Chaos at the heart of government and a failure to take Covid-19 seriously cost 23,000 lives in the first wave of the pandemic, a public inquiry has concluded.
Former prime minister Boris Johnson presided over a “toxic” culture in No 10 and regularly changed his mind, while Cabinet members including health secretary, Matt Hancock, and key scientists all failed to act with the urgency needed to tackle the virus.
Baroness Heather Hallett’s report on the government response to Covid accused Johnson of being too “optimistic” in his outlook in the early months of 2020.
And, she said his special adviser, Dominic Cummings, used “offensive, sexualised and misogynistic” language as he “poisoned” the atmosphere in Downing Street.
The inquiry found that the first and second lockdowns were not inevitable, but the government was left with no choice after failing to implement measures such as social distancing and household quarantine earlier.
Here, The i Paper looks at the most egregious claims in Baroness Hallett’s scathing report – and how it played out at the time.
January 2020
The spread of the virus around the world represented “clear warning signs” but the four UK governments did not take the virus seriously enough until it was “too late”.
By the end of January 2020 it “should have been clear that the virus posed a serious and immediate threat”, the report found.
February 2020
Johnson missed the first five meetings of the government’s emergency committee Cobra in January and February 2020, with Hancock taking the lead instead.
“Johnson should have been advised – and should himself have appreciated earlier – that this was an emergency that required prime ministerial leadership,” the report found.
“At the latest, he should have chaired COBR on 18 February, 2020.”
Boris Johnson (centre) with chief medical officer for England Chris Whitty (left) and chief scientific adviser Sir Patrick Vallance (right), speaking during a press conference, at 10 Downing Street, London (Photo: TV Pool/PA)While leading the meetings, Hancock “gained a reputation among senior officials and advisers at 10 Downing Street for overpromising and underdelivering” as the pandemic unfolded.
The report pointed out that none of the leaders of the devolved administrations – Nicola Sturgeon, Mark Drakeford and Arlene Foster – attended all Cobra meetings.
The lack of urgency in government was “inexcusable” and led to a “lost month” of inaction in responding to the threat, the report said.
Government scientists underestimated how quickly the virus was spreading in the early days and the advice given to the government by the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (Sage), “failed to reflect the need for immediate action”.
Cummings told the Covid inquiry that in February, his view was that the Cabinet Office and Department of Health and Social Care “weren’t banging alarm bells”. “Far from it,” he told the inquiry, “they were going skiing”.
28 February 2020
Johnson had been warned by the Cabinet Office’s civil contingencies secretariat that “Covid-19 looks increasingly likely to become a global pandemic, although this is not yet certain”.
Early March 2020
The prime minister started to chair Cobra meetings in March.
Early in March, the advice to the public was “weak” and focused on hand hygiene and little else.
Face masks were “positively discouraged” for the public, mass gatherings continued and “Mr Johnson’s optimistic nature frequently undermined the serious message he was meant to convey”, the report found.
13 March 2020
The inquiry found that the UK government’s “initial strategy was to slow the spread of the virus”.
On 13 March 2020, “it became clear the true number of cases was several times higher than previously estimated and that this strategy would risk overwhelming the NHS”.
14-15 March 2020
Until the weekend of 14 and 15 March, 2020, the UK’s scientific advisers Sir Chris Whitty and Sir Patrick Vallance, had advised that restrictions should not be implemented until closer to the peak of infections “in part due to their concerns about the severity of the indirect public health, social and economic impacts that the restrictions would have”.
Patrick Vallance and Chris Whitty were the leaders of Sage (Photo: Leon Neal/Getty Images)On a number of occasions prior to mid-March 2020, “both advised that restrictions should not yet be implemented for this reason”.
Whitty and Vallance both acknowledged that restrictions should have been introduced several days earlier.
16 March
The UK government introduced advisory restrictions on 16 March, including self-isolation, household quarantine and social distancing.
But had more stringent restrictions, short of a “stay at home” lockdown, been introduced earlier, the mandatory lockdown that was imposed a week later “might have been shorter or conceivably might not have been necessary at all”, the report said.
23 March
By 23 March, full lockdown was the “only viable option left”.
The report said: “The mandatory lockdown should have been introduced one week earlier. Modelling shows that in England alone there would have been approximately 23,000 fewer deaths between 16 March and the end of November 2020.”
Late March
Despite the Prime Minister announcing a full UK lockdown, telling people not to meet friends or family members they do not live with, Cummings drove to Durham with his family, explaining he was concerned they had Covid and would need help looking after their child – which was not available in London.
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