Muwafaq Al-Khouja | Amir Huquq | Marina Marhej
It has been nearly 100 days since the formation of the first Syrian government following the fall of the former regime—a government that inherited a war-torn country and the hopes of Syrians longing for solutions to a crisis that has lasted for years.
The 14-year Syrian conflict and the policies of the previous regime left behind devastation in buildings, infrastructure, the economy, and even the social fabric. Addressing these consequences requires immediate relief measures alongside long-term plans to rescue the country from collapse.
Although 100 days is not sufficient to comprehensively evaluate a government’s achievements or shortcomings, it serves as a benchmark to assess each ministry’s direction during the transitional phase, which is expected to last several more years, and to examine the implementation of governance policies.
Performance across ministries in the current government has varied, largely depending on the individuals leading them and their backgrounds and visions. Some ministries have performed better than others, while others remain without tangible accomplishments on the ground—indicating structural weaknesses and a lack of coordination, despite periodic inter-ministerial meetings.
In this report, Enab Baladi highlights the performance of the Syrian government during its first 100 days, pointing out areas of progress and shortcomings and presenting expert analysis of both the positive and negative aspects.
Seven Months Since the Regime’s FallIn the early hours of December 8, 2024, factions of the “Deterrence of Aggression” coalition entered the Syrian capital, Damascus, announcing the fall of the previous Syrian regime and the end of the authoritarian era led by Hafez al-Assad and his son, Bashar al-Assad. Bashar fled to the Russian capital Moscow, his former ally, leaving behind a country in crisis across all sectors.
At the time, the “Military Operations Administration”—the umbrella group that united the factions responsible for toppling Assad’s rule—took over the management of security and public services. The Salvation Government, previously operating in Idlib in northern Syria, was temporarily transferred to Damascus to act as a caretaker administration until a new government could be formed.
This transitional administration operated for approximately four months until Ahmad al-Sharaa, the Syrian president for the transitional phase, announced the formation of the first post-regime government on March 29. This came after a series of disruptive events, most notably the coastal events, which had sectarian and retaliatory overtones and further destabilized the social and security landscape.
The newly formed 23-minister government was described as technocratic and inclusive, featuring figures from various sects and communities. It received international and United Nations recognition, though it also drew criticism from internal parties—most notably the Autonomous Administration, the governing body of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
The government retained key sovereign ministries such as Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Interior, which were assigned to individuals formerly affiliated with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its governing body, the Salvation Government. Meanwhile, professionals and experts were appointed to more practical ministries such as Economy, Finance, and Communications.
Some ministries were merged—Energy, for instance, now includes Electricity, Oil, and Water—while others were dissolved or newly created, such as the Ministry of Youth and Sports and the Ministry of Emergencies and Disasters.
Is 100 Days Enough for Evaluation?
Ministers presented their visions and plans during the inauguration ceremony held at the People’s Palace, promising improvements in economic, service, and security sectors. However, they did not present clear timelines or well-defined roadmaps.
More than three months into its term, questions are emerging regarding the government’s performance, as scrutiny grows over its accomplishments and failures. This comes amid continued economic stagnation and harsh living conditions, despite political successes such as Syria’s reintegration into the international community and the lifting of decades-old sanctions.
Bassam Hatahet, an expert in governance and administration and the director of the European Institute for Policy Initiatives and Strategic Analysis, told Enab Baladi that evaluating the Syrian government’s 100-day performance under current circumstances is not feasible. Instead, he proposed a methodology for structured performance, which includes:
100 days to establish governance and develop a comprehensive strategy, while ministries and institutions maintain existing services in parallel. 100 days to form and train committees and build governmental operational frameworks across Syrian territory. 100 days to regulate the relationship among the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of power.Fuel shipped from Baniyas Refinery to various sectors via trucks and trains – April 28, 2025 (Ministry of Energy)
Economically: An Abundance of Promises and Decisions, but No ImpactEconomy Sets Its Priorities
The relevant ministries—Economy, Industry, Finance, Energy, among others—were quick to define their individual work priorities as soon as their respective ministers assumed office.
The Ministry of Economy began by appointing economic advisors and subsequently worked to strengthen economic ties with several Arab and foreign countries, including the Gulf states, Jordan, Azerbaijan, Italy, France, Austria, China, and others.
Minister of Economy Mohammad Nidal al-Shaar also announced efforts to develop an economic model tailored to Syria, the launch of an investment system for industrial cities, support for local industry, and boosting investment by signing several memoranda of understanding.
Additionally, the ministry sponsored several exhibitions aimed at increasing exports of local products and attracting investment. Yet, despite these efforts, the Syrian economy remains weak, with no signs of recovery—directly impacting people’s living conditions, which have not improved, even after a 200% salary increase.
Efforts Without Results
The Ministry of Finance attempted to improve the banking system and bolster the Syrian pound’s value. It began drafting financial and tax legislation, seeking to capitalize on the lifting of American and European sanctions and Syria’s reintegration into the SWIFT system. The ministry also expressed its intent to print new high-denomination currency.
Despite these efforts, the financial situation has not improved as hoped. While there has been some stabilization of the pound in Central Bank bulletins, it hasn’t translated into stability in the black market, nor has it restored public confidence in banks or financial institutions.
With ongoing disagreements with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which control Syria’s key oil fields, the Ministry of Energy turned to regional and international partners. The most notable step was the agreement signed with Qatar and Turkey to secure gas and electricity supplies. However, these deals have yet to produce a tangible impact on the industrial or investment sectors.
A Phase of “Individual Work”
Dr. Majdi al-Jamous, economics professor at the University of Damascus, told Enab Baladi that after about 100 days of the transitional government’s tenure, the period could be described as one of “individual work.”
He argued that the current government operates more like a caretaker government, working reactively rather than based on a comprehensive national plan that coordinates all ministries toward institution building. The government’s infrastructure remains at a bare minimum, without noticeable improvement—an outcome of the deeply entrenched weakness inherited from the previous economic system.
“The transitional government operates like a caretaker one, working impulsively, with no structured national project guiding all ministries toward institutional development.”
Dr. Majdi al-Jamous
university professor and economist
Al-Jamous added that a lack of coordination among ministries has resulted in standalone projects and preliminary licenses, meaning most decisions are made unilaterally. “That’s why we haven’t seen any revival in the industrial sector, despite numerous business registrations. Nor have we seen improvements in tourism, education, or real estate. Even import and export regulations remain chaotic and built on contradictory decisions,” he said.
Challenges in Living Conditions—No Breakthrough Yet
Dr. Sabri Hassan, Dean of the Faculty of Administrative Sciences at Ebla Private University, stated that the government has issued all necessary legislation to improve the economy and provide basic services. However, the living situation in Syria continues to face severe challenges stemming from the ongoing crisis since 2011.
He believes that economic deterioration has led to rising poverty and food insecurity. Despite the government’s efforts, it has failed to make tangible progress in addressing any of the fundamental challenges to people’s living standards.
Given the government’s lack of progress on economic and especially investment-related issues, Dr. Hassan argued that it is incapable of addressing unemployment—“which is not just a statistic in Syria but a compounded humanitarian catastrophe requiring a comprehensive political solution and large-scale reconstruction. Without that, the suffering will continue in a vicious cycle,” he said.
Unemployment in Syria surged dramatically after the escalation of military conflict following the 2011 revolution, surpassing 55% between 2014 and 2015. In recent years, estimates have consistently placed it above 20%, while more than 90% of the population lives below the poverty line, according to United Nations estimates.
Trust in the Financial Sector Is Lacking
Dr. al-Jamous noted that the financial sector remains underdeveloped despite efforts by the Central Bank of Syria. The issue, he emphasized, lies in trust. The government has not introduced any reforms due to low reserves in both Syrian and foreign currencies.
No new high-denomination currency has been printed to ease liquidity issues or facilitate storage, nor has any legislation been enacted to regulate corporate operations and investment.
He predicted that following the lifting of sanctions and Syria’s reintegration into the SWIFT network, foreign aid could help improve foreign currency reserves, giving the Central Bank tools to intervene in the market, control exchange rates, and inject liquidity into banks to rebuild confidence in the financial sector.
He also pointed out that the banking sector has not seen the entry of new banks or the revival of existing ones. International money transfer companies have also been reluctant to operate due to licensing inconsistencies.
Banking System Faces Major Obstacles
Dr. Hassan explained that banking services and mechanisms are key to Syria’s economic recovery. However, the government—through the Central Bank—has placed numerous obstacles in the sector’s path, most notably the lack of liquidity, which he described as the primary challenge for both banks and the public.
He emphasized that salary increases could enhance consumers’ purchasing power and thus stimulate demand and medium- to long-term investment—provided inflation is kept in check. He warned that any wage increases should not be accompanied by rising prices and called for efforts to reduce overall price levels.
Dr. Hassan also criticized the “ShamCash” platform, which he said has failed to meet expectations, particularly in ensuring full salary disbursement and liquidity. Instead of developing alternatives like “ShamCash,” he recommended revitalizing banks and launching digital payment platforms tailored to salary disbursement and e-commerce.
In mid-April, the Syrian Ministry of Finance mandated that all public sector salaries be deposited via the “ShamCash” electronic platform, making it the official method of salary disbursement. The decision was based on the government’s confidence in the platform, citing its effective use in Idlib before the fall of the previous regime. The goal was to shift from cash-based transactions to digital payments.
Regarding the investment sector, it is believed that despite the government’s efforts, investing in Syria today is a high-risk venture due to the complex overlap of security, economic, and legal crises, and it is only recommended in very limited cases.
The industrial and commercial sectors are facing severe difficulties, particularly in terms of liquidity, which is considered one of the biggest obstacles to achieving any real growth in Syrian industry and trade. This is in addition to the legal and administrative barriers that, according to Dr. Hassan, have failed to meet the requirements of the free market economy approach adopted by the Syrian government.
Proposals and Visions
Dr. Majdi al-Jamous proposed several economic policies the government should adopt:
Revitalize the financial sector, as the Syrian economy is largely dependent on it. Encourage reconstruction companies to invest, offering tax and financial exemptions to boost real estate activity. Support and incentivize industrial zones, avoiding “dreamlike” decisions that are impractical.Dr. Sabri Hassan, in turn, identified several core areas the government should focus on:
Rebuilding vital infrastructure (energy, water and sanitation, transportation). Stabilizing the monetary and financial sector (taming hyperinflation, reforming the banking and tax systems). Stimulating domestic production and diversifying the economy (supporting agriculture, reviving industry, expanding the private sector, leveraging natural resources). Attracting foreign investment and international support (creating a secure legal and investment framework, capitalizing on reconstruction efforts, encouraging Syrian expatriate investment). Institutional reform and anti-corruption (enhancing transparency and governance, reforming public administration, activating oversight mechanisms). Social protection and support for the most vulnerable (strengthening safety nets, improving the labor market, and basic services).Dr. Hassan emphasized that achieving these goals requires a commitment to governance and transparency, particularly in uniting all Syrians across ethnicities, religions, and affiliations. Inclusive participation in decision-making is key. National unity and reconciliation, he said, are essential for success.
On June 4, the United Nations announced that it and its partners provide humanitarian assistance to nearly 2.5 million people across Syria every month.
The Syrian Cabinet Line-Up – March 29, 2025 (Presidency of the Republic)
Public Services: Between Promises and Tangible ApplicationsClear discrepancies have emerged in the performance of ministries responsible for public service sectors. While some ministries have demonstrated concrete progress on the ground, others remain mired in slow implementation or long-standing challenges.
Transportation Takes the Lead
The Ministry of Transport has emerged at the forefront of Syria’s public service sector. A distinct move was made toward restructuring the ministry, unifying administrative references as part of a broader effort to digitize operations, reduce bureaucracy, simplify procedures, and enhance transportation services both within and between Syrian provinces. This strategy also aims to restore logistical connectivity with neighboring countries.
The ministry has made tangible strides in regional and international relations through meetings and agreements with delegations from various countries and organizations, all aimed at advancing the transport sector. Key developments included meetings with Jordanian and Turkish delegations to reestablish road and rail links, overcome barriers to the movement of goods and people, unify transit fees with Jordan, and agree on an implementation plan to rehabilitate 37 bridges in cooperation with the French company Matière.
Health Sector Dependent on NGOs
As for the healthcare sector, despite promises to provide medical services to citizens, rehabilitate hospitals and health centers, and ensure the availability of medicines, Syria’s healthcare system continues to suffer from a shortage of medical staff, poor service quality—particularly in public hospitals—dilapidated infrastructure, overcrowding, and a critical shortage of medicines and medical equipment. This is especially true for cancer treatments and chemotherapy drugs.
The Ministry of Health has largely focused its efforts on continuing vaccination campaigns for children and collaborating with international organizations to launch initiatives that provide free medical and surgical care.
It has also conducted meetings with international delegations and representatives of NGOs to discuss the healthcare landscape and assess its needs. The most notable outcomes of these meetings were agreements on a series of future projects intended to improve healthcare services in partnership with Turkey and Qatar, as well as ensuring that Syria is excluded from any reductions in international health aid provided through global programs.
Power conversion station in Damascus suburb– July 4, 2025 (Syrian Ministry of Energy)
Communications: Lofty Ambitions, Poor Services
The Ministry of Communications has announced a series of “ambitious” projects in recent months. However, these initiatives remain in the foundational stage, while Syrians continue to suffer from poor telecommunications and internet services—whether through 4G or ADSL networks. Additionally, internet data bundles offered by Syria’s two telecom providers, Syriatel and MTN, are expensive and offer poor service quality.
Among the most prominent initiatives announced by the ministry is the “SilkLink” project, a strategic fiber-optic network currently under negotiation with Gulf operators such as STC, Zain, and Ooredoo. The project is expected to be financed with a $300 million investment and aims to turn Syria into a digital hub between Asia and Europe.
The ministry also announced the launch of a 5G pilot in Damascus during the AI–SYRIA 2025 conference held in May. However, this service has remained limited to a narrow testing environment, with no official rollout to the general public or any timeline announced for expansion.
Plans to Advance Education… Refugees and Curriculum Reform Left Out
In the education sector, the Ministry of Education developed two key plans to enhance educational outcomes: one focused on emergency response and the other a long-term strategic development plan.
As part of the emergency response, the ministry focused on restoring, rehabilitating, and reopening several schools across various provinces in cooperation with international organizations. It also mobilized its staff to prepare for the ninth and twelfth grade exams, with related ministerial meetings dominating the ministry’s agenda throughout the 100-day period.
The Ministry of Education adopted a decentralization approach by delegating authority to provincial governors and education directors, allowing quicker decision-making in accordance with local realities, particularly given the variance in infrastructure and logistical conditions from one province to another.
However, key elements of the emergency response plan—such as curriculum reform and returning dropout students to school—lacked any tangible implementation steps, highlighting the slow pace of action despite earlier promises to begin these reforms after the end of the academic year.
With the start of the new school year approaching, the ministry has taken no serious steps to ensure access to education for returning Syrian refugees.
In higher education, the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research issued several significant decisions affecting students and faculty at both public and private universities, as well as technical institutes.
Key measures included adopting an annual system for postgraduate education (master’s programs) and for qualification and specialization programs instead of the previous semester-based system. Another notable decision was the cancellation of the mandatory national graduation exam for faculties of dentistry, pharmacy, architecture, informatics, and nursing at both public and private Syrian universities.
Additionally, students from the University of Aleppo – Idlib branch, who had been hosted at other universities following the branch’s closure, were returned to the main campus in Aleppo. A committee was formed to either merge or convert the so-called “Free Aleppo University” into the University of Aleppo.
Furthermore, the university named “Aleppo al-Shahba” was merged with the University of Idlib to unify academic pathways and degree accreditation.
The Ministry of Higher Education has not addressed the issue of revising and developing university curricula in recent months, except through promises and statements made by the Minister during his meetings, with no actual steps taken toward initiating this process.
Likewise, the ministry has not issued the executive instructions for Decree No. 97 of the current year regarding the return of Syrian government-sponsored students to Syria, which hinders those covered by the decree from making informed decisions.
Decree No. 97 of 2025 stipulates that a government-sponsored student is granted a one-year period to complete the procedures for their appointment, provided they obtained the required academic qualification—stated in their scholarship decision—after March 15, 2011, in the following cases:
The government-sponsored student failed to make themselves available to their sponsoring institution within the timeframes stipulated by the Scientific Missions Law.
The government-sponsored student was delayed in obtaining their degree beyond the maximum duration allowed by the law.
The government-sponsored student changed their university or institution of study.
The government-sponsored student changed their field of study with the approval of the sponsoring entity.
Minister of Education and Deputy Minister of Interior inspecting ninth grade exams in al-Dweila – Rural Damascus, June 23, 2025 (Ministry of Education)
Security and the Army: Progress Met with Setbacks“Defense” Tries to Overcome Obstacles
In the military realm, the Ministry of Defense is making strides—albeit not without challenges—as it navigates key issues such as the integration of factions, defining its structure, and the situations in northeastern and southern Syria.
Regarding faction integration, the ministry has made notable progress in merging formations operating in northwestern Syria, particularly those involved in the former “al-Fath al-Mubin Operations Room”, in which Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) was the leading force.
While there are signs of partial understanding with factions in As-Suwayda, the situation in northeastern Syria remains unresolved. The region, controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is marked by sluggish negotiations and a state of alert and cautious anticipation between both sides.
As for military structure, the ministry is still laying the groundwork for a new army, with promises of external participation in training and strategic planning. Meanwhile, it continues to graduate batches of corps and divisions identified by numbers, though it has yet to publicly announce a complete military map.
“Interior” Ministry: Promises in Public Services
The Ministry of Interior is tasked with both security and civil service responsibilities, including civil affairs, personal status registration, and the management of immigration and passports.
Upon assuming office, Minister Anas Khattab focused initially on improving services, pledging enhancements in the public sector. However, many services remain non-functional in some areas—particularly the registration of new events—due to dilapidated infrastructure in many buildings and outdated systems inherited from the former regime. The fragmentation of databases across the three zones of control, now consolidated under one authority, has further complicated matters.
Before the collapse of the former regime on December 8, 2024, the Syrian Salvation Government—the nucleus of the current government—controlled large areas of Idlib province and parts of Latakia, Hama, and western rural Aleppo. Meanwhile, the Syrian Interim Government held northern rural Aleppo.
The former regime maintained control over most of the remaining territory, except northeastern Syria, which remains under the control of the SDF.
Each of the four zones operated its own data systems, leading to service disruptions—particularly for civil registry tasks—in areas now governed by the new administration (except for northeastern Syria), pending the unification of databases.
On a more positive note, the ministry has completed several steps in this area, including the opening of new buildings and reactivation of services in major provinces like Damascus and Aleppo. However, other regions remain underserved.
One of the minister’s most notable decisions was the reduction of fees for obtaining Syrian passports, which had been a significant financial burden on Syrians in recent years under the former regime.
The cost of issuing an expedited passport for Syrians abroad has been reduced to $400 (USD), down from $800. The regular processing fee has dropped to $200, down from $300.
Within Syria, the fee for immediate issuance or renewal of passports or travel documents for Syrians and those with equivalent status is now set at 1,600,000 SYP, down from 2,000,000 SYP.
The ministry has maintained the performance of immigration and passport offices without interruption and opened a new branch in Idlib, northern Syria. By mid-April, it had issued 160,000 passports.
Efforts to Maintain Security
On the security front, the ministry has worked to address ongoing instability, which persists due to the aftermath of a 14-year war that drained the country’s resources and led to widespread proliferation of weapons. Armed groups and individuals with various ideologies now possess firearms, and kidnappings and thefts are rampant.
The ministry has initiated a new organizational structure and announced its work plan in mid-April. It merged the internal police and security departments into a single agency and appointed a representative in each province.
Enab Baladi has observed a decline in theft and kidnapping incidents in major cities, particularly Damascus and Aleppo, amid multiple announcements of arrests of criminal gangs. However, such crimes remain prevalent along the Syrian coast.
Drug Control: A Battlefront
The Interior Ministry has advanced in drug control efforts, with a noticeable reduction in the trafficking and manufacturing of narcotics—particularly Captagon, which had been linked to the former regime and Maher al-Assad, the brother of the ousted president Bashar al-Assad.
Minister Khattab emphasized that combating drug abuse is part of the ministry’s mission to “protect Syria’s present and future.”
Despite improvements, concerns remain. The 2025 World Drug Report from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime warned that Syria continues to be a major hub for narcotics, even after the fall of the Assad regime—which had heavily profited from Captagon production and trafficking—despite the new government’s efforts to dismantle supply chains.
In a previous report to Enab Baladi, Nawar Shaaban, a security researcher at the Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, said that Captagon smuggling did not end with Assad’s fall. However, the state’s direct involvement—which had protected the Captagon trade—has ceased. The state’s forces and tools may now be redirected to counter the trade, likely reducing its activity.
Recurrent Assassinations: No Serious Investigation
Assassinations have continued across Syria since the fall of the former regime, with varying perpetrators.
Enab Baladi recorded multiple assassinations in Aleppo, targeting individuals linked to the former regime. However, there has been no serious follow-up by the ministry—only threats of investigation and prosecution.
In Daraa, southern Syria, assassinations have targeted opposition leaders and activists. Accusations point to Iranian involvement and remnants of the former regime.
Hopes for the End of an Era
Syria’s security apparatus is widely associated with repression due to 54 years of authoritarian rule under the former regime, marked by brutality and dominance of security forces. Minister Anas Khattab, who previously established the General Security Directorate in Idlib before the regime’s fall—and who has himself faced accusations of violations against civilians and activists—emphasizes in his public statements that the security era is over, echoing the hope of many Syrians.
While many Syrians report improved treatment from the new security forces, some violations still occur. The ministry has promised accountability.
In this context, the Interior Ministry has established a complaints office in Damascus for reporting misconduct by security personnel, with plans to expand it nationwide.
Although the Ministry of Defense issued a code of conduct to regulate military behavior, the Interior Ministry has yet to issue a similar framework—despite its personnel’s direct engagement with civilians.
Interior security personnel head toward a security operation in Rural Damascus – June 23, 2025 (Syrian Ministry of Interior)
Disparity in Ministry Performance… Obstacles AheadThe first 100 days of the Syrian government reveal a wide range of activity among ministries—while some have achieved notable organizational steps and issued key decisions, others remain unable to overcome their structural obstacles.
Despite official announcements and reformist rhetoric, the actual outcomes in several areas remain limited, raising serious questions about the government’s ability to turn these decisions into tangible improvements in Syrians’ lives in the coming phases.
Bassem Hatahet, an expert in governance and public administration and Director of the European Institute for Political Initiatives and Strategic Analysis, attributed the disparity in government performance to the failure to launch a genuine governance process for public institutions based on a unified vision—something that used to be handled by the State Planning Office.
Governance is the systematic effort to identify legal and administrative issues and review the rules and regulations governing the work of public administration. Dr. Bassem Hatahet Expert in Governance and Administration, Director of the European Institute for Political Initiatives and Strategic Analysis
Hatahet stressed that it is essential not to form technical and administrative committees before completing the governance process, in order to avoid repeating past mistakes and accumulating unresolved old and new issues.
He also pointed to the lack of capable leadership figures who can manage state programs as interconnected institutions. This, he argued, contributes to building a fragile institutional society that lacks the capacity for real development.
Key Obstacles Faced by the Syrian Government in the Past 100 Days:
Lack of a unified governmental vision: There is no clear central plan guiding the reform and governance process, leading to conflicting policies and overlapping authorities. Absence of institutional governance: Government bodies continue to operate with outdated systems and methods, without modernizing their internal regulations or evaluating performance against national goals—which themselves have yet to be properly defined. Premature formation of technical and administrative committees: Committees have been formed before clear legal and administrative frameworks were established, resulting in duplicated efforts, wasted time, and squandering of resources without achieving concrete results. Complex and overlapping legal/administrative systems: Antiquated and contradictory regulations impede effective and timely decision-making, while unclear responsibilities among entities hamper cooperation. Weak administrative leadership: There is a lack of qualified leaders with a reformist vision and executive skills—whether from the old guard, the current political leadership, or newly recruited staff who were hired before receiving proper training through even a temporary governance structure. Relying on unqualified individuals in decision-making roles perpetuates institutional underperformance. Institutional fragility: Current institutions are ill-equipped to withstand crises or adapt to change. Weak administrative and organizational infrastructure further hampers any modernization effort. Lack of sustainable solutions: Most proposed solutions are short-term or cosmetic, failing to address root problems. This occurs alongside the absence of a clear framework for long-term reform.Dr. Bassem Hatahet Expert in Governance and Administration, Director of the European Institute for Political Initiatives and Strategic Analysis
Official Visits
According to Dr. Hatahet, government ministries and agencies often repeat the same mistake: focusing on media coverage of field visits and meetings, without providing clear and detailed explanations for the purpose and objectives behind them.
He added that institutions usually publish photos of these meetings and joint projects without explaining the strategic frameworks driving them.
Hatahet emphasized that the significance of such meetings lies not in simply holding them, but in their integration into unified strategic programs that ensure coordination and cooperation between relevant parties. He noted that rather than media coverage alone, ministries should prepare analytical reports that provide real performance indicators and offer comprehensive insight into the meetings’ objectives, the details of joint programs, mechanisms for cooperation and implementation, expected outcomes, and anticipated impact.
In this way, the report becomes a tool for transparency, accountability, and performance evaluation, rather than merely presenting media images that do not reflect the depth of real work or serve the citizen or the administrative reform process, according to Hatahet.
100 Days of Government: Experts Highlight Individual Performance, Weak Governance Enab Baladi.
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