria’s key reservations is that the first clause states that the transferring state, Lebanon, “may refuse to transfer any convicted person or detainee without providing justification, for reasons of its own.” This gives the Lebanese state the right not to hand over any Syrian prisoner without anyone being able to question the legal grounds.
Another clause considered more sensitive for Syrians, according to Alloush, lies in Article 10 of the agreement, which Lebanon wanted to mirror from the treaty it signed with Pakistan.
The article stipulates that the receiving state, Syria, “does not have the right to grant a pardon to any convicted person or detainee it receives from Lebanon,” whereas the agreement with Pakistan does not deprive Pakistan of the right to grant pardons to its citizens that it takes back from Lebanon.
Alloush said Damascus informed the Lebanese delegation that it “will not request the repatriation of anyone proven to have been involved in killing Lebanese soldiers or carrying out bombings that caused civilian casualties.”
According to Alloush, Damascus considers that a mandatory gateway to a sound and strong relationship with Beirut begins with a final resolution to the file of Syrian prisoners in Lebanon, especially since “most Syrians convicted or detained on terrorism charges were among the ranks of the Syrian revolution, and their arrest and trial in Lebanon was due to their political choices.”
The impact of unresolved Lebanese domestic issues
As for how Lebanon’s internal files affect Syrian Lebanese approaches, Alloush said they are very important. The starting point, he argued, is implementing the Lebanese government decision on disarmament and exclusive sovereignty and applying international resolutions, particularly 1701 and 1559. This would mean empowering the Lebanese government, and only it, to shape defense and foreign policies, including the relationship with Syria.
He added that the upcoming parliamentary elections also matter, with hopes pinned on forming new authorities that clearly understand the victory of the Syrian revolution, which would require Lebanon to undertake a political, judicial, security, media, and broader reassessment, the analyst concluded.
The collapse of the former Syrian regime shook the regional influence architecture for which Lebanon had been one of the most prominent extensions over two decades, through the Tehran, Damascus, Beirut triangle. Deep transformations struck at the heart of the scene in both countries in succession, and both Damascus and Beirut drew on the regional climate to entrench a new political landscape aligned with prevailing indicators.
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