Independence Protests in Suwayda, Southern Syria: What Comes Next? ...Syria

Enab Baladi – Mowaffak al-Khouja | Wasim al-Adawi | Amir Huquq

On August 16, Jordanian activist Nivin al-Khatib addressed protesters in al-Karama Square in the center of Suwayda (southern Syria), where demonstrators waved the Druze community flag alongside the Israeli flag during a “Right to Self-Determination” rally calling for “independence.” She warned of a so-called “Druze divorce.”

By “Druze divorce,” al-Khatib was alluding to an irrevocable break, hinting at secession from Syria and establishing a new state in the province.

The separatist calls shocked many Syrians. Although demands for autonomy had appeared before, the “Right to Self-Determination” protest was described as a “dangerous turning point” in the Suwayda crisis, creating a new fracture that complicates any political or social settlement.

Activists and researchers from Suwayda, however, argued that the “independence” rally was more of an “angry outcry” against abuses by government forces and the mobilization of Arab tribal fighters from other provinces. These developments raised fears of genocide or ethnic cleansing targeting the Druze, who form the majority in the province, without the protests necessarily representing the community’s consensus.

Enab Baladi examines the motives behind the “independence” protest and its potential impact on the Syrian political landscape, with insights from experts. The report also explores the principle of self-determination under Syrian and international constitutional law, the prospect of Israeli involvement, and possible ways out of the crisis.

Partition or Political Settlement

Like other states once under French and British colonial mandates, Syria’s territorial unity has long been a core preoccupation in domestic and foreign policy. Any challenge to this unity has been seen as undermining state sovereignty, sometimes used as a pretext to discredit opposition, and other times posing a genuine threat to state survival.

Over the past 14 years of war, Syria has witnessed turning points marked by calls for international protection and no-fly zones, followed by proposals for “safe zones” in the north and south, along the borders with Turkey and Israel.

Syrian politics has remained haunted by the specter of partition or redrawn maps. Yet this is the first time the escalation has reached the level of a province openly demanding independence.

Between Decentralization and Federalism

Suwayda has experienced a unique security and political reality for years, beginning under the former Syrian regime and deepening with the 2023 uprising against it. At that time, some voices had already called for self-rule and decentralization, though these demands were rejected by the protest movement itself.

After the fall of the Assad regime, voices in favor of decentralization persisted, led most prominently by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, the spiritual leader of the Druze community. His current is regarded today as the de facto political, social, and military authority in the province.

On the ground, al-Hijri has been moving toward a decentralized administration, amid the absence of formal government institutions such as the “High Legal Committee” tasked with managing services and security in the province, and the “Unified Army,” which merged major factions including the Mountain Brigade under a single military structure.

Fighters from local factions in Suwayda – July 17, 2025 (AFP/Shadi al-Dibisi)

An Unprecedented Event Followed by “Internationalization”

For the first time since 1936, ten years before Syria’s independence under the Franco-Syrian Treaty, residents of a Syrian province publicly demanded full independence from the Syrian state, according to Abdullah Ali, a Lebanese journalist specializing in Syrian affairs at An-Nahar.

These calls, Ali argues, indicate that the fear of partition has become an imminent danger rather than just a threat, reflecting the depth of the crisis triggered by the government’s storming of Suwayda (southern Syria) in mid-July.

Ali noted that the problem between Suwayda and Damascus was, since the fall of the Assad regime, a political issue that could have been resolved through negotiations. However, repeated opportunities were missed. “When the decision was made to storm Suwayda, and massacres, violations, and humiliating practices occurred, the crisis became one of dignity and mistrust,” he said, elevating this dimension above the purely political nature it initially had.

The writer stressed that if these “deep” wounds of dignity are not addressed through nationally grounded measures capable of restoring trust, they will remain an opening for foreign political agendas. He warned that the more such agendas entrench themselves by exploiting Suwayda’s open wounds, the harder it will be to heal them.

Ali further pointed out that the July events only came to a halt after the “internationalization” of the Suwayda issue, through an agreement that explicitly acknowledged Israel’s role and carried the guarantees of the United States, Turkey, and Jordan. Internationalization, in one sense, means moving the issue beyond national solutions and legitimizing the roles of external actors. It also sidelines the relationship between Suwayda and Damascus, making any path toward a solution longer and more difficult, effectively paving the way to today’s situation, he added.

Partition, Secession, and Independence

According to Ali, Suwayda’s trajectory toward partition gained momentum after 2020. At that time, there was only one small party in the province, the Liwa Party, headed by Malik Abu al-Khair, that explicitly promoted secession. But eight months after the Assad regime’s fall, and following the July massacres, the balance shifted: a majority in the city now supports partition and independence, while the once-dominant “unionist” voices have become a marginalized minority.

Ali noted that this evolution paralleled the deterioration of Suwayda’s ties with Damascus, reaching a climax after the massacres. “For the first time, the three Druze sheikhs of the ‘Aql aligned on a common position regarding the transitional authority,” he said, whereas previously only Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri had called for decentralization and for revisiting transitional measures, such as the national dialogue conference and the constitutional declaration, to ensure greater inclusivity and representation.

Until recently, a broad current, including military factions that had entered negotiations to join the Ministry of Defense, rejected al-Hijri’s demands. But the July events dramatically overturned that balance.

What Triggered the Suwayda Clashes?

The Suwayda events began on July 12, following a series of kidnappings between residents of the al-Maqous neighborhood, predominantly inhabited by Bedouins, and members of the Druze community. The incidents escalated into armed clashes the next day.

On July 14, the Syrian government intervened under the pretext of conflict resolution. But its intervention was accompanied by violations against Druze civilians, including degrading treatment, prompting local factions to resist, even those previously cooperating with the Ministries of Defense and Interior.

By July 16, government forces withdrew from Suwayda. Retaliatory abuses and attacks were then carried out against Bedouin residents of the province, according to testimonies obtained by Enab Baladi. In response, convoys of tribal fighters, described locally as fazaat (armed tribal reinforcements), arrived to support them.

Tribal and Bedouin fighters in the western neighborhood of Suwayda city – July 19, 2025 (AFP/Abdulaziz Ketaz)

Law Criminalizes Secession…

UN Conditions on Self-Determination

Syrian laws and the interim constitutional declaration criminalize calls for secession or partition, imposing penalties on those who promote them.

Lawyer and human rights activist Abdul Nasser Houshan told Enab Baladi that Syria’s constitutional declaration contains no reference to self-rule or federalism, nor any provisions that allow for such separatist demands. He explained that any attempt to secede from the Syrian state amounts to partition.

According to Houshan, Syrian national law considers partition, federalism, and autonomy, or even the pursuit of such arrangements—as criminal acts punishable under the Penal Code’s chapter on crimes against state security. Penalties can reach execution. He added that the constitutional declaration cannot be amended to include forms of governance contradicting a unified, sovereign Syria. Such changes would require a permanent constitution, and stability would only begin after the end of the transitional phase.

Syrian Penal Code: Articles 304–305

Article 304: “Anyone committing acts seeking to seize Syrian territory, separate parts of it from the state, or weaken its territorial unity shall be sentenced to seven to 15 years in prison.”

Article 305: “The penalty is raised to life imprisonment or execution if these crimes aim to separate part of Syrian territory.”

Referendum on Partition “Invalid”

Houshan stressed that the right to self-determination applies only to peoples under occupation or colonial rule. No single component in Syria, he said, has the unilateral right to exercise this apart from other Syrian groups, as this would create mini-states within the country, often leading to internal conflict or civil war.

Any referendum on partition or secession in Syria would therefore be invalid, he argued, since it constitutes a crime against state security. Similarly, support for separatist projects amounts to blatant interference in Syria’s internal affairs and violates Article 2 of the UN Charter, which prohibits acts of aggression under international law.

The UN, having adopted self-determination into its Charter through a 1951 amendment, applies this principle within existing borders, which has led to the emergence of multi-ethnic states struggling with shared governance. The organization later excluded applying the principle to regions within independent states.

The UN Charter also enshrines non-interference in states’ internal affairs, meaning self-determination does not automatically confer a right to secession, particularly when separation threatens a state’s stability and territorial integrity.

According to the amended 1951 UN Charter, the right to self-determination is collective, not individual, exercised by a large group bound by common ties such as language, history, and culture.

International law imposes restrictions to prevent this right from fragmenting states and undermining sovereignty. Otherwise, every minority with a shared identity could demand secession, leading to widespread fragmentation.

Notably, the UN Charter does not mention a right to secession. Instead, it upholds the principle of territorial integrity and political independence, prohibiting the threat or use of force against any state (Article 2/4).

While modern international law acknowledges the right of peoples to self-determination, it applies primarily to cases of colonial rule or territories under occupation, not to secession from established sovereign states.

A sign placed by Syrian protesters on the People’s Assembly building in Damascus – July 17, 2025 (Zeina Shahla/Facebook)

From “Humanitarian Corridor” to “David’s Passage”:

Israel Plays Its Cards

Calls for opening a humanitarian corridor between Suwayda (southern Syria) and Israel have stirred political debate over their aims and feasibility.

Analysts described the proposal as “unworkable,” arguing that Israel is pushing it for political and military purposes inside Syria, exploiting the tensions that recently rocked Suwayda under the cover of humanitarian concerns.

Local calls for such a corridor coincided with unconfirmed reports by Axios suggesting that the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump was exploring mediation to reach a deal for direct humanitarian aid deliveries from Israel into southern Syria.

A U.S.-sponsored meeting in Paris on August 19 between Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani and Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer did not result in any announcement of a corridor. Instead, leaks pointed to deeper arrangements on security measures and de-escalation between Damascus and Tel Aviv.

A Political Trap

Mahmoud Alloush, a researcher in international relations, told Enab Baladi that the proposed humanitarian corridor between Suwayda and Israel is essentially an Israeli initiative designed to deepen Israel’s influence among Syria’s Druze and to reinforce its southern strategy.

He said the “corridor is unworkable” but its fate depends on how far transitional president Ahmad al-Sharaa is willing to go in handling the issue.

Political writer Darwish Khalifa argued that, despite the impracticality of opening what some call a “humanitarian corridor” between Israel’s Galilee and Suwayda, given the absence of a direct border, the danger lies in its being a political trap. He said Tel Aviv seeks to ensnare Syrian authorities by amplifying Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri’s narrative that Suwayda is “besieged.”

Penetration and Arming Factions

Alloush explained that there is no justification for such a corridor. “Israel is attacking Syria and interfering in its affairs. It is the one proposing this passage, so the demand should not be taken seriously,” he said.

He added that the humanitarian crisis in Suwayda is partly “manufactured” to invite further Israeli intervention. The real goal, he argued, is to exploit the situation to strengthen Israel’s ties with the Druze community and to use the corridor as a channel for arming Israel-backed factions, complicating Syria’s ability to assert control over Suwayda.

Israeli Contradictions

Khalifa pointed out that Israel’s credibility is undermined by its own policies: “While it imposes a suffocating blockade on Gaza, denying food and medicine, it pushes for a humanitarian corridor with Suwayda.”

He added that the move raises serious questions about Israel’s real motives, particularly during Syria’s fragile post-Assad phase, when local groups have already been drawn into sectarian and ethnic conflicts.

According to Khalifa, the responsibility now falls on Syria’s national components to rebuild internal trust and block foreign meddling, especially from Israel, which has made its expansionist ambitions explicit, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently signaled in remarks about “Greater Israel.”

What Accepting the Corridor Would Mean

The Syrian government rejected the idea of opening a corridor, insisting that humanitarian aid is delivered exclusively through coordination with state institutions in Damascus.

Alloush said Damascus is unlikely to accept the proposal, since doing so would deepen Israeli influence over the Druze in Suwayda and amount to acknowledging Israel’s role in southern Syria, posing major risks not only to Druze affairs but also to Syria’s sovereignty in the south.

He warned that Israel will likely continue pressuring Syria to accept the plan, but Damascus recognizes the dangers of such an arrangement.

War Crimes Allegations

Khalifa noted that the corridor proposal could expose Syria to accusations of “war crimes.” International law distinguishes between a legitimate military siege targeting combatants, provided humanitarian aid is allowed in for civilians, and a siege that starves civilians or deprives them of essentials, which constitutes a war crime.

He said this is why Damascus firmly rejected the idea, emphasizing that aid must be coordinated through official institutions to shield the government from accusations local and regional actors are attempting to level against it.

Khalifa also warned that Damascus fears the “so-called corridor” could be exploited by al-Hijri’s factions for arms smuggling or by drug trafficking networks to neighboring countries.

While some local actors accuse Damascus of imposing a humanitarian and military siege on Suwayda, Interior Ministry spokesperson Nour al-Din al-Baba denied such claims, stressing that the government has opened humanitarian passages for aid deliveries in cooperation with local and international organizations.

The Syrian government rejected the idea of creating a humanitarian corridor, saying it would expose it to accusations of committing a war crime under international law.

Darwish Khalifa, political writer

“David’s Passage”: Israel’s Greater Dream Runs Through Suwayda

The demand for a humanitarian corridor into Suwayda (southern Syria) was accompanied by leaks about an Israeli plan dubbed “David’s Passage,” linking southern Syria to the northeast. The plan is tied to Israel’s long-held ambitions.

Abdullah Ali, a Lebanese journalist specializing in Syrian affairs at An-Nahar, said this comes within the broader framework of “re-engineering the Middle East,” a vision Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu no longer conceals. He is now openly speaking about “Greater Israel.”

“We are face to face with the threat of partition, and the Suwayda scenario is only the beginning,” Ali warned. He added that the most likely plan under discussion is a corridor connecting Suwayda with areas held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as far as the Euphrates River, since Israel seeks to control the region’s water resources.

Alternatively, Ali said, some talk about other possible routes, such as one extending north to Afrin. But this depends on evolving dynamics of power, particularly between Israel and Turkey.

He pointed out that the outcome will also depend on developments in northeastern Syria and the relationship between the SDF and Damascus. The question remains whether the March 10 agreement, whose prospects have “significantly declined,” will be implemented, or whether matters will move toward escalation, reshaping the map of control.

Possibility of Israeli Military Intervention

Israeli intervention played a decisive role in the battle between government forces and tribal fighters on one side, and local factions on the other. Its military involvement led to the withdrawal of the Defense and Interior ministries from Suwayda city.

Politically, negotiations over Suwayda now involve the Syrian government on one side and Israel on the other, under international and regional sponsorship. This raises questions about whether Tel Aviv could back the province’s secession militarily.

But Nawar Shaban, a security and military researcher at the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, rules out the possibility of Israeli military intervention to support Suwayda’s separation. He cited two reasons: first, the problematic situation inside the province, which remains under the control of armed militias, and second, Israel’s exhaustion from its conflicts with Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Hamas in Gaza, and its ongoing confrontation with Iran.

Pressure on the Syrian Government

Shaban told Enab Baladi that Israel is using the Suwayda issue primarily to pressure the Syrian government and place it on the negotiating table, rather than to protect the Druze community.

He added that Israel legitimized its intervention under the pretext of protecting minorities, but this rationale vanished after government forces withdrew and tribal fighters entered Suwayda.

Israel has brandished the “protecting the Druze” card since the early months following the fall of the Assad regime. This was evident during tensions in the towns of Jaramana and Sahnaya last April and July.

Protesters raise the Israeli flag in al-Karama Square in Suwayda, August 1, 2025 (Suwayda Ard al-Karama/Facebook)

From Suwayda: A Cry for Solidarity

Lubna Abdul Baset, one of the activists in the Suwayda movement that began in August 2023 against the former Assad regime, said the “independence” demonstration stemmed from a survival instinct after what she described as “genocide.” She referred to the killing of more than 1,500 people within 48 hours on sectarian grounds.

The Syrian government has denied any “plan or intent to commit genocide against the Druze,” in the words of Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani. He stressed that protecting members of the community is “the responsibility of the Syrian state.”

At a joint press conference with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov during a late-July visit to Moscow, al-Shibani said, “The identity of this community is being exploited for interference in Syria’s internal affairs, especially by Israel. There are armed groups from Suwayda seeking to prove that the government cannot impose security and are spreading chaos.”

Activist Abdul Baset argued that accusations of separatism only gain traction when national security and the army are not built on professionalism, loyalty, and the sanctity of citizenship.

Meanwhile, the Syrian Network for Human Rights documented 814 people killed and 903 injured between July 13 and 24. The tally included civilian victims, tribal fighters, local factions outside government control from the province, as well as members of the Interior Security Forces and the Defense Ministry.

Abdul Baset said people in Suwayda today fear the ideological extremism that has cost lives. She noted that the resulting social rupture has created a psychological state in which some locals feel inclined toward secession or demanding their right to self-determination.

She emphasized that the 14-year revolution sought to build a homeland that prohibits killing and sanctifies the dignity of its people, but that this goal has not been achieved in Syria.

The activist described the government and tribal assault as “barbaric and terrorist,” citing massacres carried out on sectarian grounds and the humiliation of elderly Druze men through the forced shaving of their mustaches, a symbol revered in the Druze community.

She also pointed to looting and arson in more than 30 villages in Suwayda, driven by acts of revenge, along with the displacement of about 150,000 people from the province’s western and northern countryside.

For its part, the government insists that security and army units intervened to end clashes between local factions and tribal fighters. It acknowledges violations by its forces but has pledged accountability through an investigative committee formed for this purpose.

“The people of Suwayda inherited loyalty and sacrifice for the homeland from their ancestors, from Sultan al-Atrash and his companions, who were the first to raise Syria’s green flag, the flag of the revolution, in al-Marjeh Square in 1946. All people of Suwayda are patriots who revere Syria, but today it is Syrians who have abandoned Suwayda.”

Lubna Abdul Baset,

political activist

Fayez al-Qantar, a researcher and academic from Suwayda, said that what happened in the province, describing the attack as “barbaric” and “unprecedented,” created a real sense of threat that drove people to call for separation and raise the Israeli flag.

He told Enab Baladi that such slogans do not represent Suwayda’s actual stance but were rather “a cry of anger.”

Al-Qantar believes that the violations committed by government forces left a deep impact, leading many to unite around cutting all ties with the current authorities in Damascus.

He accused the government of implementing Israeli agendas, facilitating the opening of passages from Tel Aviv to Suwayda, and excluding the province from Syrian national identity. He argued that the current authorities in Damascus came to dismantle Syria and finish off what was left after the fall of the Assad regime.

“Disappointment”

Al-Qantar also pointed to widespread disappointment among Suwayda’s residents at the lack of solidarity from other Syrian communities, with only a few voices expressing support.

Activist Lubna Abdul Baset said Suwayda’s people had expected Syrians to take to the streets, denouncing the “sanctity of Syrian blood” and holding solidarity vigils to reject a repeat of the massacres and looting once committed by the former Assad regime’s army.

“People in Suwayda feel a profound sense of disappointment with their compatriots. They are angry at the ‘barbaric’ assault and equally angry at the absence of solidarity from other Syrians. Aside from a few voices that stood with Suwayda in its ordeal, most were either gloating or indifferent. This also had a severe impact.”

Dr. Fayez al-Qantar,

Syrian researcher and academic

Abdul Baset added that Suwayda residents felt a sense of “betrayal” after witnessing state-run media mobilization and the spread of a “systematic” narrative seeking to justify massacres under political pretexts.

She said this sense of betrayal peaked with the killing of Munir Rijmeh, who was reportedly asked about his sectarian affiliation by an armed man, believed to be affiliated with the Ministry of Defense, before being shot dead.

According to Abdul Baset, Rijmeh’s killing sent a message to Suwayda that the Syrian army, in its ideological formation, does not recognize citizenship or regard Syria as a homeland.

Local media and activists in Suwayda reported that Rijmeh’s killer was likely linked to the state military, though suspicions remain that he may have been part of tribal “fazaat” (armed reinforcements) that entered the province.

Local networks in Suwayda also documented violations and killings by government forces, most notably the killing of a civilian wearing medical uniforms inside Suwayda National Hospital by an armed man suspected of belonging to the Interior Security Forces.

The Defense and Interior ministries promised accountability for perpetrators of violations “from all sides,” but activists inside Suwayda dismissed the announcement.

Protesters in al-Karama Square in Suwayda demand the right to self-determination, August 16, 2025 (AFP)

Steps Toward Resolving the Suwayda Crisis

Activists and researchers from Suwayda believe prospects for a solution are blocked, as groups inside the city have cut ties with the government since the mid-July events. They argue that the keys to a settlement lie with the government, which continues to prevent it.

Political activist Lubna Abdul Baset said the Syrian government blocks a political solution by allowing foreign powers to impose themselves inside Syria, relying instead on militarization and imposing a military cordon around the city.

Researcher and academic Fayez al-Qantar considered reconciliation between Suwayda and the authorities impossible. He said an Arab intervention led by Saudi Arabia, or the revival of a national conference and genuine political transition under UN Resolution 2254, could open a path forward.

Political researcher Dr. Nader al-Khalil outlined five key political steps to exit the Suwayda crisis:

Immediate opening of humanitarian crossings, ensuring unimpeded delivery of aid, and restoring essential services such as water, electricity, and healthcare.

Political and institutional reform through genuine representation of Suwayda’s people in state institutions, reflecting Syria’s social diversity. This would include adopting an administrative decentralization model that grants broad local powers without undermining state unity.

Launching an independent and transparent investigation into the July events, possibly under UN supervision, ensuring accountability for all violations, compensating victims, and initiating reconstruction projects in affected areas.

Initiating a societal dialogue that includes civic and political actors, not only religious leaders, while working to disarm militias and integrate willing members into state security institutions.

Confronting foreign interference and separatist agendas, exposing propaganda promoting partition, and countering it with an inclusive national discourse. This would reinforce Syrian national identity through media, education, and community initiatives.

Political Will for a Solution

Political commentator Abdullah Ali said the authorities in Damascus are no longer capable of resolving the crisis amid internationalization of the issue. Nor can they resort to alternatives such as “tribal reinforcements” (fazaat), which he argued would amount to “suicide.”

Ali warned that missteps in media or politics, whether from Damascus or Suwayda, could make Syrians settle for federalism as the best-case scenario, and risk eventual partition of the country.

Grassroots Initiatives

Activists and politicians have also called for grassroots solutions to Suwayda’s crisis, most notably through the “Popular Initiative Committee to Resolve the Suwayda Crisis,” founded by Sheikh Mutie al-Batin, former spokesperson of the now-dissolved Syrian Islamic Council.

Al-Batin, head of the committee, told Enab Baladi that resolving the crisis requires the efforts of all Syrians, including the state, local authorities in Suwayda, influential actors, tribal representatives, national elites, and religious and community figures.

He added that the solution lies in rejecting foreign interference and bringing all sides to the table under a national framework, supported by ongoing messages and initiatives among stakeholders to prepare the ground for ending the crisis.

Al-Batin emphasized that grassroots initiatives are “extremely important,” since local residents live through the crisis directly, bear its costs, and are both the primary victims and the main actors capable of shaping solutions.

Independence Protests in Suwayda, Southern Syria: What Comes Next? Enab Baladi.

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