In the wake of U.S. strikes on its nuclear sites, Iran has used the uneasy ceasefire with Israel as a strategic pause, as the regime seeks to re-arm, re-organize and crack down on dissent. As has been noted, Tehran is also working to enhance its diplomatic position, by attempting to exploit disunity among Western policymakers, court Chinese support and undermine the International Atomic Energy Agency.
One element of this post-war strategy that has received less attention is Iran’s push to strengthen ties and seek stronger commitments from Belarus and Serbia, its key European allies.
Since the full scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022, Iran has increasingly sought to integrate into the Russia-led multi-pariah order, viewing relationships with similarly isolated regimes as a means of relieving diplomatic and economic pressures. However, Russia’s lack of overt support for Iran in its conflict with Israel has led some to speculate that the two regimes may be having a falling-out.
This apparent rift offers the likely motivation behind Iran’s recent effort to shore up relations with other pariah regimes, both to ensure that this pattern does not repeat and to compensate for shortcomings in its partnership with Russia. Such actions are necessary for the Islamic Republic, should the regime seek to resume direct hostilities with the U.S. and Israel as part of a more protracted war.
Belarus has long sought closer ties with Iran, but these efforts largely stalled until shared support for Russia’s war in Ukraine provided a vehicle for strategic alignment.
When Israel and Iran began exchanging strikes, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s regime largely parroted Moscow’s ambiguous response. However, in the wake of the ceasefire, Tehran leaned on Minsk to take a stronger stance. That same week, the regimes’ defense ministries held high-level talks in China on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, which led Belarus to confirm its desire for enhanced diplomatic and military cooperation.
To facilitate this process, Iran opened a permanent military attaché office within its Minsk embassy complex. Having previously offered arms and nuclear expertise to Iran, Belarus could be in a position to help the Islamic Republic regain its footing ahead of resumed conflict.
Lukashenko has also since moved to clarify his regime’s position, by decrying Israeli and U.S. actions and lauding “Iranian resistance.” This offers much-needed explicit European support for the Islamic Republic, which has seen its network of regional proxies and allies crumble in recent months. Moreover, Belarus has begun lobbying for closer integration between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, which could offer a critical lifeline for the regime’s flagging economy.
Meanwhile, Iran has turned to Serbia as another economic gateway, exploiting the Balkan state’s strained ties with the European Union and its perceived drift into Russia’s orbit. In the last several months, Tehran has secured a set of bilateral commercial agreements with Belgrade. As Serbia resists aligning with EU sanctions policies, Tehran may also use these agreements as a circumvention tool, funneling sanctioned goods and funds through Balkan networks.
Nevertheless, Aleksandar Vucic’s government historically resisted Tehran’s requests for closer security ties, based largely on Serbia’s role as a major arms supplier to Israel. This dynamic has started to shift following U.S. strikes, however. Islamic Republic-aligned media amplified supposed solidarity among Serbian activists and nationalist politicians for Iran, and published warnings from the regime that Israel’s suppliers would be treated as adversaries.
Vucic has responded to Iranian pressure by condemning U.S. strikes and suspending arms sales to Israel. This potential pivot could open the door to closer diplomatic, commercial and military relations with Iran. Given Serbia’s continued aim to expand its arms exports, the Islamic Republic could eventually offer an appealing market, especially if Vucic drifts further from the European Union. Serbian arms dealers could use black market transactions to facilitate this process, as has occurred historically.
It remains to be seen whether the Islamic Republic will secure further tangible concessions from Serbia and Belarus. These partnerships have clear logistical and strategic limitations, much like Tehran’s relationship with Moscow. Nevertheless, Iran’s growing ties with Europe’s pariah states pose a challenge to U.S. and European interests.
For Washington, these overtures threaten to erode the efficacy of sanctions enforcement, particularly if Iran succeeds in establishing new financial pathways through Serbia or deepens integration with the Eurasian Economic Union with support from Belarus. As the Trump administration resumes talks with Iran, such moves could reduce the economic pressure underpinning efforts to constrain the regime’s nuclear ambitions. Ultimately, this may prompt Washington to seek additional leverage — namely by urging Brussels to adopt a tougher line on Serbia and Belarus, or threatening to scrap the Serbian government’s sanctions waivers.
For Europe, the challenge is no less acute. Serbia’s relationship remains frustrated with Brussels, a closer relationship with Tehran could heighten security risks in the Balkans, where unresolved political tensions, Russian influence and porous borders already pose issues for the European Union. Iran’s presence in this environment could offer illicit access to European markets, technologies and financial systems, while potentially facilitating terror-crime links.
The Islamic Republic and its proxies have already exploited such factors to commit acts of terror in Southeastern Europe, including a deadly 2012 bombing in Bulgaria. Furthermore, deepening military ties between Belarus and Iran would intensify existing concerns for European security, particularly regarding the war in Ukraine.
Taken together, Iran’s coordinated outreach to these regimes reflects a deliberate effort in the post-war environment to secure commitments from its partners for diplomatic, economic and security assistance, without relying upon Russia as a mediator.
As Iran adapts to a new phase of confrontation with the West, its relationship with Europe’s pariahs could become a more durable feature of the regime’s strategic posture. This could complicate efforts to establish deterrence, pose a security threat and bolster the Islamic Republic’s resilience amid sustained isolation.
Jack Roush is a Ph.D. candidate affiliated with the London School of Economics Iranian History Initiative.
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